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Viewing cable 06TOKYO7098, DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 12/21/06

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06TOKYO7098 2006-12-21 08:26 2011-08-26 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Tokyo
VZCZCXRO0867
PP RUEHFK RUEHKSO RUEHNAG RUEHNH
DE RUEHKO #7098/01 3550826
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 210826Z DEC 06
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9306
INFO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAWJA/USDOJ WASHDC PRIORITY
RULSDMK/USDOT WASHDC PRIORITY
RUCPDOC/USDOC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC//J5//
RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RHHMHBA/COMPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI
RHMFIUU/HQ PACAF HICKAM AFB HI//CC/PA//
RHMFIUU/COMUSJAPAN YOKOTA AB JA//J5/JO21//
RUYNAAC/COMNAVFORJAPAN YOKOSUKA JA
RUAYJAA/COMPATWING ONE KAMI SEYA JA
RUEHNH/AMCONSUL NAHA 1750
RUEHFK/AMCONSUL FUKUOKA 9267
RUEHOK/AMCONSUL OSAKA KOBE 2705
RUEHNAG/AMCONSUL NAGOYA 8789
RUEHKSO/AMCONSUL SAPPORO 0291
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 5268
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 1360
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 2821
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 10 TOKYO 007098 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR E, P, EB, EAP/J, EAP/P, EAP/PD, PA 
WHITE HOUSE/NSC/NEC; JUSTICE FOR STU CHEMTOB IN ANTI-TRUST DIVISION; 
TREASURY/OASIA/IMI/JAPAN; DEPT PASS USTR/PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE; 
SECDEF FOR JCS-J-5/JAPAN, 
DASD/ISA/EAPR/JAPAN; DEPT PASS ELECTRONICALLY TO USDA 
FAS/ITP FOR SCHROETER; PACOM HONOLULU FOR PUBLIC DIPLOMACY ADVISOR; 
CINCPAC FLT/PA/ COMNAVFORJAPAN/PA. 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: OIIP KMDR KPAO PGOV PINR ECON ELAB JA
SUBJECT:  DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 12/21/06 
 
 
INDEX: 
(1) Reform put in shade in Abe budget: Traditional negotiation 
method revived 
 
(2) Defense Agency's upgrading to ministry (Part 2): SDF tasked with 
expanded overseas missions 
 
(3) Interview with Atsushi Kusano, political scientist on the 
question of television's influence on politics; Viewers must realize 
how great an influence TV has on public opinion 
 
(4) New financial services by privatized postal companies to begin 
in three steps: Privatization panel's policy; Offering personal 
loans to be approved before they are listed 
 
(5) Precondition for pension reform plan crumbling with projected 
birthrate revised 
 
(6) LDP to submit bill to next regular Diet session proposing 
lifting ban on distribution of handouts in election campaigning for 
local government heads 
 
(7) Why doesn't child population increase in Japan? Birthrate likely 
to stay at 1.26 even in 2055 
 
ARTICLES: 
(1) Reform put in shade in Abe budget: Traditional negotiation 
method revived 
 
ASAHI (Page 2) (Excerpts) 
December 21, 2006 
 
The draft budget for fiscal 2007, the first compiled under the 
administration of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, was unveiled yesterday. 
In the draft, fiscal deficits were reduced in single fiscal year 
terms, but policy-related outlays were boosted for the first time in 
three years with an eye on the Upper House election next summer. The 
government was able to catch two birds with one stone thanks to a 
tax revenue increases that were more than anticipated, due to 
thriving corporate performances. However, there have been only few 
occasions in which the prime minister displayed his leadership, as 
he gave only vague orders. Instead, bureaucrats and the ruling camp 
were visibly exercising their restored power. Compared with the 
compilation of the first budget compiled by former Prime Minister 
Koizumi, who drastically axed expenditures despite a fierce 
backlash, any reform initiative was apparently put into the 
background in the Abe budget. 
 
Finance Minister Omi on Dec. 20 told a press conference, "There was 
concern over a possible backtracking on reform, but we were able to 
carry through with a fiscal reform policy." However, he, as a member 
of a commerce and industry policy clique in the Diet, was in fact 
able to solidly increase expenses for science and technology 
promotion, his own bailiwick, and a budget for measures for mid- to 
small businesses. 
 
