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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 NAIROBI 005393 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM KCOR KE
SUBJECT: Ethnicity & Politics in Kenya: Part 2, Kenya's Major Ethnic 
Voting Blocs 
 
 
¶1.  (SBU) Summary:  Despite attempts to steer the political debate 
in Kenya away from 
ethnic considerations towards issues-based politics, ethnic identity 
continues to factor 
prominently.  This message is a survey of the major ethnic groups in 
Kenya and how 
their perceptions and history manifest in Kenya's political context. 
 The differences, and 
similarities, will be a factor leading up to 2007's general 
election.  End Summary. 
 
¶2.   (SBU) While polls suggest that issues-based politics is slowly 
gaining ground among 
Kenyan voters, the 2007 national elections will still largely be 
determined by the ability 
of key politicians to use ethnic rhetoric, money, patronage and 
muscle to win over ethnic 
voting blocs.  By "ethnic rhetoric" we mean both appeals to group 
solidarity to promote 
the political influence of a community and hence the flow of state 
resources to that 
community and rhetoric that stokes traditional inter-ethnic 
resentments for political 
mobilization purposes.  This message presents widespread subjective 
perceptions and 
outright prejudices about ethnicity that, unfortunately, inform the 
choices of many 
Kenyan voters.  Some of these attitudes have a basis in historical 
and ethno-linguistic 
facts, but others do not.  The ethnic classifications discussed here 
are based on how 
Kenyans commonly speak of various groups in a political context. 
These classifications 
may not correspond to those of an academic specialist. 
 
¶3.  (SBU) Kenya's population encompasses three of Africa's major 
ethno-linguistic 
groups; speakers of Bantu, Nilotic and Cushitic languages. (Note: 
Modern linguistic 
classifications employ different names for these language families, 
but Kenyans regularly 
refer to Bantus, Nilotes and Cushites and so we do as well in this 
message.  End Note.) 
We assume a correlation between degree of cultural and linguistic 
affinity among various 
groups and their propensity to work together to achieve political 
aims.  However, in some 
instances historical relationships trump questions of cultural and 
linguistic affinity, 
establishing another basis for political collaboration or political 
opposition. 
 
The Bantus:  Kenya's West African Immigrants 
 
¶4.  (SBU) Kenyans speaking Bantu languages account for about 67% of 
the population. 
Swahili, Kenya's national language, largely consists of vocabulary 
drawn from Arabic 
and coastal Bantu languages with Bantu grammar and syntax.  Aside 
from speaking 
related languages, most Bantu ethnic groups share common cultural 
characteristics, such 
as favoring cultivation over animal husbandry and certain initiation 
rites.  Cultural 
similarities tend to generate political cohesion. 
 
¶5.  (SBU) The Bantu peoples originate in the area that now forms the 
southern frontier 
between Nigeria and Cameroon.  They developed iron working 
technology and spread 
throughout much of Africa, reaching Kenya sometime in the first 
millennium AD.  The 
most important Bantu voting blocs in Kenya are GEMA (the Kikuyu and 
their closely 
related neighbors, the Embu and Meru), the Akamba, and the Luhya. 
 
¶6.  (SBU) GEMA:  The Gikuyu-Embu-Meru Association had immense 
influence during 
the Kenyatta era, but lost much of its political clout during the 
Moi years.  GEMA at 
times used strong arm tactics like forced loyalty oaths and 
political violence to ensure 
that the people of Central province supported its political 
positions and preferred 
candidates.  Today these three closely related peoples still tend to 
vote as a unit, although 
there is always some hard bargaining over the share out of patronage 
positions.  The 
Kikuyu Kenya's largest ethnic group, number about 22% of Kenya's 
population while the 
Meru account for 6% and the Embu 4%, giving GEMA a very considerable 
 
NAIROBI 00005393  002 OF 004 
 
 
32% of the 
country's population.  Kikuyu culture places a high value on land 
acquisition (just as 
other groups value cattle acquisition) and material success 
generally.  Their perceived 
predominance in business, the professions and government attracts 
resentment of many 
other Kenyan communities.  The Kikuyu-led government of Mwai Kibaki 
is massively 
popular among GEMA voters, although opposition leader Uhuru Kenyatta 
also has some 
support. 
 
¶7.  (SBU) Kamba:  The Kamba account for about 11% of Kenya's 
population.  The 
Kamba and Kikuyu languages are mutually intelligible, with a little 
effort.  The Kamba 
occupy a geographic region between the Kikuyu-populated central 
highlands and the 
coast, thus they came to play a key trading role linking these two 
regions.  The Kamba 
are generally more well disposed toward the Kikuyu than other Kenyan 
communities, but 
have gone their own way politically at times, such as during the 
November 2005 
referendum on the draft constitution when GEMA-populated Central 
province largely 
supported the Kibaki draft constitution while the Kamba (and nearly 
everyone else) 
opposed the government's draft.  Native son Kalonzo Musyoka, who 
polls higher 
nationwide than any other opposition presidential hopeful, is the 
most popular politician 
in Kambaland.  Conventional wisdom predicts that if Musyoka does not 
win the 
presidential nomination of the opposition ODM-K party, then his 
Kamba supporters will 
line up behind Kibaki rather than support any of the other 
opposition leaders. 
 
