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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 STATE 196230 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR MOPS IZ IR SY XF
SUBJECT: IRAQ STUDY GROUP REPORT GUIDANCE 
 
REF: STATE 195169 (NOTAL) 
 
STATE 00196230  001.2 OF 004 
 
 
¶1. This cable provides initial guidance for posts to use 
in responding to inquiries about the report of the Iraq 
Study Group, led by former Secretary of State James A. 
Baker III and former Representative Lee Hamilton. 
 
¶2. BACKGROUND: The Iraq Study Group (ISG) was created on 
March 15, 2006 at the request of a bipartisan group of 
members of Congress. The facilitating agency for the 
group is the U.S. Institute of Peace (www.usip.org) with 
the support of the Center for the Study of the Presidency 
(www.thepresidency.org), the Center for Strategic and 
International Studies (www.csis.org), and the James A. 
Baker III Institute for Public Policy at Rice University 
(www.bakerinstitute.org). More background information is 
available on its USIP website. The ISG first briefed its 
report to President Bush, then members of Congress, and 
then posted the 140-plus page report to the websites of 
 
its four supporting organizations. USIP invited 
Ambassadors from Coalition members, NATO allies, plus 
Syria, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia to a briefing and 
reception with Baker and Hamilton at 5:00 pm EST on 
December 6. Reftel provides information on a recent 
briefing that senior Department and CENTCOM officials 
provided to Washington's diplomatic corps on the review 
processes underway and the current situation in Iraq, and 
may be used to complement information provided here. The 
President's comments can be found at 
www.whitehouse.gov/news. 
 
¶3. The Administration is not bound by the 
recommendations of the commission, although it is 
considering them seriously in the context of a wider USG 
policy review. END BACKGROUND 
 
¶4. Posts may draw on the following points in explaining 
this non-governmental report to host governments: 
 
-- The Iraq Study Group (ISG) led by former Secretary of 
State James A. Baker III and former Representative Lee 
Hamilton is a Congressionally appointed non-governmental 
group. 
 
-- The ISG's findings and recommendations will be 
reviewed by the Administration and considered as 
important input into the administration's Iraq policy 
review. 
 
-- Our goal is a careful, deliberate consideration of 
all aspects of our strategy in order to chart a 
successful way forward. 
 
-- The Administration will discuss a new way ahead in 
Iraq. While there are certain recommendations that we 
might not ultimately support, there is much good in the 
report. 
 
-- After briefing President Bush and members of Congress, 
the ISG posted its findings on December 6 on the websites 
 
of its four supporting organizations at 11 am EST on 
December 6, 2006 (see background for organizations and 
URLs). 
 
-- The President himself said on December 4th: "My 
attitude is, I ought to absorb and listen to everything 
that's being said because I'm not satisfied with the 
progress being made in Iraq. And the good news is, 
neither is the Iraqi leadership. And so I'm listening to 
the Iraqis. I'm going to listen to members of Congress. 
I want to listen to, obviously, Baker-Hamilton. More 
importantly, when it comes to military matters, I want to 
listen to the military to come up with a way of achieving 
our objective quicker." 
 
-- Upon the report's release on Dec 6th the President 
noted: "I told the ISG members that this report, called 
"The Way Forward," will be taken very seriously by the 
administration. This report gives a very tough 
assessment of the situation in Iraq. It is a report that 
brings some really very interesting proposals. And we 
will take every proposal seriously and we will act in a 
timely fasion. The commission is headed up to Congress, 
and I urge the members of Congress to take this report 
seriously. While they won't agree with every proposal, 
and we probably won't agree with every proposal, it 
 
STATE 00196230  002.2 OF 004 
 
 
nevertheless is an opportunity to come together and work 
together on this important issue." 
 
-- We look forward to continuing a dialogue with 
addressee host countries as the review process proceeds, 
and to consultations on how we can together further the 
international community's common goals in Iraq. 
 
