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RUEHLN RUEHLZ RUEHROV RUEHSR RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHSF #1655/01 3451517
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 111517Z DEC 06
FM AMEMBASSY SOFIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2941
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 SOFIA 001655 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PINR BU
SUBJECT: BULGARIA STRUGGLES TO DISCLOSE COMMUNIST-ERA FILES 
 
Ref: (A) Sofia 1499, (B) Sofia 786 
 
¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY:  Bulgaria's parliament passed groundbreaking 
legislation on December 6, to open up the files of the former 
communist secret services.  Under the law, adopted after heated 
debate, all senior officials in the Presidency, Parliament, 
government, the Judiciary, academia, mass media, etc., will be 
checked for links with the former State Security service.  The 
Socialist-led majority decided, however, that second-tier chiefs in 
the present-day intelligence services will not be checked for 
affiliation to the State Security due to national security reasons. 
The controversial provision was adopted after intense discussion 
among the partners in the ruling center-left coalition and under 
what MPs termed as "immense pressure" from the current intelligence 
leadership and influential Socialist circles.  The new legislation 
was also marked by the mysterious death of the official in charge of 
the ex-communist intelligence files.  The timing and delayed public 
announcement of his apparent suicide triggered a wave of speculation 
and highlighted the need for Bulgaria to come to terms with its 
communist-era past.  END SUMMARY 
 
THE UNTOUCHABLES: INTELLIGENCE CHIEFS 
 
¶2. (SBU) Unlike other East European countries, Bulgaria has never 
fully released the files of its former State Security Committee (the 
communist security agency that included intelligence and 
counter-intelligence services and political police.)  Socialist PM 
Sergei Stanishev has shown political will to resolve the sensitive 
and divisive issue, even though his party is expected to suffer most 
from the file's disclosure.  While there has been broad consensus 
among the political class that the files of the notorious communist 
political police should be opened in full, influential BSP 
politicians have argued that some of the communist intelligence 
files should be kept classified "for national security reasons." 
Thus, in what has become the biggest controversy surrounding the new 
law, the BSP-led majority decided that heads of departments, offices 
and sections within the present-day military or civil intelligence 
services will not be checked for affiliation with the former State 
Security.  The widely debated amendment to the initial draft was 
adopted after tense consultations between the BSP and its coalition 
partners, the ethnic Turkish Movement for Rights and Freedoms (MRF) 
and the National Movement for Simeon II, both of which have demanded 
the complete release of the files. 
 
POLITICAL PRESSURE 
 
¶3. (SBU) MPs from the ruling coalition, who drafted the law, backed 
off after an emergency meeting with the National Intelligence 
Service (NIS) chief, Gen. Kircho Kirov, who reportedly argued the 
amendment was needed to protect people who are still on active 
intelligence duty.  MPs who drafted the law openly spoke about being 
subjected to "immense pressure" from the current intelligence 
leadership and influential Socialist circles to adopt the 
controversial text.  MRF deputy leader Kassim Dal, an author of the 
initial draft law, said in an interview that Kirov's strong 
opposition to files' complete disclosure illuminated the fact that 
his service had not been sufficiently reformed.  A vocal opponent of 
the archives opening, Kirov has said that "the archives should not 
be opened immediately and read like a newspaper."  He was backed by 
the communist-era intelligence officers, now grouped in the 
Association of the Reserve Intelligence Officers, who told a news 
conference the declassification of the files would be a "suicidal 
act" for the present-day intelligence services. 
 
