VZCZCXRO2610
RR RUEHAG RUEHAST RUEHDA RUEHDBU RUEHDF RUEHFL RUEHIK RUEHKW RUEHLA
RUEHLN RUEHLZ RUEHROV RUEHSR RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHBW #0019/01 0090622
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 090622Z JAN 07
FM AMEMBASSY BELGRADE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0034
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 BELGRADE 000019 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM SR
SUBJECT: DS-DSS COALITION MOST LIKELY AFTER SERBIAN 
ELECTIONS 
 
SUMMARY 
------- 
¶1.  (SBU) Although both DS and DSS officials deny that they 
have a pre-cooked deal to share power after elections, a 
coalition centered around the DS and DSS is the most likely 
outcome of 21 January elections. Prime Minister Kostunica 
has made clear his intention to retain his position in the 
next government, and the DS has not tried hard to counter 
the perception that the party is prepared to accept 
Kostunica as head of a DS-DSS government. G17 Plus (and 
possibly the Socialists) could further tip the scales in 
favor of Kostunica, with party leader Mladjan Dinkic 
rumored to have cut a deal with Kostunica. Although we 
cannot completely count them out, the Radicals reportedly 
see little chance that they can form the next government 
and may be saving resources for presidential, local, and 
Vojvodina elections later this year. Ceda Jovanovic's 
Liberal Democratic Party also is preparing to sit in 
opposition if its coalition passes threshold, but has not 
ruled out supporting a minority DS-DSS government if 
necessary to keep the Radicals out of power. In theory, a 
series of deadlines imposed by Serbia's election law and 
new constitution should lead to a new government being in 
place by mid-March, although this is by no means a sure 
thing. End Summary. 
 
DS CLOSING GAP ON RADICALS 
-------------------------- 
¶2.  (SBU) The latest tracking polls from IRI show eroding 
support for the Radical Party (SRS) and the Democratic 
Party (DS) within striking distance of becoming the biggest 
vote-getter in 21 January elections. The poll shows only 
four parties--the SRS, DS, Democratic Party of Serbia 
(DSS), and G17 Plus--definitively above the five-percent 
election threshold. It also shows the United Pensioners 
Party (PUPS) helping to put at risk the chances that the 
Socialist Party (SPS) has to cross the threshold. Here are 
the results of a survey conducted at the end of December: 
 
SRS    26 percent 
DS     24 
DSS    18 
G17     8 
LDP     5 
SPS     4 
PUPS    2 
SPO     2 
 
DS INTENTIONS REMAIN AMBIGUOUS 
------------------------------ 
¶3.  (SBU) Serbian President Boris Tadic and his Democratic 
Party (DS) continue to send mixed signals about their post- 
election goals and expectations. Tadic's close adviser 
Dragan Djilas recently stated publicly that the DS 
prioritizes taking over the economic, health, and education 
portfolios in the next government because these are the 
domains in which the DS can best fulfill its promise of 
securing a better life for Serbian citizens. Similarly, 
other members of Tadic's cabinet have expressed privately 
to Poloffs a willingness to accept a power sharing deal 
with the Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS) in which DSS 
leader Vojislav Kostunica remains prime minister, his party 
retains control of the Interior and Justice Ministries as 
well as the Security Information Agency, and the DS is 
given a deputy prime minister slot, all major economic 
portfolios, and the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and 
Defense. 
 
¶4.  (SBU) The DS's refusal so far to put forward their own 
prime minister candidate has reinforced the perception that 
the party is prepared to accept Kostunica as head of a DS- 
DSS government. On the other hand, in an interview with the 
Blic daily published on 2 January, Tadic asserted that the 
DS would surely win significantly more votes than the DSS 
and therefore would be entitled to appoint the next prime 
minister.  He and other senior DS leaders have said that 
the DS has at least five (unspecified) PM candidates, with 
most pundits mentioning ex-Finance Minister Bozidar Djelic, 
People's Office Director Dragan Djilas, ex-Minister Gordana 
Matkovic, Ambassador to the US Ivan Vujacic, and Tadic 
himself.  Tadic said in an interview that appeared on 1/7 
that he plans to run for re-election as President of Serbia 
later this year. 
 