¶8.  (SBU) Luhya:  The Luhya are a grouping of around sixteen 
neighboring Bantu 
communities in Western Kenya, speaking different languages, having 
different traditions, 
but all labeled as "Luhya" largely for political mobilization 
purposes.  Consequently, 
"Luhya Unity" is an oft talked about but seldom achieved political 
goal for the area's 
leaders.  With 14% of the national population, the Luhya vote is 
heavily courted.  Both 
government factions (NARC-Kenya, elements of FORD-Kenya) and 
opposition factions 
(ODM-Kenya, elements of FORD-Kenya) claim significant support from 
various Luhya 
sub-groups.  The Luhya divided their vote during the draft 
constitution referendum.  Most 
Luhya constituencies opposed the government's draft while the Bukusu 
sub-group of the 
Luhya stood behind favorite son Trade Minister Kituyi in his support 
for the government 
draft.  The Luhya do not have the Kamba's close historical ties to 
the Kikuyu.  They have 
been culturally influenced by their more homogeneous neighbors, the 
Luos; traditional 
political rivals of the Kikuyu.  Thus the Luhya are considered less 
reflexively pro-Bantu 
than are other Bantu groups, and more open to cooperation with the 
Luo.  Also, unlike 
the GEMA and Kamba, who are all entirely Kenyan, the Luhya are 
transnational, with a 
significant population in Uganda. 
 
¶9.  (SBU) Other Bantus:  Other important Bantu groups include the 
Kisii, the Taita, the 
Pokomo, and the Mijikenda (a collection of small groups, like the 
Luhya).  All things 
being equal, Kenyan observers tend to assume that Bantus will 
support a fellow Bantu 
candidate over a Nilote. (Cushites need not apply.  See below.) 
Given the numerical 
predominance of the Bantus, this gives a Bantu candidate a major 
advantage.  Moi, as a 
Nilote, was a master at ensuring that all things were not in fact 
equal.  He gave specific 
Bantu leaders material reasons to support his presidency and bring 
their communities 
along with them. 
 
The Nilotes:  Lake, Plains & Highlands 
 
¶10.  (SBU) The Nilotic speaking peoples of Kenya are more culturally 
 
NAIROBI 00005393  003 OF 004 
 
 
varied than the 
Bantus, and less than half as numerous.  They comprise at most 30% 
of the population. 
They are divided into three culturally distinct groups:  the Lake 
Nilotes (Luos), Plains 
Nilotes (Turkana, Maasai, Samburu) and the Highland Nilotes 
(Kalenjin). 
 
¶11.  (SBU) Luo:  The Luos are usually counted as Kenya's second 
largest ethnic group, 
after the Kikuyu.  They probably number about the same as the Luhya, 
at about 14% of 
the population, but, unlike the Luhya, the Luo speak one language 
and behave as a single, 
unified community.  Like the Luhya, they have significant numbers in 
Uganda.  The Luo 
place a high value on owning livestock, but they are settled 
farmers, not pastoralist 
nomads like their plains nilote cousins.  The Luo are among the few 
groups in Kenya that 
do not practice male circumcision as a rite of passage into 
adulthood.  This is a major 
hurdle for Luo politicians seeking the Presidency, as other Kenyans 
do not hesitate to 
express the view that the country cannot be led by an uncircumcised 
"boy."  While 
foreigners may consider this matter irrelevant to the question of 
national leadership, 
Kenyans cite the issue quite often. 
 
¶12.  (SBU) The Luos are known as intellectuals, with the stereotype 
being that they are 
more thinkers than doers.  They were politically divided between Tom 
Mboya and 
Oginga Odinga during the immediate post-independence period. 
Following Mboya's 
assassination (often attributed by Luos to GEMA agents), the Luos 
have strongly 
followed Oginga and his political heir, his son Raila Odinga.  They 
are firmly in the 
opposition camp.  Foreign Minister Rafael Tuju, a Luo who abandoned 
Raila Odinga to 
side with the Kibaki government, is widely considered unelectable 
"traitor" in his home 
constituency. 
 
¶12.   (SBU) Plains Nilotes (Turkana, Maasai, Samburu, Iteso, 
Njemps):  The plains 
nilotes are traditionally nomadic pastoralists.  They occupy much of 
Kenya's section of 
the Rift Valley.  Their combined share of Kenya's population comes 
to only about 5%, 
hence they do not represent a major voting bloc.  As pastoralists, 
the plains nilotes often 
come into conflict with Bantu farmers.  The Maasai and Kikuyu have 
both a tradition of 
violent conflict and of intermarriage. 
 