¶4. (SBU) The issue has drawn a dividing line within the Socialist 
Party as well, with reformist BSP MP Tatyana Doncheva telling local 
media about pressure coming from "the very top" of the state.  A 
leader of the lobby in favor of complete disclosure, Doncheva 
stopped short of directly pointing the finger at President Georgi 
Parvanov, although clearly implied his involvement.  The 
center-right opposition party led by ex-PM Ivan Kostov, however, 
openly accused Parvanov and the NIS which is under him, of inspiring 
the controversial text, and again reminded the public about the 
Socialist President's alleged ties with communist-era State 
Security.  Parvanov, the former BSP leader who won re-election by a 
landslide in October, earlier this year openly voiced his opposition 
to the files' declassification, saying that the issue "might push 
Bulgaria back."  Allegations that Parvanov collaborated with the 
State Security intelligence service led him to acknowledge in June 
the existence of a secret intelligence file on him, code-named 
"Gotse" (Ref. A). This dossier should be kept in the NIS which 
presently houses the files of the communist intelligence service 
(the State Security First Directorate).  Interior Minister Roumen 
Petkov, a close associate of Parvanov, has also firmly opposed the 
files' opening and was allegedly among the Socialist politicians who 
exercised pressure on BSP MPs to adopt the controversial text. 
 
PUBLIC FIGURES UNDER SCRUTINY 
 
¶5. (U) The new law opens the files of the communist State Security 
Committee and the Bulgarian military intelligence services prior to 
July 16, 1991, when those services were formally disbanded.  The law 
 
SOFIA 00001655  002 OF 003 
 
 
stipulates the disclosure of the names of public figures who have 
worked or collaborated with the communist secret services.  Falling 
into this category are: 
-- President, Vice president; Prime Minister, government ministers, 
senior officials in the Presidency, government, Judiciary, central 
bank, government agencies, regulatory bodies; 
-- Senior officials in the Ministries of Interior, Defense and the 
intelligence services; 
-- Regional governors and deputies, mayors, deputy mayors and 
municipal counselors; 
-- Senior officials in the state and private media, academia, 
polling agencies, professional trade unions, public health 
organizations; 
-- Senior officials in financial institutions (banks, insurance and 
re-insurance companies, brokerage houses, investment intermediaries 
and investment funds,) gaming companies and telecom operators; 
-- Senior officials in the political parties, religious communities, 
chambers of commerce and sports organizations; 
-- Senior Bulgarian officials in the EU, NATO bodies and every other 
international organization of which Bulgaria is a member; 
-- Any officials holding positions through a presidential 
appointment (such as Ambassadors) and through an appointment by 
parliament, government or the PM. 
 
INDEPENDENT BODY TO UNVEIL FILES 
 
¶6. (U) The communist-era files will be reviewed by an independent 
commission, whose nine members will be elected by parliament for a 
five-year term.  No political party or coalition will have a 
majority.  The commission will collect, study, analyze and evaluate 
the information in the State Security files and the Bulgarian 
military intelligence files; disclose and announce the names of the 
pubic officials whom the committee has established have links to the 
services; and publish this info on the commission's Internet site. 
The archives of the State Security and the communist military 
intelligence should be handed over to the commission within eight 
months.  The law allows every Bulgarian citizen to have access to 
information collected by the former State Security and the military 
intelligence services about them and their deceased relatives. 
 
MYSTERIOUS DEATH PROMPTS SPECULATION 
 
¶7. (SBU) The need to resolve the issue with the communist files was 
further highlighted by the death of the official responsible for the 
intelligence archives, who was found in his office with a bullet in 
his head just two weeks before parliament started debating the new 
law.  Bozhidar Doychev, 61, had served since 1991 as director of the 
National Intelligence Service (NIS) archives.  The public 
announcement of Doychev's death, however, was delayed for 24 hours 
and was made only after a London-based Internet news provider broke 
the story.  Only then did Chief Prosecutor Boris Velchev and 
Interior Minister Roumen Petkov confirm his death, saying that 
Doychev had most probably committed suicide for personal reasons and 
dismissing any link to his job.  The timing of his death and its 
delayed announcement, however, triggered a wave of speculation. 
Center-right opposition MPs and commentators openly contest the 
official version, speculating that Doychev might have been subject 
to pressure to destroy some documents for people who want their 
links with the former security services to remain hidden.  Local 
press noted that of the present NIS staff, only Doychev and service 
chief Kirov had unlimited access to the full archive.  Doychev's 
relatives added fuel to the fire, telling local media they were 
dismayed by the official explanation, without benefit of an 
investigation, or even questioning the relatives. 
 
