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OO RUEHAG RUEHAST RUEHDA RUEHDBU RUEHDF RUEHFL RUEHIK RUEHKW RUEHLA
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DE RUEHPS #1088/01 3540901
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 200901Z DEC 06
FM USOFFICE PRISTINA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6846
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0959
RHMFISS/CDR USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUFOADA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK
RHFMIUU/AFSOUTH NAPLES IT
RHMFIUU/CDR TF FALCON
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUEPGEA/CDR650THMIGP SHAPE BE
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC
RUFOANA/USNIC PRISTINA SR
RUEILB/NCTC WASHINGTON DC

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 PRISTINA 001088 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR S/CT RHONDA SHORE AND ED SALAZAR, DEPT FOR DRL, 
INL, AND EUR/SCE, NSC FOR BRAUN, USUN FOR DREW 
SCHUFLETOWSKI, USOSCE FOR STEVE STEGER 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PTER ASEC KCRM PGOV KJUS EAID KDEM UNMIK YI
SUBJECT: KOSOVO:  2006 ANNUAL TERRORISM UPDATE 
 
REF: STATE 175925 
 
¶1. (U) The following submission provides Post's contribution 
to the Department's "Country Reports on Terrorism 2006." 
 
BEGIN REPORT 
 
¶2. (U)  The United Nations Interim Administration Mission in 
Kosovo (UNMIK) continues to administer Kosovo pursuant to UN 
Security Council Resolution 1244, and Kosovo remains a 
steadfast member of the global coalition against terrorism. 
There have been no significant acts of international 
terrorism in Kosovo in 2006.  Kosovo is not a sponsor of 
terrorism and does not provide safe haven to international 
terrorist organizations. 
 
¶3. (U) The Provisional Institutions of Self-Government (PISG) 
and UNMIK continue to monitor suspected terrorist activity. 
UNMIK Police and Kosovo Police Service (KPS) monitor 
individuals entering Kosovo at official points of entry; a 
regulation adopted in 2005 requires persons entering Kosovo 
who are not employed by an international organization or 
liaison office to register with the KPS's Office of Foreign 
Registration. 
 
¶4. (U)  Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are of concern 
in Kosovo, and the PISG and UNMIK monitor NGOs suspected of 
funding Islamic extremist and Albanian extremist movements 
within Kosovo.  Officials believe only several of the more 
than 400 NGOs operating in Kosovo are involved in suspicious 
activities, and they seek to prevent extremists from using 
NGOs to gain a foothold in Kosovo.  Consequently, 
municipalities authorize NGOs' use of public facilities for 
religious gatherings only if the relevant religious community 
gives its consent.  The Kosovo Islamic Community (KIC) 
reports that it evaluated about 20 applications of mostly 
foreign NGOs in 2006 and rejected four due to reservations 
about their proposed programs and participants.  The KIC 
reports that it generally consents to religious gatherings of 
a cultural character, but rejects those involving preaching. 
With few exceptions, municipalities have respected KIC 
positions when issuing their permits. 
 
¶5. (U) UNMIK Police's Counterterrorism Task Force (CTTF) is 
primarily responsible for counterterrorism efforts in Kosovo. 
 It has nine international police officers and reports that 
its objectives have recently shifted from reactive to 
preventive measures.  It receives information and analysis 
support from the UNMIK Central Intelligence Unit (CIU) and 
the UNMIK Police Intelligence Liaison Unit (ILU).  In October 
2006, with UNMIK Police's support and guidance, the KPS 
established its own counterterrorism unit (CTU).  Six 
officers are currently assigned to the KPS CTU and are 
receiving training.  The KPS plans to expand the CTU in four 
phases to be completed by September 2007.  It will eventually 
have 35 officers.  In January 2007, upon completion of phase 
one of the expansion plan, the CTU will be incorporated into 
the work of UNMIK's CTTF. 
 
¶6. (U) UNMIK and the PISG are also involved in the United 
Nations Development Program (UNDP) Internal Security Sector 
Review (ISSR) process, which is scheduled to conclude in 
December 2006 with the publication of a comprehensive 
analysis of short- and long-term needs for institutional 
development of Kosovo's security sector.  Initiated by the UK 
Ministry of Defense in 2004 and later taken over by UNDP, the 
ISSR proposes concrete measures to increase Kosovo's capacity 
to prevent such future strategic threats as terrorism, 
inter-ethnic extremism, organized crime and corruption. 
 
¶7. (U) UNMIK established the Ministries of Justice (MOJ) and 
Internal Affairs (MOIA) in December 2005, launching the 
process of gradual transfer of police and justice 
competencies to the PISG.  Following a successful interim 
progress review, UNMIK assigned an additional set of 
 
PRISTINA 00001088  002 OF 003 
 
 
competencies to the two new ministries in April 2006.  The 
MOJ and MOIA should play an important role in 
counterterrorism as they gain more competencies. 
Nevertheless, UNMIK retains the ultimate authority in law 
enforcement and continues to exercise operational control 
over the KPS. 
 
¶8. (U) Despite these advances, Kosovo lacks an official 
domestic intelligence collection organization, and its 
counterterrorism efforts are also hampered by weak border 
control.  The Kosovo border police service is young, lacks 
basic equipment and only has a mandate to patrol the green 
border (areas where are no official, manned borders or 
boundary gates) from two to three kilometers from the actual 
border and administrative boundary lines.  NATO KFOR has 
roving teams patrolling the green border right up to the 
border and administrative boundary lines, but terrorists 
could exploit numerous passable roads leading into Kosovo 
which lack borders or boundary gates.  Border police are also 
poorly paid and thus are susceptible to corruption. 
 
