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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 THE HAGUE 002546 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SA, EUR/UBI, EUR/RPM 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV AF NL
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR A/S BOUCHER'S DECEMBER 6 VISIT TO 
THE NETHERLANDS 
 
Assistant Secretary Boucher: 
 
¶1. (SBU) My embassy and I warmly welcome you to the 
Netherlands.  Your visit comes at a time when the Dutch 
political landscape is undergoing significant change.  The 
November 22 national elections have left the country divided, 
with no party or group of parties having a clear majority. 
In the short run, we do not expect any major changes in Dutch 
policies relevant to the U.S., including especially the Dutch 
deployment to Afghanistan as part of NATO's ISAF mission. 
But Dutch voters' dissatisfaction with the status quo could 
have troubling implications for the long term relationship. 
Your visit provides an excellent opportunity to reach out to 
Dutch parliamentarians, officials, and press on Afghanistan, 
as well as other issues across South Asia, including border 
security with Pakistan and the U.S.-India Nuclear Cooperative 
Agreement.  In addition, your interlocutors will be very 
interested in hearing your views regarding U.S. positions on 
Afghanistan, especially following the recent U.S. elections, 
the NATO summit in Riga, and the recently released DoD-State 
report critical of Afghan police training efforts. 
 
Dutch Elections: Polarization and Uncertainty 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (SBU) Last June, the fragile coalition government of Jan 
Peter Balkenende collapsed over the mishandling of the 
citizenship status of Ayaan Hirsi Ali -- a former member of 
Parliament and outspoken critic of Islam who now lives in the 
U.S. -- forcing early elections on November 22.  Although 
Balkenende's Christian Democratic Alliance (CDA) emerged as 
the putative "winner" of these elections, the 41 seats they 
control in the 150-seat Dutch Parliament are far too few to 
command a majority, and there are no obvious partners with 
which to form a new coalition government.  Observers here 
believe the difficult negotiations could take weeks or months 
-- if they succeed at all.  In the meantime, Balkenende will 
continue to head a caretaker minority government until a new 
coalition emerges or new elections are held. 
 
¶3. (SBU) The biggest electoral losers were the Center-Left 
Labor Party (PvdA) headed by Wouter Bos, and the conservative 
Liberal Party (VVD) headed by Mark Rutte.  Both were 
supportive of the Dutch deployment to Afghanistan and had 
been perceived as potential partners in a future 
Balkenende-led cabinet.  But with 33 and 21 seats, 
respectively, neither now has enough support to reach the 
necessary 76 seats.  The surprising success of fringe parties 
on the right and left, meanwhile, are pushing both parties 
away from the center, further complicating the prospects of 
the sort of centrist government coalition favored by 
Balkenende.  On the left, the formerly Maoist Socialist Party 
grew from 9 to 25 seats overnight and now poses a serious 
threat to the PvdA for leadership of the Dutch left.  On the 
right, the new Party of Freedom (PVV) successfully exploited 
deep-seated anti-immigrant and anti-EU emotions to capture a 
surprising 9 seats. 
 
¶4. (SBU) The election results reveal a deeply divided Dutch 
electorate that is becoming even more so.  The voters' swing 
to the fringes reflects the same broad dissatisfaction with 
the traditional political establishment that shot down the EU 
Constitutional Treaty in the Dutch referendum in 2005.  This 
frustration is particularly striking at a time when the Dutch 
economy is performing better than it has in decades, 
consistently outperforming eurozone averages: GDP is expected 
to grow by 2.5 to 3 percent this year, and unemployment has 
fallen to 5.5 percent.  Balkenende owes much of his 
relatively strong performance in the elections to these 
positive trends.  Many have credited his government's 
implementation of painful structural reforms for this 
economic turnaround.  This positive economic picture, 
however, was clearly not enough to overcome many voters' 
concerns in other areas.  Your lunch with Dutch 
parliamentarians affords the opportunity to ask them how the 
coalition process will unfold, and whether issues like 
Afghanistan will be affected. 
 