Budgetary negotiations with the ruling parties and government 
agencies went smoothly. An estimated increase in tax revenues worth 
7.6 trillion yen served as lubricant. Coordination of views 
regarding constraining social expenses by 220 billion yen and 
cutting public projects and official development assistance (ODA) 
were thorny issues, but it was not difficult to adopt these 
policies, since the Koizumi administration already incorporated 
 
TOKYO 00007098  002 OF 010 
 
 
these issues in the basic policy guidelines on economic and fiscal 
management and structural reforms for the fiscal 2006 national 
budget. Prime Minister Abe just faithfully observed the set 
guidelines. 
 
Taking advantage of the prime minister giving no new orders, central 
government agencies revived the traditional method of adopting a 
cross between A and B. Some even tried to water down the basic 
policy guidelines. 
 
Winding up the last budgetary negotiations with Omi, Education, 
Culture, Sports, Science and Technology Ibuki looked satisfied. That 
is because he made a successful deal of receiving subsidies for 
private schools equivalent to a 1 PERCENT  cut in subsidies to 
private universities as set in the basic policy guidelines from an 
increased portion of the science and technology promotion budget. 
 
Explaining changes occurred to the policy-making process since Abe 
came into office, a senior Finance Ministry official said, "Though 
the public may not like the way we settled our budgetary requests, 
it is democratic for Kasumigaseki (Japan's bureaucratic center). 
 
Growing party pressure, bureaucratic pressure 
 
The Finance Ministry unveiled the draft budget at a joint ruling 
party meeting on the morning of Dec. 20. The meeting ended in less 
than an hour with no opposition raised. 
 
One senior LDP official proudly said, "Almost all proposals the 
ruling parties made have been adopted." A mid-ranking lawmaker 
revealed that calls on the Abe administration to compile a budget in 
a manner that was clearly different from that of Koizumi were strong 
in the LDP, which was suppressed as forces of resistance under the 
Koizumi administration. The way the budget was compiled this year 
was completely different from last year, as can be seen in the issue 
of revising the special-purpose road construction revenues -- 
construction of roads that are really necessary was allowed. 
 
Behind the reinstatement of the ruling parties was the fact that Abe 
only gave orders that were in line with the arrangements made by 
bureaucrats in the budget compilation process. 
 
Koizumi directed the budget compilation work, setting a target for 
new government bond issuances at around 30 trillion yen at an 
informal cabinet meeting on Nov. 15 last year. In contrast, it was 
not until the general framework of the budget was set on Dec. 11 
that Abe referred to a specific margin of a cut in government bond 
issuances. However, he did not indicate any specific figure, just 
mentioning that the envisaged cut would be the largest to date. 
 
Though the prime minister had insisted on additional appropriations 
for allowances for babies and infants, he gave only a vague order, 
making his aides worry. The Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare 
(MHLW) at one time decided to give up on an increase in child 
allowances for the next fiscal year due to a funding shortfall. 
Surprised at the move, MHLW Minister Yanagisawa ordered 
working-level officials to include the proposal since the prime 
minister approved it when he was chief cabinet secretary. In the 
end, the MHLW secured a special fund for it for the next fiscal year 
only. 
 
The New Komeito availed itself of the prime minister's vague stance. 
Regarding an increase in allowances for babies and infants, 
 
TOKYO 00007098  003 OF 010 
 
 
Secretary General Kazuo Kitagawa Party rushed to the Kantei and 
 
SIPDIS 
urged the prime minister to comply with the proposal. He thus played 
a role of a person who has greatly contributed for the realization 
of the increase in such allowances. 
 
The plenary session of New Komeito lawmakers of both Diet chambers 
held on Dec. 19 exploded in exultation with the remark by Shozo 
Kusakawa, chairman of the New Komeito caucus in the House of 
Councilor: "Chiefs of the secretariats of many government agencies 
are well aware how much the New Komeito's opinions have been 
included in the fiscal 2007 budget. Budget Bureau officials of the 
Finance Ministry all said that we have gained power." 
 
While the Kantei remains static, pressure from the ruling parties 
and bureaucracy appears to be increasingly mounting. 
 