¶5. For reference, the executive summary of this non- 
governmental report is as follows: 
 
BEGIN TEXT 
 
Executive Summary 
 
The situation in Iraq is grave and deteriorating. There 
is no path that can guarantee success, but the prospects 
can be improved. 
 
In this report, we make a number of recommendations for 
actions to be taken in Iraq, the United States, and the 
region. Our most important recommendations call for new 
and enhanced diplomatic and political efforts in Iraq and 
the region, and a change in the primary mission of U.S. 
forces in Iraq that will enable the United States to 
begin to move its combat forces out of Iraq responsibly. 
We believe that these two recommendations are equally 
important and reinforce one another. If they are 
effectively implemented, and if the Iraqi government 
moves forward with national reconciliation, Iraqis will 
have an opportunity for a better future, terrorism will 
be dealt a blow, stability will be enhanced in an 
important part of the world, and Amercia's credibility, 
interests, and values will be protected. 
 
The challenges in Iraq are complex. Violence is 
increasing in scope and lethality. It is fed by a Sunni 
Arab insurgency, Shiite militias and death squads, al 
Qaeda, and widespread criminality. Sectarian conflict is 
the principal challenge to stability. The Iraqi people 
have a democratically elected government, yet it is not 
adequately advancing national reconciliation, providing 
basic security, or delivering essential services. 
Pessimism is pervasive. 
 
If the situation continues to deteriorate, the 
consequences could be severe. A slide toward chaos could 
trigger the collapse of Iraq's government and a 
humanitarian catastrophe. Neighboring countries could 
intervene. Sunni-Shia clashes could spread. Al Qaeda 
could win a propaganda victory and expand its base of 
operations. The global standing of the United States 
could be diminished. Americans could become more 
polarized. 
 
During the past nine months we have considered a full 
range of approaches for moving forward. All have flaws. 
Our recommended course has shortcomings, but we firmly 
believe that it includes the best strategies and tactics 
to positively influence the outcome in Iraq and the 
region. 
 
     External Approach 
 
The policies and actions of Iraq's neighbors greatly 
affect its stability and prosperity. No country in the 
region will benefit in the long term from a chaotic Iraq. 
Yet Iraq's neighbors are not doing enough to help Iraq 
achieve stability. Some are undercutting stability. 
 
The United States should immediately launch a new 
diplomatic offensive to build an international consensus 
for stability in Iraq and the region. This diplomatic 
effort should include every country that has an interest 
in avoiding a chaotic Iraq, including all of Iraq's 
neighbors. Iraq's neighbors and key states in and 
outside the region should form a support group to 
reinforce security and national reconciliation within 
Iraq, neither of which Iraq can achieve on its own. 
 
Given the ability of Iran and Syria to influence events 
within Iraq and their interest in avoiding chaos in Iraq, 
the United States should try to engage them 
constructively. In seeking to influence the behavior of 
both counties, the United States has disincentives and 
incentives available. Iran should stem the flow of arms 
and training to Iraq, respect Iraq's sovereignty and 
territorial integrity, and use its influence over Iraqi 
Shia groups to encourage national reconciliation. The 
issue of Iran's nuclear programs should continue to be 
dealt with by the five permanent members of the United 
Nations Security Council plus Germany. Syria should 
 
STATE 00196230  003.2 OF 004 
 
 
control its border with Iraq to stem the flow of funding, 
insurgents, and terrorists in and out of Iraq. 
 
The United States cannot achieve its goals in the Middle 
East unless it deals directly with the Arab-Israeli 
conflict and regional instability. There must be a 
renewed and sustained commitment by the United States to 
a comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace on all fronts: 
Lebanon, Syria, and President Bush's June 2002 commitment 
to a two-state solution for Israel and Palestine. This 
commitment must include direct talks with, by, and 
between Israel, Lebanon, Palestinians (those who accept 
Israel's right to exist), and Syria. 
 
As the United States develops its approach toward Iraq 
and the Middle East, the United States should provide 
additional political, economic, and military support for 
Afghanistan, including resources that might become 
available as combat forces are moved out of Iraq. 
 
