VZCZCXRO8001
RR RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHNJ #1432 3521727
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 181727Z DEC 06
FM AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4703
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS NDJAMENA 001432 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE, SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: PREL PREF CD SU
SUBJECT: MEETING WITH KHALIL IBRAHIM IN ABECHE 
 
REF:  A) N'DJAMENA 1402; B) N'DJAMENA 1423 
 
¶1.   (SBU) SUMMARY. During a two-hour meeting in 
Abeche, Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) leader 
Khalil Ibrahim expressed JEM's desire to be included in 
any forthcoming negotiations on an international 
presence in Chad.  He was evasive about JEM involvement 
in recent fighting between Chadian government forces 
(ANT) and Chadian rebels but did not dispute rumors of 
a significant JEM presence observed in Guereda.  He 
advised "letting the dust settle" in Chad in the wake 
of the most recent wave of internal conflict (ref B) 
before expecting any political reconciliation.  Khalil 
promised to provide Poloff with a draft of the JEM's 
proposal for alternative peace plans which the group 
planned to submit to the Security Council, to be sent 
septel.  END SUMMARY. 
-------------------------------------- 
JEM NOT TO BE IGNORED ON BORDER ISSUES 
--------------------------------------- 
¶2. (SBU) Poloff met with JEM leader Khalil Ibrahim in 
Abeche on December 14, following up on his conversation 
with the Ambassador December 5 (reftel A).  One of 
Khalil's main gripes was that JEM was not being 
consulted on decisions taken by the international 
community (specifically the United Nations) vis--vis 
Darfur and eastern Chad, including the implementation 
of UN Security Council resolution 1706 (2006) and the 
recent visit by the UN Department of Peacekeeping 
Operations Technical Assessment Mission.  "We're part 
of the problem and part of the solution, "declared 
Khalil, "yet the United Nations is not taking the 
initiative to include us in its deliberations."  He 
voiced the JEM's support for an international border 
presence but with the caveat that a durable peace come 
first. 
 
 
¶3.   (SBU) To remedy this perceived exclusion, JEM 
plans to transmit within the next 72 hours to the 
Security Council its proposal for alternative peace 
plans beyond the Darfur Peace Agreement (which Khalil 
categorically rejected as the product of "diplomatic 
terrorism" in Abuja) and to submit a request for a 
"hearing session" with the Security Council to air the 
group's grievances on both the Darfur Peace Agreement 
and UNSCR 1706. 
 
¶4.   (SBU) Khalil argued that the international 
community, in particular the UN Security Council, was 
doing more harm than good by "dictating" to the people 
of Darfur untenable terms for addressing the crisis 
there and by issuing "premature documents" such as 
UNSCR 1706 that failed to take into account the 
realities of the situation on the ground.  For example, 
Khalil contended that UNSCR 1706 made no mention of the 
Janjaweed, whose movement Khalil 
predicted would sweep to West Africa [NOTE: Operative 
Paragraph 12 (a) of UNSCR 1706 refers to "armed 
groups."  END NOTE].  Instead, Khalil focused his 
attention on Operative Paragraph 14 of UNSCR 1706, 
which threatens sanctions against non-signatories to 
the DPA, calling this a direct affront to the JEM. 
----------------------------------- 
STILL VAGUE ON JEM SUPPORT FOR GOC 
----------------------------------- 
¶5.   (SBU) Khalil was just as evasive in the December 
14 conversation with Poloff on the subject of the 
Chadian rebellion as he had been in the December 
conversation with Ambassador (ref A).  He said that the 
internal political situation in Chad needed at least 
one month for the "dust to settle" after recent events 
in Guereda and Hadjar Marfaine (ref B).  He predicted 
that at the end of this period, "if the Government of 
Chad (GOC) feels it needs peace talks, then it will 
start peace talks" with the rebellion.  Khalil remained 
optimistic that the GOC would accept a political 
reconciliation with the rebellion, admitting that 
President Deby had run out of negotiating time with the 
SCUD before the latest round of violence had erupted. 
 
¶6.   (SBU) Khalil was similarly evasive on the topic of 
JEM support to the ANT.  When asked about the observed 
presence of up to 60 JEM vehicles in and around Guereda 
earlier this month, he said that these were "legitimate 
movements" in an exceedingly porous border area. 
Khalil reaffirmed that Guereda and the surrounding 
areas to the north remained JEM-controlled 
territory.  Wall