Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 64621 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 07AITTAIPEI59, MEDIA REACTION: U.S.-TAIWAN RELATIONS

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #07AITTAIPEI59.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07AITTAIPEI59 2007-01-09 09:23 2011-08-23 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
VZCZCXYZ0003
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHIN #0059/01 0090923
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 090923Z JAN 07
FM AIT TAIPEI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3662
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 6168
RUEHHK/AMCONSUL HONG KONG 7399
UNCLAS AIT TAIPEI 000059 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR INR/R/MR, EAP/TC, EAP/PA, EAP/PD - DAVID FIRESTEIN 
DEPARTMENT PASS AIT/WASHINGTON 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: OPRC KMDR KPAO TW
SUBJECT: MEDIA REACTION: U.S.-TAIWAN RELATIONS 
 
 
Summary:  As the insolvency crisis involving The Chinese Bank stayed 
in the Taiwan media's spotlight, news coverage on January 9 also 
focused on President Chen Shui-bian's transit of San Francisco and 
on the personnel reshuffle currently going on in the KMT.  In terms 
of editorials and commentaries, an editorial in the pro-unification 
"United Daily News" looked at President Chen's transits of the 
United States as the result of a 'short-term trading' style in 
U.S.-Taiwan interaction.  The article said Washington's Pavlov-style 
means of conditioned stimuli toward Chen is a great insult for Chen 
and for Taiwan.  An editorial in the limited-circulation, 
conservative, pro-unification, English-language "China Post," on the 
other hand, discussed the three links across the Taiwan Strait and 
the possibility for Taiwan to sign a free-trade agreement with the 
United States.  The article urged President Chen to open the three 
links as his first and last chance to leave a legacy. End summary. 
 
A) "Conditioned Relations between the United States and Chen 
Shui-bian" 
 
The pro-unification "United Daily News" [circulation: 400,000] 
editorialized (1/9): 
 
"Chen Shui-bian set out for an overseas visit yesterday, and he has 
resumed the level of treatment of [being able to] 'transit the 
continental United States,' a move of special significance indeed. 
As it stands now, one can say that Chen has already got out of the 
trough in terms of his situations inside and outside Taiwan; an 
opportunity has appeared for him to rearm and to prepare for a 
comeback.  For Chen, the current situation he is facing within and 
outside Taiwan is:  First, [results of] the Taipei and Kaohsiung 
mayoral elections have put the DPP on a more stable footing; second, 
[Chen's remarks that] '[he] will not step down unless [his wife] is 
found guilty in an initial trial' and his dilatory tactics at the 
court hearings have alleviated the pressure caused by the scandals 
of the Presidential Office and the First Family; third, the 
[government decision] to allow [Taiwan semiconductor manufacturers] 
to move 0.18-micron manufacturing technology to China, and the 
upcoming moves to allow the Renminbi be exchanged in Taiwan and 
allow mainland Chinese tourists to visit the island have all helped 
to ease tensions cross the Taiwan Strait; fourth, the United States' 
conditional decision to resume [Chen's] treatment to 'transit the 
continental U.S.' is akin to endorsing Chen's political struggle. 
... 
 
"A lasting tacit agreement built on solid mutual trust is obviously 
missing from the interaction between Washington and Chen, which has 
turned into a 'case by case' and 'retail' behavior.  One 'case' that 
people can hardly bear to look back on took place last May when 
Washington, due to its deteriorating ties with Taiwan as a result of 
[Chen's decision to] 'cease the functions of the National 
Unification Council,' ordered Chen to transit Alaska in a 
humiliating manner, while Chen, angered as a result of 
embarrassment, staged an 'odyssey' in return. 
 
