VZCZCXRO2858
PP RUEHQU
DE RUEHPU #2448 3561717
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 221717Z DEC 06
FM AMEMBASSY PORT AU PRINCE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4950
INFO RUEHZH/HAITI COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA PRIORITY 1350
RUEHSA/AMEMBASSY PRETORIA PRIORITY 1181
RUEHQU/AMCONSUL QUEBEC PRIORITY 0665
RUEAHLC/HOMELAND SECURITY CENTER WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUMIAAA/HQ USSOUTHCOM J2 MIAMI FL PRIORITY
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 1079

UNCLAS PORT AU PRINCE 002448 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR WHA/EX AND WHA/CAR 
S/CRS 
SOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD 
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR LAC/CAR 
INR/IAA (BEN-YEHUDA) 
WHA/EX PLEASE PASS TO OAS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM HA
SUBJECT: UN STABILIZATION PROGRAM: FILLING THE GOH GAP 
 
¶1.  Summary: The United Nations announced on December 18 an 
appeal for USD 97.9 million in support of the economic and 
social stabilization of Haiti over the next 18 months 
(January 2007 -- June 2008).  The plan proposes 55 separate 
programs run by the various UN organizations in the areas 
where they have a comparative advantage.  It is intended to 
help the government carry out its proposals put forward at 
the July donors' conference, including GoH intent to mobilize 
and manage its own international aid.  According to 
Minustah's humanitarian and development section chief, Jens 
Kristensen, his office designed the UN proposal in direct 
consultation with the key ministries, specifically the 
Ministry of Planning and External Cooperation, and partner 
NGOs.  Though a fairly standard UN country plan, this appears 
to be in reaction to the government's failure to harness the 
donor process as defined during the conference in July.  End 
Summary. 
 
¶2.  The document prioritizes the eight sectors which need 
immediate work, as declared by the GoH at the July donors' 
conference in Port-au-Prince: public works, the Social 
Appeasement Program (PAS), justice and security, increase in 
government revenues, reinforcement of public institutions, 
education, health, and agriculture.  (Comment: The GoH has 
made minimal, if any, visible strides in each of the sectors. 
 Though not surprising given the many challenges the new 
government faces, the growing impatience of the population is 
increasingly evident.  End Comment.) 
 
¶3.  Kristensen described the UN proposal as a supplemental 
tool for the Haitian government, intending to reinforce GoH 
capacity, solicit additional financial resources, and focus 
on the grand dimensions of stabilization such as security, 
economic and social governance.  The new UN program will work 
over the next 18 months in order to respond to the county's 
priority needs: reinforced democratic institutions; a modern 
Haitian state in favor of a reduction in inequality, national 
dialogue, and reconciliation; an increase in national 
production; and the availability of basic services, 
particularly for the most vulnerable populations. 
 
¶4.  Eighty percent of the funding will be used outside of 
Port-au-Prince and will give priority to marginalized urban 
areas as well as fragile rural areas vulnerable to natural 
disasters and food insecurity.  Included in the document is 
the GoH's earlier stated priority to create a more favorable 
environment for development by removing current obstacles to 
social inclusion and to respond to the needs of the most 
vulnerable populations.  The document specifies that when 
possible the separate programs will seek labor intensive 
solutions to generate the maximum employment.  In addition to 
seeking funding from the major donors (the U.S., Canada, EU, 
and France), the UN will solicit funds from the Nordic 
countries and Japan.  This could be an opportunity for China 
to make its name known in Haiti, Kristensen surmised. 
 
¶5.  Comment: The UN makes every effort to present the 
document as supplementary to GoH proposals as outlined in 
July's conference document.  However, after two and a half 
years in Haiti -- and seven months into President Preval's 
tenure -- the UN appears to be posing as a substitute for GoH 
inability and inaction.  Kristensen told Poloff December 20 
that his office has been working on the document since the 
beginning of the year, but did not want to "compete" with the 
government.  Apparently, the competition has forfeited: the 
Prime Minister gave his stamp of approval at Minustah 
headquarters December 18.  Despite his calls for the 
sovereign management of donor aid and distribution, even he 
is left to admit that his government can not do it alone. 
TIGHE