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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MEXICO 007055 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/14/2016 
TAGS: PREL PGOV OAS MX VE CI BR BL CU NI
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR MAISTO CALLS ON SRE OFFICIALS 
 
REF: LA PAZ 3355 
 
Classified By: CHARGE D'AFFAIRES LESLIE A. BASSETT, REASONS: 1.4(B/D). 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary: During a brief visit to Mexico City December 
13-14, USOAS Ambassador John Maisto met separately with 
outgoing SRE Undersecretary for Latin America Jorge Chen 
Charpentier and his successor, Geronimo Gutierrez Fernandez. 
Chen offered a readout of the recent South American summit in 
Cochabamba (reftel), at which Venezuelan President Chavez 
quietly signaled his interest in more constructive relations 
with the GOM, while publicly urging more rapid movement 
towards South American integration.  Chen also emphasized the 
efforts of the Brazilians at the summit to encourage the 
emergence of a South American union, presumably under 
Brazilian leadership.  Ambassador Maisto emphasized to both 
interlocutors his perception that circumstances in the 
Central American countries were ripe for progress and noted 
that the USG looked favorably upon GOM involvement through 
the "Puebla Process" in the pursuit of stability and 
prosperity.  Being new to the region, Gutierrez was in far 
more of a listening mode than Chen, although he promised the 
GOM's continued close cooperation in dealing with regional 
challenges.  End summary. 
 
Chavez Vents in Cochabamba... 
----------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (C) In their December 14 meeting, outgoing SRE 
Undersecretary for Latin America Jorge Chen recounted for 
Ambassador Maisto his observations at the recent South 
American summit in Cochabamba.  He noted that due to last 
minute changes in the seating arrangements, he had the 
unexpected opportunity to exchange views with Venezuelan 
President Hugo Chavez.  Chavez asked Chen to tell President 
Calderon he hoped the two governments would be able to put 
recent tensions behind them and focus on building a more 
constructive relationship in the future.  Nevertheless, 
alluding at least in part to the Calderon presidential 
campaign, Chavez expressed resentment that some in the 
hemisphere were using images of Chavez against left-wing 
candidates.  Ambassador Maisto noted that the USG also sought 
to engage more constructively with the BRV for a long time 
through former FM Rodriguez, who never followed up on his own 
expressions of interest in a high-level dialogue. 
 
¶3.  (C) Chen said that at the summit, Chavez had urged on his 
fellow heads of state more rapid progress towards South 
American integration, including the creation of a South 
American Community secretariat.  Chen concurred with 
Ambassador Maisto that most South American governments feared 
confronting Chavez, adding that the BRV appeared to be using 
its membership in Mercosur to isolate Chile, which had been 
the least receptive of the Southern Cone countries to 
Chavez's overtures. 
 
...While Brazil Flexes Its Muscles 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶4.  (C) Chen recounted that during summit discussions, the 
Brazilians sought to convince their counterparts that the 
international system rapidly was evolving from a unipolar 
system, dominated by the United States, to one with four 
poles, including Europe and neighboring areas; North America 
(including the Caribbean); the Far East; and South America. 
Chen said that Brazil sought to provide political leadership 
to the South American "pole," while Venezuela would provide 
financial support.  Among the priorities of the Brazilian-led 
South American community would be energy integration, 
democracy and human rights, and security and 
counter-terrorism.  Chen noted that the Brazilians defined 
human rights in moral rather than political terms, presumably 
in order to avoid alienating the BRV. 
 
¶5.  (C) Although Bolivian President Evo Morales, as the 
summit host, had personally invited the GOM to send an 
observer to the summit, Chen noted that some summit 
participants -- particularly Brazil -- were less than 
welcoming, presumably because of the GOM's close relationship 
with the USG.  He noted, however, that Nicaraguan 
President-elect Daniel Ortega -- also in attendance as an 
observer -- was afforded a warm welcome by all.  Chen 
expressed surprise that the OAS was never mentioned at the 
summit and that although OAS SYG Insulza had been invited to 
attend, he was not afforded an opportunity to address the 
summit. 
 
Cuba: The Transition Has Begun 
------------------------------ 
 
¶6.  (C) Chen told Ambassador Maisto that the European Union 
 
MEXICO 00007055  002 OF 003 
 
 
was increasingly concerned about post-Castro Cuba.  He said 
that in 2007, the EU and Latin American governments would 
hold a series of preparatory talks in advance of the 2008 
EU-Latin American Summit, and that these preparatory talks 
could provide a key opportunity to discuss Cuba, as well as 
possible EU financial support for Cuba's post-Castro 
transition. 
 
