VZCZCXRO9534
OO RUEHCHI RUEHDT RUEHHM
DE RUEHML #5038/01 3540617
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 200617Z DEC 06
FM AMEMBASSY MANILA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4324
INFO RUEHZS/ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RHHMUNA/CDRUSPACOM HONOLULU HI IMMEDIATE
RUEILB/NCTC WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 MANILA 005038 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR S/CT(RHONDA SHORE) AND EAP/MTS 
USPACOM ALSO FOR FPA HUSO AND J5 
SECDEF/OSD/ISA/AP (TOOLAN/BAILEY) 
JOINT STAFF/J5 (WILKES/ROBINSON/CLEMMONS) 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PTER ASEC RP
SUBJECT: PHILIPPINES: 2006 COUNTRY REPORTS ON TERRORISM 
 
¶1.  (U) Summary.  The Philippines, one of the earliest 
supporters in the global coalition against terrorism, 
continues to cooperate with the United States on bilateral 
and multilateral counterterrorism efforts.  In 2006, 
ninety-three bombings occurred in the Philippines from 
improvised explosive devices, grenades, and landmines.  The 
Armed Forces of the Philippines launched on August 1 an 
ongoing operation codenamed "Operation Ultimatum" against 
leading members of the Abu Sayyaf Group and Jemaah Islamiyah 
on Jolo Island.  The Anti-Terrorism Task Force arrested, 
captured, or killed 88 suspected terrorists, and seized over 
900 kilograms of explosive materials.  Philippine authorities 
also made progress in tracking, blocking, and seizing 
terrorists' assets.  Nevertheless, major evidentiary and 
procedural obstacles in the Philippines continue to hinder 
the building of effective terrorism cases, and a large and 
growing case backlog and the absence of continuous, 
contiguous trials for terrorism cases are impediments to the 
Philippines' prosecution of suspected terrorists.  The House 
of Representatives in April approved a draft counterterrorism 
bill, while the Senate continues to deliberate on a different 
version.  End Summary. 
 
------------------ 
GENERAL ASSESSMENT 
------------------ 
 
¶2.  (U) The Philippines, one of the earliest supporters in 
the global coalition against terrorism, continues to 
cooperate closely with the United States on bilateral and 
multilateral counterterrorism efforts. 
 
¶3.  (U) The Philippines faces numerous threats from 
terrorism.  Operating within the country are the Abu Sayyaf 
Group (ASG), Communist Party of the Philippines/New People's 
Army (CPP/NPA), and Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), all of which the 
U.S. Government has designated as Foreign Terrorist 
Organizations (FTOs).  In addition, the Alex Boncayao Brigade 
(ABB) and the Pentagon Gang are on the U.S. Terrorist 
Exclusion List.  Embassy has also recommended inclusion of 
yet another local group on the FTO list -- the Rajah Solaiman 
Movement (RSM) -- and this proposal remains under 
consideration. 
 
¶4.  (U) In 2006, 93 bombings and 28 non-criminal mechanical 
explosions left 65 persons dead and 258 injured in the 
Philippines, according to the Philippine National Police 
(PNP) Bomb Data Center.  According to PNP, 35 bombings were 
the result of improvised explosive devices, 50 from grenades, 
and eight from landmines.  PNP investigations established the 
motives for 16 of the 93 bombings as terrorism, while 35 
stemmed from vandalism, ten for "revenge," two for 
"political" reasons, and one for "personal" reasons.  The 
motives for the remaining 29 bombings remain unknown. 
 
¶5.  (U) In February, the bombing of a videoke bar located 
near a Philippine military base on Jolo Island left one dead 
and 22 injured.  During March, a bomb exploded at the Sulu 
Consumers' Cooperative on Jolo, killing nine people and 
injuring 20.  In June, a roadside bombing in Shariff Aguak 
killed three people and injured eight.  In August, two bombs 
exploded almost simultaneously in Kidapawan City, injuring 
three people.  In September, a bomb exploded at a public 
market in General Santos City, killing two people and 
injuring six.  In October, a bomb exploded near the 
headquarters of the Sulu PNP in Jolo, injuring two persons. 
Also in October, three bombs exploded in Tacurong, Sultan 
Kudurat; Makilala, North Cotabato; and Cotabato City, killing 
eight people and injuring over 30. 
 