Afghanistan: "To The Letter" 
---------------------------- 
 
¶5. (SBU) Despite a contentious parliamentary debate last 
winter and low public support, the Dutch deployment to the 
southern Afghan province of Uruzgan as part of NATO's ISAF 
III mission did not emerge as a difficult election issue for 
the caretaker government.  In retrospect, the lengthy debate, 
 
THE HAGUE 00002546  002 OF 003 
 
 
in which the PvdA ultimately voted in favor of the deployment 
despite serious reservations, effectively neutralized most 
serious critics of the mission early and locked all major 
parties into supportive positions.  In an effort to destroy 
this consensus, opposition parties to the left of Labor, 
notably Green Left and the Socialist Party, continue to argue 
noisily that the GONL has failed in its promise to maintain a 
clear line between ISAF and OEF operations, and that the 
focus of the mission has shifted from reconstruction -- which 
the public largely supports -- to a far more controversial 
combat mission. 
 
¶6. (SBU) While PvdA leaders did not take the bait from 
parties further to the left during the elections, they will 
be hard pressed by the Socialists' strong election showing 
and their own disappointed grassroots members to reexamine 
the Dutch deployment given the perception that the security 
situation currently makes it impossible to conduct a 
successful reconstruction mission.  Afghanistan could emerge 
as a coalition formation issue.  However, time appears to be 
on the caretaker government's side -- given the complicated 
election outcome, coalition formation is expected to be a 
long, arduous process, allowing the "stay the course" 
argument to build momentum.  GONL officials have told us on 
several levels that the Dutch will honor their deployment to 
Uruzgan "to the letter," meaning they will remain in Uruzgan 
for their two-year commitment, but will most likely not opt 
to extend the deployment. 
 
¶7. (SBU) Meanwhile, the caretaker government is satisfied 
with the first phase of its mission in Afghanistan and has 
sought to address the reconstruction vs. combat mission 
divide.  GONL officials have maintained on all levels that 
the Dutch deployed to Uruzgan "with their eyes open," knowing 
that they would be tested by the enemy and will be required 
to fight.  To date, the Dutch have engaged and killed the 
enemy during combat missions.  Nevertheless, the Dutch 
acknowledge a "difference of opinion" with their NATO allies, 
notably those deployed to the south.  Instead of initiating 
major military operations, the Dutch emphasize winning 
"hearts and minds," and have employed an "ink blot" strategy 
by building secure areas within the province and connecting 
these areas through reconstruction projects.  During a 
December 1 press conference, Dutch CHOD Gen. Berlijn and 
Dutch Ambassador to Afghanistan van de Geer noted that the 
frequency of skirmishes in Uruzgan is decreasing, while the 
GONL has invested six million euros in reconstruction 
projects in Uruzgan this year.  Dutch Major General van Loon, 
commander of NATO ISAF forces in the southern provinces, and 
NATO Senior Civilian Representative Daan Everts -- a Dutchman 
-- have both stressed that success should not be measured by 
body counts, but by bolstering the Afghan local government. 
 
¶8. (SBU) This Dutch "dissenting opinion" has led other Allies 
to question whether the Netherlands has the will to actively 
seek out and destroy the Taliban, especially after the Dutch 
assumed regional command of the southern provinces in 
Kandahar in November.  The fact that the Dutch have yet to 
lose a soldier in combat exacerbates this perception.  The 
Canadians and Brits have suffered casualties in heavy 
fighting in Kandahar and Helmand provinces, while Uruzgan 
initially was rather quiet.  The Dutch have responded 
emphatically to these "soft" and "gutless" assertions, 
claiming they have fought effectively when deemed necessary, 
and to have actively patrolled in Uruzgan and supported the 
Canadians in Kandahar.  Nevertheless, Dutch concerns about a 
"negative spiral of violence" has resulted in at least one 
occasion in which the Dutch policy of not pursuing enemy 
fighters -- even after having been fired upon -- led to chain 
of command issues among NATO allies. 
 