¶7.  (C) For his part, Undersecretary Gutierrez intimated that 
maintaining stability in post-Castro Cuba ranked higher among 
his concerns than seeing a prompt transition to democracy. 
He argued that Raul Castro's appointment as Acting President 
was carried out in accordance with the Cuban constitution and 
that he therefore enjoyed legitimacy within the Cuban legal 
order.  Gutierrez argued that when Fidel definitively passes 
from the scene, the USG should afford his successor a window 
of opportunity -- even if brief -- to demonstrate whether or 
not the successor would seek to undertake democratic reforms, 
adding that the new government's attitude toward reforms 
would quickly become apparent.  Ambassador Maisto underlined 
that the Cuban regime first had to have an internal dialogue 
with Cubans on the island. 
 
OAS Finishing a Difficult Year 
------------------------------ 
 
¶8.  (C) Ambassador Maisto noted that 2006 had been a 
difficult year at the OAS, due in part to the challenges 
posed by the BRV and also to the large number of closely 
contested elections in the hemisphere this year.  Maisto 
noted in particular the difficult negotiations over a draft 
BRV resolution praising its conduct of the recent elections, 
explaining that the Canadians and the USG had worked together 
to ensure that such an excessively laudatory resolution would 
not be adopted. 
 
¶9.  (C) Maisto emphasized to both interlocutors the difficult 
circumstances under which the OAS had carried out its 
election observation mission in Venezuela.  He noted that the 
BRV waited until the last possible minute -- 60 days before 
the election -- to invite the OAS to send a mission, and that 
60 days did not provide enough time to conduct a thorough 
mission.  He said Chavez had "played the OAS like a fiddle:" 
by inviting OAS observers at the last possible minute, he 
ensured they would have as little influence as possible over 
the conditions of the election, while being present to 
witness that the Election Day mechanics complied with minimum 
standards.  Maisto concluded that the OAS's experience in 
Venezuela demonstrated that the rules governing election 
observation missions needed to be changed.  He added that in 
the future, he hoped the OAS would do a better job of 
post-election follow-up, to ensure that the recommendations 
of election observation missions were implemented. 
 
Central America Ripe for Progress 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶10.  (C) Ambassador Maisto told both Chen and Gutierrez that 
the USG believed present circumstances provided the best 
opportunity in years for progress in Central America, adding 
that the USG favored Mexico's engagement in the region.  He 
noted that the USG and GOM shared the same interests in the 
region -- stability, democratic consolidation, and economic 
and social development -- and that he hoped the two 
governments would continue to cooperate in pursuit of these 
goals.  Chen noted that while he looked forward to further 
USG-GOM cooperation in Central America, he believed that GOM 
support for certain aspects of the Plan Puebla-Panama -- 
particularly the proposed construction of an oil refinery in 
Central America -- appeared to be waning. 
 
¶11.  (C) Gutierrez largely concurred with Chen, noting that 
Plan Puebla-Panama enjoyed far more support outside of Mexico 
than within.  He explained that many in the GOM doubted that 
the proposed oil refinery would be economically viable for 
Mexico, given declining Mexican oil production.  Ambassador 
Maisto encouraged Gutierrez to work with post to see whether 
USG financial support -- such as through the Trade and 
Development Agency -- might be available to facilitate the 
project. 
 
Comment: The Tone May Change, But Not the Substance 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
¶12.  (C)  Although Gutierrez is new to the region, in his 
prior position overseeing GOM relations with North America, 
we found him to be a quick study, pragmatic, and sensitive to 
USG interests and concerns.  For his part, both during and 
after the campaign, President Calderon called for greater 
emphasis in Mexican diplomacy on relations with Latin 
America; accordingly, the months ahead are likely to bring 
 
MEXICO 00007055  003 OF 003 
 
 
GOM efforts to smooth over differences with other governments 
in the region, particularly Venezuela and Cuba. Nevertheless, 
while the Calderon administration is likely to conduct its 
diplomacy in the region with more subtlety and sophistication 
than its predecessor, we expect its basic pro-democracy and 
free market orientation to remain.  We can count on the 
Calderon administration to remain a key -- if possibly more 
discreet -- ally in the region as we seek to promote 
democratic consolidation and economic development.  End 
comment. 
 
 
Visit Mexico City's Classified Web Site at 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/wha/mexicocity 
BASSETT