¶6.  (U) Philippine authorities recovered 36 IEDs/IED 
components, 145 military ordnance/vintage bombs, and 11 
explosive ingredients during 2006.  Nineteen bomb 
threats/hoaxes and one theft of explosives also occurred in 
2006, according to PNP data. 
 
¶7.  (U) Philippine authorities had a number of successes 
against terrorists in 2006.  On March 10, Philippine 
authorities arrested ASG member Ali Ambing in Valenzuela 
City, north of Manila, for his involvement in the February 
2004 Superferry 14 bombing and an October 2002 bombing in 
Zamboanga that killed U.S. Army SFC Mark Wayne Jackson.  On 
March 12 and April 29, Philippine security forces arrested 
ASG Commander Burham Sali and ASG member Abdusalih Dimah, 
 
MANILA 00005038  002 OF 004 
 
 
respectively, for their involvement in the murders of U.S. 
citizens Martin Burnham and Guillermo Sobero and several 
Filipino hostages during the Dos Palmas kidnapping in 2001. 
On April 24, Philippine authorities arrested Al-Sharie 
Amiruddin in Zamboanga City for his involvement in the Dos 
Palmas and Sipadan kidnappings.  On October 3, Philippine 
authorities captured Istiada Oemar Sovie, the Indonesian wife 
of wanted Bali bomber-JI terrorist Dulmatin, and deported her 
to Indonesia on November 30.  On November 13, Philippine 
authorities arrested JI-trained bomber Blah Platon in 
Tacurong, Sultan Kudurat.  On November 24, Philippine 
authorities arrested ASG member Annik Abbas in Basilan.  On 
November 30, Philippine authorities arrested Delos Reyes, one 
of the founding members of the RSM and a suspect in the 2003 
Awang Airport bombing.  According to Philippine officials, 
the Anti-Terrorism Task Force (ATTF) arrested, captured, or 
killed a total of 88 suspected terrorists in 2006.  However, 
Philippine courts made no convictions of terrorists in 2006, 
compared to at least eight convictions in 2005.  The ATTF 
also coordinated operations that led, in October and 
November, to seizures of over 900 kilograms of ammonium 
nitrate and 100 bomb detonators/devices in Zamboanga City. 
 
¶8.  (U) Philippine military forces killed several key ASG 
figures during armed encounters.  On April 3, the Philippine 
military killed ASG commander in Basilan Province, Romy 
Akilan, and his brother, Patta Akilan, on Sacol Island, off 
Zamboanga City.  On April 11, Philippine military forces 
killed ASG Urban Terrorist Group leader Amihamja Ajijul, 
a.k.a. Alex Alvarez, near Zamboanga City.  On August 29, 
Philippine military forces killed Ibrahim Salem during a raid 
of an ASG hideout in Sultan Kudurat, Maguindanao.  On 
November 6, Philippine military forces in Zamboanga Del Sur 
Province killed Tajajul Ampul, a suspect in dozens of 
kidnappings and a 2001 raid on a rubber plantation in Basilan 
that led to the beheading of eleven farmers.  During an 
ongoing AFP operation launched on August 1 -- codenamed 
"Operation Ultimatum" -- Philippine military forces have so 
far killed at least 31 members of the ASG, including Ismin 
Sahiron, the son of ASG Commander Radullah Sahiron, and 
captured seven others. 
 
¶9.  (U) U.S. and Philippines authorities worked closely 
during 2006 on rewards programs targeting terrorist groups. 
The U.S. Department of State paid $100,000 in January through 
its Rewards for Justice Program to an informant who led to 
the capture of Toting Craft Hanno, an ASG terrorist under 
U.S. indictment for his role in the Burnham kidnappings. In 
May, the U.S. Department of State Rewards for Justice Program 
made a payment of $500,000 to two informants for their roles 
in the capture of RSM founder/leader Hilairon Del Rosario 
Santos.  Using its rewards program, the U.S. Department of 
Defense made a $50,000 payment in July to an informant who 
led to the capture of Gamal Baharan, a suspect in the 
February 14, 2005, bombings in Manila, Davao, and General 
Santos.  The U.S. Department of Defense made other payments 
to informants whose information led to the capture of: Alex 
Kahal ($7,500, February); Benhar Ismi ($3,000, February); 
Abdulla Mohammad ($5,000, February); Pio de Vera ($30,000, 
July); Ahiri y Lipaie ($3,000, July); Abdulgani Esmael Pagao 
($10,0000, July); Amilhamja Ajijul, Sawari Asion, and Sabri 
Kamlon ($40,000, October); and, Nasid Tahjid ($7,000, 
November).  Other payments were related to the seizure of two 
speedboats used by the ASG ($10,000, October) and the 
recovery of IEDs in Jolo ($1,800, December). 
 