¶8. (U) Kirov said the reason his service had not announced Doychev's 
death was that NIS was not a public agency and did not have a press 
office.  Gen. Dimo Gyaurov, who headed the NIS in 1997-2002, 
questioned the official explanation, saying that "no one so far has 
given a single serious argument in support of this version."  "I 
would not rule out, him being subjected to a certain pressure which 
could have become the reason (for the suicide)," Gyaurov, who 
recently returned from an assignment as Ambassador to Hungary, told 
a TV interview.  Local media recalled that Doychev's death was not 
the first one of a key intelligence official that could be related 
to the communist intelligence files.  In 1991, Gen. Stoyan Savov, 
deputy head of the State Security's First Directorate, committed 
suicide just a day before he had to appear in court as a defendant 
on a case of alleged destruction of State Security files. 
 
SECRETS AND LIES UNVEILED? 
 
SIPDIS 
 
¶9. (SBU) Although belatedly adopted, the public expectation is that 
the law will help expose links of current politicians and public 
figures to State Security, thus diminishing their influence on 
various areas of Bulgaria's public life.  The opening of the files 
may also shed more light on the State Security service operations, 
with the work of the notorious Sixth Directorate, the political 
police that was used as an instrument of oppression by the communist 
leadership, expected to evoke strong public attention and painful 
revelations.  The files may also unveil more information about the 
foreign operations of the intelligence services, including the 
 
SOFIA 00001655  003 OF 003 
 
 
notorious 1978 "umbrella" murder in London of dissident writer 
Georgi Markov.  Public interest will also focus on files with 
information about the overseas trading companies and offshore shell 
companies launched by the State Security in 1983-1989. Those firms 
later provided the resources for most of the private commercial 
banks and businesses that sprung up after communism collapsed, 
forming the country's business elite.  The files may give 
information about communist-era "hidden transit," a term used by the 
secret services for the state-organized and controlled channels for 
 
SIPDIS 
smuggling arms, drugs, cigarettes, alcohol, precious metals, and 
antiquities from and through Bulgaria.  Those channels, organized by 
former counter-intelligence, have served as a basis for 
post-communist organized crime groups and their disclosure may 
illuminate links of current organized crime figures to the State 
Security. 
 
DOUBTS STILL REMAIN... 
 
¶10. (SBU) Many Bulgarians, however, remain skeptical, saying the 
files are unlikely to yield critical revelations, because the past 
17 post-communist years have provided ample opportunity for the 
communist archives to be destroyed or tampered with.  Back in 1991, 
a court case established that a significant portion of the State 
Security files was burned in January-February 1990 in the furnaces 
of a metallurgical plant in the small town of Pernik.  According to 
some reports, as much as 46 percent of the files of all 
collaborators, 30 percent of the files of people placed under 
surveillance, and 91 percent of the archive on those who let 
facilities to the secret police had been destroyed in this period. 
This, coupled with speculation that some of the archives had been 
exported to Moscow right after communism collapsed, support the view 
among Bulgarians that the whole truth about the State Securities 
deeds and network may never be unveiled.  Politicians and 
commentators said that much will depend on the new commission's 
composition and the will of the Interior Minister and secret 
services' chiefs to implement the law and hand over the complete 
archives on time. 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶11. (SBU) The adoption of the new law may not reveal the whole story 
of the communist State Security, but it still constitutes Bulgaria's 
most far-reaching move to date to deal with the sensitive issue of 
the communist-era files.  Insiders have told us the passage of the 
landmark law was just the first battle - they expect stiff 
opposition to the actual implementation of the law from the same 
circles that fought to limit its scope, and a major battle over the 
nomination of the Commission's chairman, who will have access to the 
most sensitive files that are not subject to disclosure.  Although 
slow and difficult at present, we expect that this process will 
ultimately have a positive impact on Bulgarian society in the 
long-term.  It will also lend credibility to a new generation of 
post-communist politicians, such as PM Stanishev, who has been 
supportive to the process despite strong internal party opposition. 
END COMMENT 
BEYRLE