DSS COUNTING ON LEADING THE NEXT GOVERNMENT 
------------------------------------------- 
¶5.  (SBU) DSS Executive Board President Jovan Palalic 
denied to Poloffs that the DSS has made a pre-cooked deal 
with the DS for a governing coalition headed by Kostunica. 
He noted, however, that the Radical Party (SRS) and Liberal 
Democratic Party (LDP) have already voluntarily opted out 
 
BELGRADE 00000019  002 OF 003 
 
 
of any potential coalition with the DSS -- the SRS due to 
party leader Vojislav Seselj's last will and testament that 
identified Kostunica and DS leader Boris Tadic as equal 
nemeses of the Radicals, and the LDP because of its 
willingness to accept the reality of an independent Kosovo. 
(Note: Kostunica in a recent interview with daily Vecernje 
Novosti stated that the DSS will determine its coalition 
partners first and foremost according to their stance on 
Kosovo, which suggests he would be less disinclined to 
cooperate with the SRS than with the LDP. Nevertheless, an 
official in Kostunica's closest inner circle categorically 
ruled out to us recently the possibility of DSS 
participating in a coalition with the SRS.  End note.) 
 
¶6.  (SBU) Palalic also confirmed that the DSS's firm goal 
in any governing coalition is for Kostunica to remain as 
prime minister and for the DSS and its main coalition 
partner New Serbia to retain their most important current 
ministry portfolios, including Interior, Justice, and 
Capital Investments. Given the inordinate weight that 
Kostunica continues to place on Kosovo during the campaign, 
it can also be assumed that the DSS intends to retain 
control over the government's Coordination Center for 
Kosovo. 
 
G17 PLUS COULD DECIDE WHO HEADS THE NEXT GOVERNMENT 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
¶7.  (SBU) G17 Plus deputy leader Ivana Dulic-Markovic 
(protect) told Poloffs that party chairman Mladjan Dinkic 
almost certainly would refuse to join or support a 
governing coalition unless he was reappointed Finance 
Minister or offered a powerful Deputy Prime Minister 
position. She dismissed the possibility that Dinkic would 
settle for his old job as central bank governor as a 
consolation prize in any potential government formation. 
Dulic-Markovic also said she strongly suspected that Dinkic 
had already cut a secret deal with Kostunica guaranteeing 
Dinkic one of these plum portfolios in exchange for G17 
Plus's support for Kostunica as head of the next 
government, though she hastened to add that Dinkic would 
never confirm this information with her because he knows 
that she cannot stand Kostunica. Dulic-Markovic herself 
does not intend to participate in the next government, 
preferring instead to focus her attention on preparing G17 
Plus for local elections in Novi Sad and Vojvodina's 
provincial elections. 
 
RADICALS FOCUSING ON ELECTIONS LATER IN THE YEAR 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
¶8.  (SBU) The Radicals continue to conduct a relatively 
subdued campaign, apparently after soberly assessing that 
they have little chance of forming a governing coalition 
after elections. Post sources say that the SRS's top 
officials expect the Socialist Party (SPS), their most 
viable potential coalition partner, to struggle to pass the 
election threshold and, even if they do, to continue to 
gravitate toward the DSS away from the Radicals, 
particularly after Ivica Dacic's victory as new SPS 
chairman at last month's party congress. At the same time, 
even before SRS leader Vojislav Seselj's last will and 
testament, these same SRS officials reportedly had written 
off any chance of enticing the DSS to form a coalition with 
them. 
 
