VZCZCXRO5348
PP RUEHBZ RUEHDU RUEHGI RUEHJO RUEHMA RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHRN RUEHROV
DE RUEHNJ #1383/01 3380909
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 040909Z DEC 06 ZUI RUEHSW SVC (CORRECTED COPY TAGS LINE)
FM AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4642
INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHUJA/AMEMBASSY ABUJA PRIORITY 1331
RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA PRIORITY 0882
RUEHGI/AMEMBASSY BANGUI PRIORITY 1257
RUEHKH/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM PRIORITY 0369
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI PRIORITY 0372
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0934

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 NDJAMENA 001383 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREF PREL SU UNSC CD KPKO
SUBJECT: DPKO STILL FORMULATING PLAN FOR EASTERN CHAD 
DEPLOYMENT 
 
REF: N'DJAMENA 01378 
 
NDJAMENA 00001383  001.4 OF 002 
 
 
¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY. Ambassador and Poloff met with the United 
Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) 
Technical Assessment Mission (TAM) on December 1 and 2, 
before and after a meeting between the TAM and President 
Deby.  The TAM reported that Deby had agreed in principle to 
deployment of UN forces in eastern Chad, but raised 
fundamental questions about the nature and mandate of the 
force.  The TAM will depart Chad December 3 without having 
visited the eastern border region and will accordingly make 
only preliminary recommendations to the Security Council for 
an eventual UN presence in eastern Chad and Central African 
Republic (CAR), pursuant to paragraph 9(d) of UN Security 
Council Resolution 1706.  DPKO Assistant-Secretary-General 
(A/SYG) Hedi Annabi posited that any force in Chad and CAR 
would be "separate yet integrated" into the eventual Darfur 
operation.  Annabi did not offer much insight into DPKO's 
thinking on the mandate of the Chad force beyond warning that 
the more involved in border security the force was intended 
to be, the heavier the UN footprint that would be required. 
The diplomatic community present at the December 1 briefing 
stressed that no sustainable security solution in Chad was 
possible without a parallel political process, a point agreed 
between the Ambassador and Annabi in their private December 2 
meeting.  END SUMMARY. 
 
TAM'S WORK IN CHAD IS DONE FOR NOW 
---------------------------------- 
¶2. (SBU) DPKO A/SYG Annabi told a December 1 gathering of the 
diplomatic community that the TAM's work in Chad would be 
incomplete on account of recent instability in the eastern 
border region, which had prevented the team's travel there. 
Annabi admitted that the recommendations the TAM planned to 
present to the Security Council before the end of December 
for an eventual UN presence in Chad and CAR would be only 
preliminary and that another assessment visit would 
eventually be required to develop a proper concept of 
operations. 
 
¶3. (SBU) Annabi reported a productive meeting with CAR 
President Bozize, who had confirmed that anti-government 
rebels re-captured the northeastern town of Birao.  Annabi 
noted that Bozize had been unambiguous in his support for a 
UN presence in CAR, despite equivocation on the part of 
President Deby. 
 
¶4. (SBU) In a private meeting December 2 with the Ambassador, 
Annabi described his 90-minute discussion earlier in the day 
with President Deby on the TAM's visit.  Annabi expressed 
frustration at what he speculated was either Deby's "lack of 
knowledge about how the UN works" or his "not wanting to 
upset le guide (COL Qadhafi)" during their conversation about 
a UN presence in Chad.  First, Deby had insisted, as he had 
in a November 29 meeting with the Ambassador (reftel), that 
the most urgent priority in ensuring security in the east was 
to immediately re-locate the refugee camps away from the 
border.  Deby had then raised the possibility of deploying 
the same type of hybrid force in Chad as was being 
contemplated for Darfur, a possibility which Annabi 
dismissed.  Deby went on to ask if the UN envisioned 
integrating its presence with the Chadian armed forces under 
a single Chadian commander, again dismissed by Annabi. 
Finally, Deby had raised concerns that the eventual 
deployment would infringe upon GOC sovereignty and 
territorial integrity. 
¶5. (SBU) While Annabi acknowledged Deby's comments were 
reminiscent of those made by Sudanese President Bashir 
regarding UN deployment in Darfur, Annabi deemed that Deby 
understood his message by the end of their meeting and took 
Deby's agreement in principle to UN forces as a positive sign 
of GOC support.  Nevertheless, he recommended that "pedagogic 
work" remained to be done to ensure Deby remained engaged on 
the process of UN deployment in Chad.  Annabi tried to broach 
the topic of political dialogue with President Deby to no 
avail.  The diplomatic community present at the December 1 
briefing stressed that no sustainable security solution in 
Chad was possible without a parallel political process, a 
point agreed between the Ambassador and Annabi in their 
private December 2 meeting. 
 
MANDATE OPTIONS 
--------------- 
 
NDJAMENA 00001383  002.8 OF 002 
 
 
¶6. (SBU) Annabi described two possible goals for UN 
deployment in Chad: one, to contribute to the creation of an 
environment that would improve the security situation in the 
refugee camps and internally displaced persons (IDPs) zones; 
or two, to establish a highly mobile border force along 
principal access routes that would deter cross-border 
attacks.  To accomplish these goals, Annabi outlined three 
major options for a UN presence in eastern Chad and CAR.  The 
"light" option envisioned by DPKO would station unarmed 
monitors on the ground.  Annabi warned that this option would 
provide only a limited number of personnel, would be 
insufficient to protect affected populations and would run 
the risk of suffering reduced credibility as had AMIS in 
Darfur.  The "medium" option would station troops in three 
principal locations in Chad's eastern border region, as well 
as in one location in northeastern CAR, and would also 
include a police contingent to assist local authorities in 
protecting civil society.  The "big" option would be an 
ambitious peacekeeping operation geared at stopping by force 
cross-border attacks and weapons flows.  To carry out such a 
preventative mission would require a Chapter VII mandate, as 
well as significant personnel and financial resources, none 
of which were assured, Annabi admitted. 
 
¶7. (SBU) Annabi acknowledged that even the "medium" option 
would require time to stand up, noting deployment of 10,000 
UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) forces in southern Sudan had 
taken over one year to complete.  Annabi added that another 
Security Council resolution would be necessary to articulate 
force size and mandate of the Chad operation.  Annabi 
mentioned the traditional difficulties associated with 
generating Francophone troop contributors.  He also flagged 
the absence of political stability in Chadian as an 
additional impediment to troop-contributing countries' 
commitment and as a less-than-ideal condition under which a 
UN operation could deploy, given no clear indication of an 
eventual exit strategy. 
 
¶8. (SBU) In his private meeting with the Ambassador, Annabi 
sought our input on what an eventual UN presence in Chad and 
CAR could look like and our analysis of the current security 
situation in eastern Chad.  Annabi noted that the UN 
typically made up for what it lacked in military 
sophistication by putting more "boots on the ground," which 
he suspected would be the case if the Security Council were 
to eventually authorize a heavy UN presence on the Chad-Sudan 
border.  Annabi was firm that any force be highly mobile and 
come equipped with air assets.  He speculated that a 
quick-reaction capability would be useful for intervening in 
the face of inter-ethnic conflicts in the southeast border 
region, were the force's mandate to assign it this 
responsibility.  Annabi was concerned about the issue of how 
a force would be perceived by Chadian rebels, stressing that 
it would need to make clear to all parties within Chad - 
government and rebel alike - the provisions of its mandate so 
as to be seen as neutral. 
WALL