(2) Defense Agency's upgrading to ministry (Part 2): SDF tasked with 
expanded overseas missions 
 
YOMIURI (Page 4) (Full) 
December 17, 2006 
 
Early this month, former Joint Staff Council Chairman Adm. Tohru 
Ishikawa was watching the TV news reporting Diet deliberations on a 
package of legislative measures to upgrade the Defense Agency to the 
status of a ministry. At the time, Ishikawa recalled the Maritime 
Self-Defense Force's dispatch of minesweepers to the Persian Gulf on 
a seaborne demining mission in 1991. 
 
"If we did it straight, we couldn't get the Diet's understanding," 
Ishikawa said. "We had to find out where the political hurdle was 
low," he added. 
 
In the Diet, the opposition bench opposed the SDF's first overseas 
dispatch. In the ruling camp as well, there were negative and 
cautious arguments. At that point, Ishikawa exploited a provision of 
the Self-Defense Forces Law. It was "removing mines, etc.," a clause 
of Article 99 in Chapter 8 for "miscellaneous provisions." This law 
provision of minesweeping was the grounds for the MSDF dispatch. 
 
The provision was initially intended for MSDF activities to be 
conducted in waters near Japan. However, it does not prohibit 
activities in the Middle East, which is far off from Japan. The MSDF 
dispatch to the Persian Gulf was almost like walking a tightrope 
with a down-to-the-wire way of reading the law. 
 
Fifteen years later, the SDF is now working abroad on its missions, 
including its one-time dispatch to Cambodia and its current dispatch 
to the Golan Heights for United Nations peacekeeping operations. And 
now, the SDF is in Iraq to engage in humanitarian and reconstruction 
assistance-the most dangerous and difficult mission the SDF has ever 
been on. 
 
The SDF has steadily obtained actual results overseas. This fact is 
a valuable card for Japan on the diplomatic front. 
 
Ishikawa is honest with himself: "Japan should be prepared to shed 
blood and sweat, and Japan will have to work for stability in the 
world in order to survive in the international community. We must 
make the United States think of Japan as an indispensable country 
that the United States should help. Otherwise, our alliance with the 
United States will collapse." 
 
 
TOKYO 00007098  004 OF 010 
 
 
The SDF has been tasked with overseas missions, such as 
international peace cooperation activities, overseas evacuation 
operations for Japanese nationals, and seaborne demining activities. 
Under the SDF law revised this time, these overseas activities, 
which used to be ancillary tasks, are now raised to the SDF's 
inherent and primary tasks. It is only natural to do so when viewed 
from what the SDF does on these missions, and it was too late to do 
so, one says. 
 
Ground Self-Defense Force Recruiting Division Director Col. Junji 
Suzuki, who commanded the 6th Iraq Reconstruction Support Group, 
gave a directive to about 500 GSDF members before their dispatch to 
Iraq in April last year. 
 
Suzuki told the Iraq-bound detachment of GSDF troops: "The primary 
purpose of our mission there is to help the Iraqi people. However, 
it's also important to build a relationship of mutual trust with the 
armed forces of the United States and other countries. That will 
lead to their extending a helping hand to Japan if and when 
something happened to Japan." 
 
All SDF personnel are sworn in. They must sign a written oath upon 
their entry into service, vowing to endeavor to carry out their 
duties at the risk of their lives and meet public mandate. 
 
SDF members express their preparedness to give their lives to Japan 
in the event of emergencies. This, however, is intended to protect 
Japan's peace and independence. Suzuki's directive was aimed at 
reminding those GSDF members of the purpose of their activities in 
Iraq before leaving for that country. 
 
In connection with tasking the SDF with international peace 
cooperation as one of its inherent missions, Defense Agency Director 
General Kyuma, in his Diet reply, reiterated the necessity of 
creating a fact-finding team ready to go at once and a training unit 
based on the experience and knowledge of overseas activities. 
 