¶9. (U) Witness intimidation is also an obstacle to combating 
terrorism in Kosovo.  While there have been no new terrorism 
cases this year, UNMIK's Department of Justice (DOJ) reports 
that intimidation of witnesses during investigation and trial 
phases has hampered current terror prosecutions.  According 
to UNMIK DOJ, a weak domestic witness protection program and 
the absence of witness relocation agreements with other 
countries make it difficult to convince witnesses to come 
forward.  Moreover, international officials still handle 
terrorism cases due to fears over local officials' 
susceptibility to intimidation. 
 
¶10. (U) While Kosovo officials struggled to bring the 
perpetrators of terrorist acts to justice in 2006, domestic 
extremists, acting individually or in groups, continued to 
commit inter-ethnic violence and threaten public security and 
order.  In early December, groups of armed, masked men 
reportedly presenting themselves as members of the Albanian 
National Army (AKSH) intermittently stopped pedestrians and 
vehicles in western Kosovo to check their identification 
documents.  These incidents occurred in the same area and 
bore a striking resemblance to those involving a group 
calling itself the Kosovo Independence Army (UPK) that 
threatened public security in late 2005.  On December 5, the 
masked men fired at KPS officers in the village of Gercine 
near Gjakove.  These groups have not issued statements or 
made any public requests so far.  AKSH's Tirana-based 
spokesman Gafurr Adili told Kosovo media that these groups 
are not affiliated with the AKSH. 
 
¶11. (U) AKSH made its first and sole public proclamation in 
Kosovo at a commemoration for two former Kosovo Liberation 
Army (KLA) fighters in the central Drenica region in 2004. 
Previously, it has been active in western Macedonia and 
southern Serbia.  It calls for the unification of all 
Albanian-inhabited lands into one state through armed 
struggle, but claims its units do not operate anywhere in 
Kosovo except in the north, which it considers to be under 
Serbian occupation.  Although there have been numerous 
instances in recent years of masked men, dressed in black 
blocking roads, Ardili has repeatedly rejected their AKSH 
affiliation.  In November, the town of Gllogovc in Drenica 
was covered in leaflets distributed on AKSH's behalf 
denouncing the appearance of armed masked groups attired in 
uniforms bearing AKSH insignia in the region. 
 
END REPORT 
 
¶12. (U) Significant incidents in 2006 have included: 
 
-- January 4 - A rocket-propelled grenade hit a regular local 
bus to Belgrade near Suhareke, but did not explode.  There 
were 57 passengers on board (26 Albanians, 21 Gorani, eight 
Bosniaks, one Turk and one Chinese national), and none were 
 
PRISTINA 00001088  003 OF 003 
 
 
injured. 
 
-- January 6 - An Albanian and a Serb working as security 
guards at the municipal court liaison office in Gracanica 
were shot and wounded in a drive-by shooting.  Two Kosovo 
Albanians were convicted. 
 
-- May 6 - Shots were fired at the vehicle driven by the 
secretary of the Diocese of Raska and Prizren near Zvecan. 
 
SIPDIS 
Two Serb KPS members are suspected of involvement in the 
incident. 
 
-- May 11 - A Serb was killed and another was seriously 
wounded in an armed robbery at a petrol station in the 
village of Grabovac near Zvecan. 
 
-- June 1 - A Serb was killed in an ambush on the 
Zvecan-Zitkovac road. 
 
-- June 19 - An elderly Serb returnee was found killed in his 
house in Klina. 
 
-- August 26 - A hand grenade was thrown at the Dolce Vita 
Cafe in north Mitrovica, injuring nine people, including  a 
British national.   A 16-year-old Kosovo Albanian was 
detained in connection with the incident. 
 
-- September 11 - An explosion in the village of Shtupelj 
near Klina destroyed a Serb returnee family's reconstructed 
house. 
 
-- September 15 - A bomb exploded in the parked private 
vehicle of Minister of Internal Affairs Fatmir Rexhepi in 
Gjilan. 
 
-- September 16 - A bomb exploded in the parked official 
vehicle of an advisor to Deputy Prime Minister (DPM) Lutfi 
Haziri. 
 
-- September 17 - A bomb exploded in the parked vehicle of a 
local businessman in Ferizaj. 
 
-- September 19 - Four Serb returnees were injured, one 
seriously, when a grenade was thrown at their apartment in 
Kline. 
 
-- October 4 - A bomb exploded in the yard of the house of an 
advisor and confidante of DPM Lutfi Haziri in Gjilan. 
 
-- December 8 - An explosive device destroyed part of the 
railroad tracks at the entrance to the bridge in the village 
of Mihalic near Vushtrri.  A train that regularly carries 
Serbs who live north of the Ibar River to the Serbian 
enclaves south of the Ibar River was due to cross the bridge 
roughly an hour later. 
 
¶13. (U) Post's point of contact on this issue is political 
officer Tracey Thornton.  She can be reached at 
381-38-549-526, ext. 3110 or by e-mail at 
thorntontr@state.gov. 
 
¶14. (SBU) U.S. Office Pristina clears this cable in its 
entirety for release to U.N. Special Envoy Martti Ahtisaari. 
KAIDANOW