     Internal Approach 
 
The most important questions about Iraq's future are now 
the responsibility of Iraqis. The United States must 
adjust its role in Iraq to encourage the Iraqi people to 
take control of their own destiny. 
 
The Iraqi government should accelerate assuming 
responsibility for Iraqi security by increasing the 
number and quality of Iraqi Army brigades. While this 
process is under way, and to facilitate it, the United 
States should significantly increase the number of U.S. 
military personnel, including combat troops, imbedded 
(sic)in and supporting Iraqi Army units. As these 
actions proceed, U.S. combat forces could begin to move 
out of Iraq. 
 
The primary mission of U.S. forces in Iraq should evolve 
to one of supporting the Iraqi army, which would take 
over primary responsibility for combat operations. By 
the first quarter of 2008, subject to unexpected 
developments in the security situation on the ground, all 
combat brigades not necessary for force protection could 
be out of Iraq. At that time, U.S. combat forces in Iraq 
 
could be deployed only in units embedded with Iraqi 
forces, in rapid-reaction and special operations teams, 
and in training, equipping, advising force protection, 
and search and rescue. Intelligence and support efforts 
would continue. A vital mission of those rapid reaction 
and special operations forces would be to undertake 
strikes against al Qaeda in Iraq. 
 
It is clear that the Iraqi government will need 
assistance from the United States for some time to come, 
especially in carrying out security responsibilities. 
Yet the United States must make it clear to the Iraqi 
government that the United States could carry out its 
plans, including planned redeployments, even if the Iraqi 
government did not implement their planned changes. The 
United States must not make an open-ended commitment to 
keep large numbers of American troops deployed in Iraq. 
 
As redeployment proceeds, military leaders should 
emphasize training and education of forces that have 
returned to the United States in order to restore the 
force to full combat capability. As equipment returns to 
the United States, Congress should appropriate sufficient 
funds to restore the equipment over the next five years. 
 
The United States should work closely with Iraq's leaders 
to support the achievement of specific objectives--or 
milestones--on national reconciliation, security and 
governance. Miracles cannot be expected, but the people 
of Iraq have the right to expect action and progress. The 
Iraqi government needs to show its own citizens--and 
citizens of the United States and other countries--that it 
deserves continued support. 
 
Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, in consultation with the 
United States, has put forward a set of milestones 
critical for Iraq. His list is a good start, but it must 
be expanded to include milestones that can strengthen the 
government and benefit the Iraqi people. President Bush 
and his national security team should remain in close and 
frequent contact with the Iraqi leadership to convey a 
 
clear message: there must be prompt action by the Iraqi 
government to make substantial progress toward the 
achievement of these milestones. 
 
If the Iraqi government demonstrates political will and 
 
STATE 00196230  004.2 OF 004 
 
 
makes substantial progress toward the achievement of 
milestones on national reconciliation, security, and 
governance, the United States should make clear its 
willingness to continue training, assistance, and support 
for Iraq's security forces and to continue political, 
military, and economic support. If the Iraqi government 
does not make substantial progress toward the achievement 
of milestones on national reconciliation, security, and 
governance, the United States should reduce its political, 
military, or economic support for the Iraqi government. 
 
Our report makes recommendations in several other areas. 
They include improvements to the Iraqi criminal justice 
system, the Iraqi oil sector, the U.S. reconstruction 
efforts in Iraq, the U.S. budget process, the training of 
U.S. government personnel, and U.S. intelligence 
capabilities. 
 
      Conclusion 
 
It is the unanimous view of the Iraq Study Group that 
these recommendations offer a new way forward for the 
United States in Iraq and the region. They are 
comprehensive and need to be implemented in a coordinated 
fashion. They should not be separated or carried out in 
isolation. The dynamics of the region are as important to 
Iraq as events within Iraq. 
 
The challenges are daunting. There will be difficult days 
ahead. But by pursuing this new way forward, Iraq, the 
region, and the United States of America can emerge 
stronger. 
 
END TEXT 
 
¶6. Minimize considered. 
RICE