"This time, Chen knocked on the U.S. door again.  Rumors had it at 
first that Washington wanted to 'review' Chen's New Year Day's 
address in advance, but it turned out that there was no wording 
regarding a 'campaign for Taiwan's new constitution' in his address. 
 As it followed, the United States, while announcing that it agreed 
to Chen's transit request, has unprecedentedly said [such a 
decision] 'accords with the United States' one China policy.' 
Afterwards, Chen said in a roundabout way when receiving foreign 
guests that he supports 'the foundation of a consensus reached 
during the [cross-Strait] talks in Hong Kong in 1992,' a move that 
seemed to have made a revision to his 'anti-China' remarks in the 
New Year Day's address, as the '1992 Consensus' is precisely 'one 
China, with both sides free to interpret what that means.'  Or even 
Chen's recent endorsement of [Premier] 'Su's revisionist line,' as 
one recalls now, seemed to be a kind of political leverage he used 
to pave for the way to [be able to] 'transit in the continental 
United States.' ...   Given all these moves above, the haggling 
between the Taiwan and U.S. authorities over '[Chen's] transit of 
the continental U.S.' this time have thus constituted yet another 
'case.' 
 
"Evidently, the interaction between Taiwan and the United States has 
turned out to be a 'short-term trading' style of operation.  When 
Chen deviated from the normal track last May, the United States 
punished him for that; when he appears to be tamed as now, 
Washington awards him.  This is the United States' way of [using] 
'Pavlov's means of conditioned [stimulus-response],' but it is a 
great insult for Chen and for Taiwan. ...  After Chen returns from 
his trip, he should drop the 'short-term trading' style of 
operation, which will only sabotage mutual trust between Taiwan and 
the United States.  He should re-establish credibility in 
U.S.-Taiwan relations and develop a lasting and strong tacit 
agreement between the two.  In addition, he should, without a doubt, 
get rid of the always-changing 'short-term trading' style of 
manipulation when it comes to making other major domestic and 
 
foreign political and economic policies.  Only by doing so can 
Taiwan embrace a great and lasting future." 
 
B) "San Tong a Chen legacy?" 
 
The conservative, pro-unification, English-language "China Post" 
[circulation: 30,000] editorialized (1/9): 
 
"Taiwan's most important ally, the United States, has refused to 
negotiate a free trade agreement (FTA) with the island in an 
apparent rejection of Taipei's repeated China-provoking policies 
that threaten to jeopardize U.S. geopolitical, military and economic 
interests.  Frequent policy surprises of independence-leaning 
President Chen Shui-bian have diverted U.S. focus from crises in 
Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan and North Korea. 
 
"Washington thus has also been forced to plead with Beijing not to 
raise tensions in the Taiwan Strait as the U.S. tries to abort those 
provocations.  President Bush has been 'Taiwan's guardian angel.' 
But Chen has angered him with many surprises.  Last May, Washington 
sent a ranking official to openly voice U.S. displeasure with the 
Chen administration's mainland policy.  But the U.S. warnings were 
overshadowed by sensational stories of corruption scandals involving 
the president, his wife, in-laws and close aides.  Few heard them. 
 
"Deputy Trade Representative Karan K. Bhatia, the highest U.S. 
official to visit Taipei in six years, came to formerly turn down 
President Chen's appeal for an FTA.  'Washington has a very full 
trade agenda until 2007, making new FTA discussion (with Taiwan) 
impossible,' Bhatia told Chen. ...  Bhatia also bluntly warned 
against Chen's China-phobic economic policy, saying restrictions 
towards the mainland -- such as the ban on direct air and sea 
transport links (the three-links or san tong) -- 'create uncertainty 
as well as a distinctive competitive disadvantage for Taiwan.' 
 
"Stephen Young, director of the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT), 
offered similar advice last month.  'We encourage Taiwan to 
negotiate with China to open the three links as soon as possible,' 
Young said in an address to the American Chamber of Commerce here. 
'The longer Taiwan waits to open the three links, the greater risk 
it faces of placing itself outside of regional integration trends.' 
Year 2007 is the last year for Chen to achieve anything.  'San tong' 
is his first and last chance to leave a legacy." 
 
YOUNG