What Kyuma had in mind was the Central Readiness Command (CRC), 
which will be launched in late March next year. The CRC will be 
headquartered at the GSDF's Nerima garrison in Tokyo and manned with 
about 3,300 troops. The CRC's International Activities Training 
Squadron-detached to the GSDF's Komakado garrison in Shizuoka 
Prefecture with about 80 personnel-is to be mainly made up of GSDF 
returnees from the Iraq mission. The training squadron will give 
experience-based lectures and other training sessions to GSDF 
members deployed across the nation. In late March 2008, the GSDF 
will form the Central Readiness Regiment (CRR) at its Utsunomiya 
garrison in Tochigi Prefecture with about 700 troops. The CRR is to 
be tasked with sending advance teams overseas for PKOs and other 
international peace cooperation activities. 
 
There are also problems, however. The SDF, in its overseas 
activities, embarks on various missions in foreign lands with 
different climates and customs. When GSDF troops were deployed in 
Iraq for humanitarian and reconstruction assistance, there was much 
demand for electric power and water supply. However, the GSDF was 
not outfitted enough to meet that local demand. The GSDF purchased 
tropical combat suits and dust-tight goggles for severe heat and 
sandstorms in Iraq. It was also after the government decided on its 
SDF dispatch to Iraq. 
 
"If we are supposed to be sent to countries mainly in Asia, for 
example, it's easy to prepare," a GSDF staff officer said. "But," 
 
TOKYO 00007098  005 OF 010 
 
 
the officer added, "there's still no basic principle for now, so 
we'll have to make preparations as far as we can under our limited 
budget." So saying, this officer was already worried about how to 
become ready. 
 
(3) Interview with Atsushi Kusano, political scientist on the 
question of television's influence on politics; Viewers must realize 
how great an influence TV has on public opinion 
 
TOKYO SHIMBUN (Page 6) (Slightly abridged) 
December 19, 2006 
 
Interviewer: Yoichi Toyoda, correspondent 
 
Toyoda: Former Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi established the 
pattern of answering questions by reporters before TV cameras every 
day. Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has taken over this system. How far 
do you think the transmission of such information shapes public 
opinion? 
 
Kusano: It has considerable influence. With the appearance of 
politicians like Koizumi who are capable of taking advantage of the 
media, television in particular, relations between television and 
politicians are repeatedly before the public. After the inauguration 
of the Abe cabinet, TV has continued playing that role. Koizumi was 
exceptional, anyway. It is said that the media created the high 
approval rating for the Koizumi cabinet, but although that is a 
necessary condition, it is not a sufficient explanation. One 
commentator who was critical of the Koizumi reform drive said that 
Koizumi was a great actor. He was an actor, who took advantage of 
the media. 
 
Toyoda: What were his unique points? 
 
Kusano: He was a genius in being able to explain himself with his 
own words using short phrases and within a limited amount of time. 
When he handed the champion cup to grand sumo champion Takanohana in 
the summer tournament in May 2001, he told him, "You did your best 
while bearing the pain of your injury. I was moved by your efforts." 
There were few politicians who spoke so intuitively. 
 
Toyoda: Do you think Abe can't hold a candle to Koizumi? 
 
Kusano: Abe looks nicer than his predecessors and he speaks clearly. 
But he is not interesting since he is too serious. He is not an 
attractive politician. A TV staff member told me that whenever Mr. 
Abe appears on TV programs, audience rates drop. He is not a person 
who has been received favorably by the media. In that sense, he is 
inferior to his predecessor, who knew the essence of the media and 
attracted viewers. 
 
Toyoda: Looking back on my own political reporting, newspapers 
cannot ignore politicians' remarks on TV talk shows, ever since the 
formation of the so-called YKK (trio made up of Taku Yamasaki, 
Koichi Kato and Koizumi). After that, Koizumi began to take 
advantage of the TV media. While serving as prime minister, he 
responded to questions from reporters twice a day. He allowed TV 
cameras to cover one of the two daily press conferences. What impact 
did that have on support rates of the Koizumi cabinet? 
 
Kusano: Imprinted in the public's mind was the image of their leader 
always in contact with them in a friendly manner. He also made 
negative remarks from an international point of view. Such remarks 
 
TOKYO 00007098  006 OF 010 
 
 
worked well domestically, instead, indicating Mr. Koizumi's common 
touch. The so-called "Team Abe (aides and advisors to Abe)" has 
reduced contacts between Abe and reporters. They have agreed that it 
is not good for Abe to appear often on TV. He should have given an 
account of the readmission of postal rebels to the Liberal 
Democratic Party (LDP) because the public wanted to hear his voice. 
 