¶9.  (SBU) As a result, SRS acting leader Tomislav Nikolic 
reportedly has decided to marshal the party's resources for 
presidential, local, and Vojvodina elections due later in 
the year. Nikolic appears to be counting on capitalizing on 
a negative decision on Kosovo by the spring and ensuing 
tensions within the DS-DSS government to defeat Tadic in 
presidential elections. Perhaps an even bigger prize that 
the SRS is eyeing is control of Belgrade, which SRS 
Secretary General Aleksandar Vucic fell 7,000 votes short 
 
SIPDIS 
of claiming in the 2004 mayoral race against DS Vice 
President Nenad Bogdanovic. Bogdanovic reportedly now is 
suffering from cancer, which raises uncertainty about his 
ability to run an effective campaign or for the DS to 
produce another viable candidate to defeat Vucic. Winning 
Belgrade would provide the SRS an almost limitless revenue 
stream, in the form of kickbacks and bribes that the party 
is reportedly carrying out on a smaller scale in Novi Sad, 
Serbia's second biggest city, and its best opportunity yet 
to sanitize its image and escape its pariah status at the 
republic level. 
 
LDP ANGLING TO SERVE IN OPPOSITION 
---------------------------------- 
¶10.  (SBU) Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) leader Ceda 
Jovanovic told Poloff that the LDP-led coalition, which 
also includes the Civic Alliance (GSS), the League of 
Social Democrats of Vojvodina, and the Social Democratic 
 
BELGRADE 00000019  003 OF 003 
 
 
Union, has no intention of joining a governing coalition 
that includes the DSS.  He said that his goal is for the 
coalition to win 10 percent of the vote on 21 January and 
then serve as a forceful but constructive opposition. This 
role would mean supporting a DS-DSS government on 
legislation that moves Serbia in a pro-Western, reformist, 
and civic direction and sharply criticizing and obstructing 
the government when it pursues more nationalist and 
populist policies. Jovanovic's public statements in which 
he has ruled out joining a government that includes 
Kostunica, Dinkic, or Velimir Ilic underscores his 
preference to serve in opposition, since a government with 
none of this trio is virtually inconceivable. 
 
¶11.  (SBU) GSS Vice President and one of the LDP 
coalition's two deputy campaign managers Ivan Andric joked 
to Poloffs that the coalition's leaders already have plans 
to go into hiding to preempt any potential pressure by the 
US or European countries for them to join a DS-DSS 
government. He indicated that the coalition's leaders 
already have a strategy that would enable them to go into 
opposition but avoid helping the SRS ascend to power, if 
necessary by supporting a minority DS-DSS government. LDP 
Presidency member Dejan Randjic said that the LDP 
coalition's guiding principle in such a role would be to 
stiffen the DS's spine and "force the DS to be the DS." 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
¶12.  (SBU) Coalition wrangling will be fierce regardless of 
the election results, and the outcome of these negotiations 
will depend on two main factors: how well the DS does 
relative to the Radicals and the DSS and how many of 
Serbia's smaller parties surpass the five-percent 
threshold. For instance, the DS will have greater leverage 
to dictate the terms of the ruling coalition, and Tadic 
will face greater internal pressure to demand the 
appointment of a DS official as prime minister, if the 
party outpaces the DSS.  Unless DSS's results are miserable 
(and polling strongly indicates they will not be), we 
expect the DSS to strongly demand that Kostunica retain the 
PM job. 
 
¶13.  (SBU) On the other hand, with the LDP coalition's 
plans to voluntarily consign itself to the opposition and 
the SPS facing continuing marginalization and possibly 
exclusion from parliament, G17 Plus could also emerge as 
kingmaker of Serbia's next government. Although G17's rank- 
and-file are more personally and ideologically inclined 
toward the DS, a pre-electoral "deal" between party leader 
Mladjan Dinkic and Kostunica could help tip the scales in 
favor of the prime minister keeping his post and the DSS 
gaining far greater weight in the government than its 
popularity could command on its own. Kostunica could also 
seek out Socialist support to strengthen his hand, if the 
SPS crosses the threshold. 
 
¶14.  (SBU) In any event, the new constitution places time 
constraints on the parties to form a governing coalition, 
dictating that the parliament convene its first session 
within 30 days of the certification of the election results 
and that it elect the new government sometime during this 
session. Since the Republican Election Commission is likely 
to certify election results by early February, and this 
first parliamentary session is likely to last a number of 
days, it is theoretically possible for Serbia to have a new 
government in place by mid-March. That said, the Kosovo 
status process, combined with inter-party squabbling, could 
conceivably delay this timetable. 
 
MOORE