¶10.  (U) Major evidentiary and procedural obstacles in the 
Philippines continue to hinder effective legal cases against 
terrorists, notably the absence of a law identifying 
terrorist acts and restrictions on gathering of evidence by 
electronic surveillance and other modern techniques.  Major 
problems in the law enforcement and criminal justice systems 
also hamper bringing terrorists to justice in the 
Philippines, including corruption, low morale, inadequate 
salaries, recruitment and retention difficulties, lack of 
information technology upgrades, and inadequate cooperation 
between police and prosecutors. 
 
¶11.  (U) The Philippine government contributes fully to 
regional and international efforts to combat terrorist 
financing and strives to fulfill its responsibilities through 
the United Nations to detect and block the flow of funding to 
individuals and entities that support terrorism.  The country 
is hampered somewhat in the implementation of these efforts 
 
MANILA 00005038  003 OF 004 
 
 
because of its laws and legal system. 
 
¶12.  (U) The Anti-Money Laundering Council (AMLC), operating 
under the Philippine Anti-Money Laundering Act of 2001 
(AMLA), as amended in 2003, pursues the investigation and 
prosecution of money laundering and is the lead agency 
responsible for implementing the asset freeze measures called 
for by the UN Security Council 1267 Sanctions Committee.  The 
Philippine government has signed and ratified all 12 
international conventions and protocols related to terrorism, 
including those pertaining to the suppression of terrorist 
financing.  The AMLA is the legislative basis for the 
implementation of the financial sanctions against al-Qaida 
and the Taliban.  Under the current law, however, the AMLC 
cannot take direct action against suspected terrorists or 
those supporting terrorism, but must apply for a court order 
to inquire into bank accounts and direct the freezing of 
assets and transactions. 
 
¶13.  (U) In 2006, the Philippine government came closer to 
enacting new antiterrorism legislation.  The House of 
Representatives approved a counterterrorism bill during 
April.  The Senate is currently deliberating on a different 
draft counterterrorism bill. 
 
¶14.  (U) The United States and the Philippine government 
signed a bilateral Extradition Treaty in 1996.  The treaty 
gives precedence to the Philippine government for the 
prosecution, conviction, and imprisonment of Filipino 
criminals apprehended in the Philippines, but the Philippine 
government has routinely issued arrest warrants for Filipino 
nationals whom the U.S. has sought on terrorism charges.  The 
Philippine government did not extradite or request 
extradition of terrorists for prosecution during 2006. 
 
¶15.  (U) The Philippine government does not offer any support 
for terrorists either within or outside its borders. 
 
¶16.  (U) The Philippine government consistently supports the 
United States in United Nations General Assembly and United 
Nations Security Council matters related to terrorism. 
 
--------------------------------- 
SANCTUARY (SAFE HAVEN) ASSESSMENT 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶17.  (U) The Philippine government launched intensive 
civil-military operations in January to eliminate terrorist 
safe havens within the Sulu Archipelago.  Balikatan Exercises 
and a visit by the USS Mercy supported the Philippine 
government's campaign to separate terrorists from the general 
population and diminish support for their cause. 
 
¶18.  (U) The Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), with U.S. 
intelligence, reconnaissance, and surveillance support, 
launched "Operation Ultimatum" on August 1 to capture the top 
five ASG and JI leaders on the island of Jolo: Khadaffy 
Janjalani; Isnilon Hapilon; Abu Solaiman; Umar Patek; and, 
Dulmatin.  The Philippine Navy established a tight maritime 
cordon around Jolo and has conducted over 4,300 interdictions 
during this ongoing operation. 
 
¶19.  (U) The Philippine government is aware that some JI 
members have obtained safe haven in Mindanao and is actively 
engaged in efforts to capture them.  There is an Ad Hoc Joint 
Action Group under which the Philippine government and the 
Moro Islamic Liberation Front cooperate against terrorists 
and criminals in Mindanao. 
 
