VZCZCXRO6567
OO RUEHQU
DE RUEHPU #2385 3491702
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 151702Z DEC 06
FM AMEMBASSY PORT AU PRINCE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4889
INFO RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEHZH/HAITI COLLECTIVE
RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 1329
RUEHSA/AMEMBASSY PRETORIA 1165
RUMIAAA/HQ USSOUTHCOM J2 MIAMI FL
RUCOWCV/CCGDSEVEN MIAMI FL//OLE/OI//

C O N F I D E N T I A L PORT AU PRINCE 002385 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR WHA/CAR 
DRL 
S/CRS 
SOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD 
STATE PASS AID FOR LAC/CAR 
INR/IAA (BEN-YEHUDA) 
TREASURY FOR JEFFREY LEVINE 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/14/2011 
TAGS: PGOV PREL MOPS MARR ASEC KCRM HA BR
SUBJECT: PREVAL TELLS MINUSTAH TO TARGET THE GANGS 
 
Classified By: Classified by Deputy Chief of Mission Thomas C. Tighe fo 
r reasons 1.4(b) and (d). 
 
¶1. (C) President Preval on December 15 directed SRSG Mulet to 
have MINUSTAH forces conduct targeted operations against 
known leaders in Cite Soleil and other Port-au-Prince slums, 
according to MINUSTAH political staff.  Senior MINUSTAH 
civilian staff present at a birthday party for Mulet's chief 
of staff on the evening of December 15 told Polcouns they 
were eager to carry out Preval's directive and finally begin 
to attack the roots of insecurity.  Many expressed concern, 
however, that with MINUSTAH force commander General Jose 
Elito ending his tour in January, he did not have the will to 
mount potentially dangerous operations.  MINUSTAH's political 
chief told Polcouns, "Elito knows his flight number and his 
seat assignment.  Until he gets on the plane, he doesn't want 
to see a scratch on a Brazilian soldier."   Mulet told 
MINUSTAH's deputy political chief, however, that Brazilian 
Ambassador to Haiti Paulo Pinto had given a stern lecture to 
Elito regarding the necessity for decisive action, and that 
Elito had come into line.   MINUSTAH staff reported on 
December 16 that there was much more optimistic mood in their 
headquarters regarding their military colleagues. 
 
¶2. (C)  Comment.  Even with everyone's full commitment, 
taking into account time needed for planning and 
coordination, it may take MINUSTAH several days or even weeks 
to take action.  Nevertheless, with the GoH and MINUSTAH on 
the defensive over security policy, public anxiety peaking 
because of kidnappings of children and the prospect of a 
disrupted holiday season, and President Preval knowing his 
return to Cuba for medical treatment will heighten 
uncertainty over his government's performance, the situation 
seems to be moving inexorably toward some kind of showdown 
with the criminal gangs. 
SANDERSON