Toyoda: Are there possibilities for television to manipulate public 
opinion by fabrications? 
 
Kusano: It is impossible to fabricate live programs, but it is 
possible to fabricate recorded programs by editing them to come out 
with a completely reverse message. Viewers therefore should be aware 
of such trickery and create their own "media literacy." 
 
Toyoda: Isn't there the possibility of politics on TV being unable 
to come up with the necessary policies if it simply accommodates the 
wishes of the public? 
 
Kusano: It is true that television has been inadequate when it comes 
to policy debate. Although broadcasting companies have devised ways 
of doing so, they have not necessarily been successful. When the 
time is up, the program will end. A program cannot be aired without 
footage. There are few policy debate programs with footage that can 
be concluded within a given time period. The pension issue is 
typical. On TV programs, such side issues as pension premium 
non-payments are often taken up for discussion, but there are no 
explanations on the basic pension issue. It is also a problem that 
once a program is aired, we cannot watch it again. 
 
Toyoda: What are effects and problems of the Internet? 
 
Kusano: According to a survey on how much time each day people spend 
surfing the Internet, watching TV and reading newspapers, the number 
of people relying on the Internet has steadily increased. I think 
Internet's influence over politics will surely grow. However, the 
problem of the Internet is that people can write in their views to 
blogs on an anonymous basis. If this problem is resolved, the Web 
site is a good place to exchange views. I wonder how many people 
have developed Internet etiquette. It is difficult to convey the 
nuance of one's view in a short sentence. Since the Internet is a 
part of the media that has its limits, it is problem to totally rely 
on it. 
 
Atsushi Kusano was born in 1947 in Tokyo. He graduated from the law 
faculty of Keio University in 1971 and completed his Ph.D. at the 
University of Tokyo in 1982. He has been professor at Keio 
University since 1992, after serving as a visiting professor at 
Princeton University. His published books include, "Can TV change 
politics?" 
 
(4) New financial services by privatized postal companies to begin 
in three steps: Privatization panel's policy; Offering personal 
loans to be approved before they are listed 
 
NIHON KEIZAI (Page 1) (Full) 
Evening, December 21, 2006 
 
The government's Postal Services Privatization Committee, tasked 
with monitoring the postal privatization process, yesterday decided 
to approve new postal services to be extended by the privatized 
postal services companies in three steps - first shortly after 
privatization, then before they are listed, and finally after they 
 
TOKYO 00007098  007 OF 010 
 
 
are listed. The plan is to allow the privatized companies to manage 
their funds in wider areas, starting shortly after privatization 
next October, and to provide financial services, such as mortgages, 
to individual customers, before they are listed, a process that will 
take place in fiscal 2011. Offering loans to companies will not be 
allowed until they are listed. Following the proposals, Japan Post 
will get down to drafting specific business programs. 
 
The financial services industry will likely heighten their criticism 
of the giant privatized companies diversifying their operations, 
saying that they are squeezing the operations of private companies. 
 
The privatization panel will discuss these issues at a meeting to be 
held this afternoon. It will then release its view of survey results 
and deliberations on new services to be provided by the privatized 
companies. Though its view is not to be used to determine the 
propriety of new services that postal savings bank and Kampo life 
Insurance wish to offer, once these businesses are launched after 
privatization, the panel will indicate the priority order. 
 
Regarding the timing for allowing the privatized companies into new 
business areas, whether approval should be given before or after 
they are listed will be determined, based on the notion of whether 
the discipline of the stock market will work or not. Loan 
transactions with companies will not be allowed before the listing, 
because there is concern that the wishes of the government, 
essentially a major stockholder of the privatized companies, could 
be reflected in their actions, distorting market competition. 
 
In the meantime, the privatized companies before they are listed 
will be allowed to deal with commodities whose interest rates are 
determined by market competition. The panel appears to have such 
commodities as mortgages, credit cards and foreign currency savings. 
The view will include the panel's stance of further strengthening 
the forte of postal services in order to encourage the privatized 
companies to provide financial services to individual customers. At 
present, postal funds are allowed to be invested in government 
bonds, etc. Approval to invest such funds in stocks and the like 
will likely come shortly after privatization. 
 