¶20.  (U) Philippine military and law enforcement at the 
regional and provincial level work closely with U.S. Embassy 
counterparts and visiting military personnel to ensure 
counterterrorism force protection to more than 25 annual 
bilateral military events.  In 2006, U.S. and Philippine 
military and law enforcement officials cooperated against JI 
and ASG targets, with U.S. officials actively assisting in 
investigating and pre-empting several terrorist attacks. 
Members of Joint Special Operations Task Force - Philippines 
in the southern Philippines are involved in civil-military 
operations and intelligence fusion to help the AFP develop a 
sustained counterterrorism capability.  The Embassy's law 
enforcement team maintains regular contact with police and 
security counterparts.  Mission received excellent levels of 
cooperation from Philippine law enforcement officials in 
 
MANILA 00005038  004 OF 004 
 
 
obtaining access to terrorist detainees and witnesses for FBI 
interviews, and access to criminal, immigration, financial, 
and biographic records via the mechanisms established in the 
U.S.- Philippine Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty.  The U.S. 
Department of State's Bureau of Diplomatic Security is 
improving the capability of Philippine agencies to respond to 
terrorist threats through an in-country Anti-Terrorism 
Assistance Program. 
 
¶21.  (U) Neither the proliferation nor the trafficking of 
weapons of mass destruction plays a role in terrorism in the 
Philippines, though the Philippine National Intelligence 
Coordinating Agency remains concerned about possible future 
developments. 
 
---------------- 
TERRORIST GROUPS 
---------------- 
 
¶22.  (U) Embassy has no information suggesting that any 
foreign government provides financial support, military or 
paramilitary training, weapons, diplomatic recognition, or 
sanctuary from prosecution to terrorist groups operating in 
the Philippines. 
 
¶23.  (U) The Philippine government considers the NPA as the 
greatest threat to security of the Philippines and declared 
"all out war" against the Communist insurgents.  The AFP 
requested a $620 million budget for 2007 from the Philippine 
Congress to support its campaign to crush the 38-year old 
Communist insurgency by 2010.  The NPA, with an estimated 
strength of 6,828 members, has killed over 840 civilians and 
360 soldiers and police officers since January 2000, 
according to the AFP. 
 
¶24.  (U) A major recent trend is growing cooperation among 
members of the JI, ASG, and RSM. 
 
------------------------------ 
FOREIGN GOVERNMENT COOPERATION 
------------------------------ 
 
¶25.  (U) The Philippines cooperates fully with the United 
States on bilateral and multilateral counterterrorism 
efforts.  In April, the two governments established the U.S. 
- Philippine Security Engagement Board (SEB) -- modeled after 
the bilateral Mutual Defense Board -- to deal with 
non-traditional security issues, including counterterrorism 
and maritime security.  This watershed agreement set the 
stage for the "Kapit Bisig" (Shoulder-to-Shoulder) 
counterterrorism framework that focuses on civil affairs, 
capability upgrades, and support for AFP operations. 
 
¶26.  (U) The United States is assisting the Philippines in 
the establishment of an interagency intelligence fusion 
center in Zamboanga City that will support maritime 
interdictions against transnational criminal/terrorist 
organizations as well as a "Coast Watch" system in Mindanao, 
with Australian assistance.  Other centers will eventually be 
in Palawan, General Santos City, and Davao. 
 
¶27.  (U) Despite plans dating back to 2001, the Philippine 
Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) does not yet have a 
digitized, machine-readable passport.  While the Philippines 
cooperates with USG requests for prosecutions for persons who 
tamper or alter travel documents, the prosecutions carry low 
level penalties.  In addition, there is a reluctance to 
investigate or charge vendors or users of false documents 
when the Philippine government is not the issuing authority. 
 
¶28.  (U) Embassy Manila's POC for the 2006 Terrorism Report 
is Political Officer Stephen Worobec (worobecSF@state.gov), 
telephone 528-6300, ext 2288. 
 
Visit Embassy Manila's Classified SIPRNET website: 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eap/manila/index. cfm 
 
You can also access this site through the State Department's 
Classified SIPRNET website: 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/ 
 
KENNEY