¶9. (SBU) The Dutch have differed vocally with Allies on 
several other issues.  They have been highly critical of 
Afghan President Karzai, and have expressed a willingness to 
talk to all Afghan parties.  During a recent trip to 
Afghanistan, Dutch FM Bot said NATO should be willing to 
engage with moderate Taliban forces.  The GONL also values 
its bilateral MOU with Afghan authorities regarding detainee 
transfers over ISAF policy.  According to the Dutch-Afghan 
MOU, the Dutch will turn over any detainees to Afghan 
authorities within 96 hours.  However, Afghan authorities 
must obtain Dutch approval prior to transferring detainees to 
third parties, i.e., the "anti-Guantanamo" clause.  Finally, 
the Dutch are opposed to poppy eradication efforts, unless 
the poppy crop can be replaced by an alternative. 
 
 
THE HAGUE 00002546  003 OF 003 
 
 
Riga NATO Summit 
---------------- 
 
¶10. (SBU) Despite these differences, the Dutch continue to 
work effectively with Allies in the south.  Dutch PM 
Balkenende and Canadian PM Harper together made a joint plea 
prior to the NATO Summit, citing the many reconstruction and 
democratic governance accomplishments, but stressing the need 
to ensure better security.  They called on the Afghan 
government to extend its reach into remote areas and support 
governance at the local level, and stressed the importance of 
the Afghan national army and police force.  Most importantly, 
they called for Allies to consolidate NATO resources, and 
work with the international community, including especially 
the UN and EU, to achieve better cooperation and unity of 
effort.  The Dutch joined us at Riga in calling out Allies to 
contribute more towards the fight in the south.  Your 
roundtable meeting with Dutch MFA, MOD, and the Prime 
Minister's office presents the opportunity to discuss 
cooperation and differences in southern Afghanistan, as well 
as next steps post-Riga in the effort to get other Allies to 
engage in the south and the recent joint DoD-State report 
critical of Afghan police training efforts. 
 
Pakistan/India 
-------------- 
 
¶11. (SBU) Much of the Dutch interaction with Pakistan can be 
seen through the Afghanistan prism.  During his recent 
October trip to the region, Dutch FM Bot harshly criticized 
his Pakistani counterpart for the lack of security along the 
Afghan-Pakistan border.  Bot also has expressed interest in 
building a fence along certain portions of the 
Afghan-Pakistan border in an effort to achieve better 
security.  The Dutch were highly supportive of NATO 
humanitarian and disaster relief efforts following the 
earthquake in Pakistan in late 2005. 
 
¶12. (SBU) Most Dutch comment on India has been focused on the 
US-Indian Nuclear Cooperation Agreement.  The Dutch remain 
skeptical of the deal, especially regarding India's ability 
to honor commitments to IAEA safeguards.  They also remain 
concerned regarding how the deal will affect the NPT. 
However, they have expressed a willingness to listen to USG 
arguments, and appear ready to play a constructive role. 
 
Short-term Continuity; Long-term Questions 
------------------------------------------ 
 
¶13. (SBU) In the short term, the lack of a new national 
consensus means policies of the previous, pro-Atlantic 
government will continue -- at least as long as Balkenende 
remains caretaker Prime Minister.  Any new government will 
also be cautious about overturning or reversing commitments 
made by the previous government.  Over the long run, however, 
the clear desire for change expressed by Dutch voters cannot 
be ignored.  The traditionally close relationship between the 
U.S. and the Netherlands is one obvious target of frustration 
(as are NATO, the EU and the Dutch political establishment), 
and recent high-profile events -- Abu Gharib, Guantanamo, 
"CIA Flights," etc., have not made our jobs any easier.  We 
are actively working to develop and maintain solid 
relationships across the political spectrum in an effort to 
refocus the relationship back on our core shared values, 
history, and future potential.  Your visit here comes at a 
crucial stage in this effort, and outreach to Parliament, the 
current caretaker government, and the press will be very 
helpful. 
 
ARNALL