(5) Precondition for pension reform plan crumbling with projected 
birthrate revised 
 
TOKYO SHIMBUN (Page 2) (Full) 
December 21, 2006 
 
In a report on projected future population released yesterday by the 
National Institute of Population and Social Security Research, the 
future birthrate was lowered by about 10 percent from 1.39 to 1.26. 
This means that a precondition for the 2004 pension reform plan has 
completely crumbled. The Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare 
(MHLW) intends to announce the provisional estimates of financial 
resources to fund the pension programs late January of next year, 
but a ministry official said, "Considerably severe projections are 
likely to come out," in terms of the level of benefits and other 
conditions." 
 
The pension reform program in 2004 included these two key measures: 
(1) The insurance premium for the employees' pension should be 
raised to 18.30 percent of monthly income and the national pension 
premium to 16,900 yen by FY2005 and fix the rates afterward; and (2) 
the monthly payment of the employees' pension benefit should be 
secured at 50 percent of the average monthly net wage for the 
 
TOKYO 00007098  008 OF 010 
 
 
standard model (of a husband who worked for more than 40 years and a 
full-time homemaker wife) in 2011 and after. 
 
The MHLW plans to issue a re-estimation report early next year. In 
it, the ministry intends to leave the current maximum premium rate 
unchanged but recalculate the impact on the monthly payment of 
benefit. The ministry will assume various cases, focusing on future 
rises in wages and commodity prices, and changes in yields on the 
pension funds. It then will release the results of its study 
afterward. 
 
Liberal Democratic Party Policy Research Council Chairman Shoichi 
Nakagawa told reporters at party headquarters yesterday: "The basic 
systemic design presented to the public by the government and the 
ruling coalition will remain unchanged." The government trumpeted 
(in 2004) that "pension payments will be secured for 100 years under 
the reformed system," but the monthly payment of benefit could fall 
below the 50 percent line. 
 
In actuality, the pension reform in 2004 projects that if the 
birthrate stays at 1.10, the monthly benefit payment would plummet 
to 46.4 percent. With the revision of future population downward, 
the situation moved one step closer to this pessimistic scenario. 
 
Prime Minister Abe told reporters yesterday, "This is certainly a 
severe figure, but various factors, such as economic growth, will be 
reflected in determining the amount of pension payments. The pension 
system will not collapse." MHLW Minister Hakuo Yanagisawa also said, 
"We would like to make utmost efforts so that the government will be 
able to respond to young couples' desires to have children. 
 
The government has decided to reform the pension programs every five 
years in principle. The public hates to see the pension premium 
raised and the payment of benefit lowered each time. The government 
is urged to present a clear-cut design to ensure the "100-year 
security" slogan at an early date. 
 
(6) LDP to submit bill to next regular Diet session proposing 
lifting ban on distribution of handouts in election campaigning for 
local government heads 
 
TOKYO SHIMBUN (Page 2) (Full) 
December 21, 2006 
 
The Liberal Democratic Party's Research Commission on the Election 
System yesterday outlined a bill amending the Public Offices 
Election Law to enable a manifesto (policy platform), which includes 
numerical targets or fiscal resources, to be distributed in election 
campaigning for the heads of local governments. After Chairman Kunio 
Hatoyama determines the details through coordination, the ruling 
party will present the bill at the outset of the regular Diet 
session to be convened in January. In the nationwide unified 
elections next spring, candidates for local government heads are 
likely to distribute the party's manifesto without any restrictions 
in election campaigning. 
 
The amendment bill proposes lifting a ban on distributing flyers in 
government-head election campaigning. The maximum number of such 
handouts will be set at 100,000 to 300,000 in the case of 
prefectural gubernatorial elections, 16,000 for mayoral elections, 
and 5,000 in elections for town or village heads.' 
 
The LDP also proposes deregulating the distribution of handouts in 
 
TOKYO 00007098  009 OF 010 
 
 
national election campaigning. Under the current rules, candidates 
are allowed to place their handouts only in their election campaign 
offices or the halls used to deliver campaign speeches. But the 
amendment bill will allow handouts to be placed in each small 
constituency in House of Representatives elections and in up to 300 
locations across the nation. The New Komeito has agreed to remove 
the ban for elections for local government heads, but it is also 
calling for enabling handouts to be distributed on the occasion of 
street speeches. 
 