¶13.  (SBU) Kalenjin:  Like the Luhya and the Mijikenda (coastal 
Bantus), the Kalenjin 
are a collection of small ethnic groups (Kipsigis, Nandi, Sabaot, 
Tugen, Elgeyo, 
Marakwet and Pokot) amalgamated into one ethnic identity largely for 
political 
mobilization purposes.  The Kalenjin are cultivators and sedentary 
stock-raisers 
occupying the highland West-Central districts of Rift Valley 
province.  They make up 
about 11% of Kenya's population.  The Kalenjin were greatly favored 
for recruitment 
into government during the 24 year rule of President Moi, himself a 
Kalenjin.  They 
remain steadfast supporters of the former ruling party, KANU. 
However, that party now 
is severely divided with former President Moi promoting one faction 
led by Nicholas 
Biwott and fellow Kalenjin William Ruto supporting another.  Many 
Kalenjin voters 
remain loyal to their great benefactor, former President Moi, but 
his influence appears to 
be on a slow decline. 
 
The Cushites:  "Are They Really Kenyan?" 
 
¶14.  (SBU) Cushitic speaking peoples (Somali, Rendille, Orma, 
Borana, Gabra and 
Sakuye) occupy nearly half of Kenya's land area, but make up only 
about 3% of the 
population.  They are not a numerically important voting bloc, 
although votes in 
Northeastern Province (the Kenyan Somali heartland) are sought after 
 
NAIROBI 00005393  004 OF 004 
 
 
in presidential 
campaigns due to the requirement for a winner to acquire at least 
25% support in five of 
the eight provinces.  Cushitic territory consists of Northeastern 
Province and the three 
northern districts of Eastern Province.  This region is arid, poor, 
remote and infrastructure 
starved.  The cost of political campaigning per vote is extremely 
high compared to the 
rest of Kenya, which is more densely populated and better served by 
the country's road 
network. 
 
¶15.  (SBU) The Somali account for the great majority of Kenya's 
Cushitic speakers, 
forming 2.3% of Kenya's population.  The next largest group is the 
Borana at 0.3%. 
Both groups are Muslim and transnational ("Borana" is simply the 
Kenyan name for the 
Oromo, Ethiopia's largest ethnic group.)  The Cushitic speakers are 
considered exotic and 
foreign by many Kenyans.  Somalis in particular are often viewed 
with suspicion and 
hostility by other Kenyans, who often question whether a Somali is 
truly Kenyan or an 
opportunistic illegal immigrant from Somalia.  Cushitic political 
influence is further 
undermined by a tendency toward disunity and violent conflict among 
the Cushitic ethnic 
groups.  The Borana and Gabra have a particularly bitter, bloody and 
longstanding feud. 
 
¶16.  (SBU) The Cushitic speakers have a tradition of supporting the 
former ruling party, 
KANU.  However, there is a countervailing tendency to support 
whichever party is 
currently in power.  As a Borana leader told PolCouns, "We are the 
poorest community 
in Kenya.  We cannot afford opposition politics."  KANU predominates 
in the Cushitic 
districts, but pro-government NARC-Kenya has made recent in-roads. 
As noted above, 
this vast region returns only a handful of Members of Parliament, 
although one, 
Mohammed Kuti, a Borana, is Minister for Youth Affairs, and has 
precious few voters. 
There will be minimal campaigning by presidential candidates in the 
north and northeast 
of the country and no serious consideration of candidates for 
national office from that 
region. 
 
Comment:  What Does All this Mean for the Elections? 
 
¶17.  (SBU) A few bottom lines to keep in mind for the 2007 national 
elections: 
 
-- The ideal Presidential candidate as regards ethnicity is a 
non-Kikuyu Bantu.  Such a 
candidate theoretically attracts the 67% of the population that is 
Bantu-speaking and yet 
dodges widespread anti-Kikuyu resentment.  Among the politicians 
presently considered 
top Presidential hopefuls, MP Kalonzo Musyoka fits this bill. 
 
-- Anti-Luo cultural prejudices widespread among the Bantu in 
general and especially 
intense among the Kikuyu play against the candidacy of Luo standard 
bearer, MP Raila 
Odinga. 
 
-- The Luhya are unlikely to coalesce around a single political 
figure or party.  The utility 
of a Luhya Vice Presidential candidate to mobilize the Luhya vote is 
limited.  VP Awori 
is unlikely to be kept on by Kibaki for the second term. 
 
Recognizing the need to steer politics away from largely ethnic 
identification, both 
ODM-K and NARC-Kenya aspire to successfully brand themselves as 
national parties. 
The task is a formidable one, however, as the legacy of ethnic 
politics will take a long 
time to diminish. 
RANNEBERGER