(7) Why doesn't child population increase in Japan? Birthrate likely 
to stay at 1.26 even in 2055 
 
MAINICHI (Page 2) (Full) 
December 21, 2006 
 
Keishi Yoshida, Setuko Ogawa 
 
The birthrate in Japan will not recover even in the future. The 
National Institute of Population and Social Security Research 
(NIPSSR) yesterday announced that the total fertility rate in 2055 
would remain at 1.26, which is the same as the actual lowest rate 
registered in 2005. Why have the government's measures to stop the 
falling birthrate failed to achieve good results? If the trend 
continues as is, what will happen to our pension program? 
 
Poor countermeasures 
 
The government began adopting a serious stance against the declining 
birthrate in 1990. The trigger was when Japan's total fertility rate 
dropped to a record low of 1.57 in 1989.  Under the "angel plan" 
worked out in 1994 and the "new angel plan" in 1999, the government 
established systems to assist men and women balance career and 
child-raising. In 2002, the government began reviewing the previous 
working patterns involving both men and women, under the program 
"measures against decline birthrate plus one." It appears that the 
government has been working hard to hammer out measures in rapid 
succession. 
 
But, compared to the measures taken by other industrialized nations, 
Japan's are minimal and of poor quality. 
 
According to Hidehiko Fujii, director of the Japan Research 
Institute's Business Strategy Research Center, stepping up job 
assistance and reducing the burdens of child-rearing and education 
are two key factors that would push up the birthrate. But the 
government's outlays for those two measures in terms of GDP were 
both well below the averages of the OECD member nations, in fact, 
near the bottom. 
 
In fiscal 2005, Japan's budget for measures against decline 
birthrate was 1.3 trillion yen or merely 0.3 percent of GDP, but 
advanced nations in Europe spent several times as much as Japan. 
Fujii insists that it is necessary to dramatically increase that 
budget so that it will be spent mainly for those two key factors. 
"Child-rearing continues until children reach 20 or so. During this 
period, the government needs to ensure that the parents are employed 
and can support most of their education costs," Fujii asserts. 
 
Take a look at the fiscal 2007 budget. The centerpiece of the 
measures against decline birthrate is to increase the child 
allowance in consideration of infants, but the increase is only by a 
mere 5,000 yen. Referring to that, a senior Health Ministry official 
 
TOKYO 00007098  010 OF 010 
 
 
said self-mockingly: "It's such a poor policy that is seen by most 
officials in charge as something 'meaningless.'" 
 
Lying behind surge in unmarried population is difficulties in 
balancing career and child-rearing 
 
One reason for revising the birthrate downward was a review of the 
lifetime unmarried rate. The unmarried rate of women born in 1990 is 
predicted to reach 23.5 percent, a sharp rise. This figure means one 
in four women will not marry at all; this is four times the rate of 
5.8 percent of women born in 1955. 
 
The data to back up the prediction are a birth trends survey 
conducted by the NIPSSR. According to it, the average number of 
children per couple with 15 years of marriage was 2.09 (in 2005), 
almost the same as the 2.20 registered in 1972. By contrast, the 
ratio of women aged 15-49 who have not given birth rose to 38 
percent in 2005 from the 6 percent in 1970. In other words, if women 
get married, they will give birth to at least two children. 
 
As the reasons why women remain unmarried, Shigesato Takahashi, vice 
president of the NIPSSR, cites: (1) increased demand for unmarried 
woman in the labor force; (2) a rise in the number of nonregular 
workers among the younger generation; and (3) difficulties in 
striking a balance between career and a married life. He points 
out: 
 
"The past measures against a declining birthrate were focused on 
domestic matters, such as childbirth and child-care, and neglected 
the way people work. But now, it's time to reconsider from the 
bottom up the way people work, for this factor seems to have blocked 
women from getting married even though they may want to do so. 
Industries are also required to have a long-term perspective of the 
Japanese labor force, envisioning the future of our nation, instead 
of prioritizing immediate gains over a span of five or 10 years; 
otherwise, the declining number of births will not abate." 
 
DONOVAN