VZCZCXRO7555
OO RUEHCHI RUEHDT RUEHHM
DE RUEHML #4915 3401008
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 061008Z DEC 06
FM AMEMBASSY MANILA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4187
INFO RUEHZS/ASEAN COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI IMMEDIATE

UNCLAS MANILA 004915 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: PREL EAID PTER RP
SUBJECT:  INCENTIVES FOR PEACE AND COUNTER-TERRORISM GAINS IN 
MINDANAO 
 
REF:  A. MANILA 4656 
 
-         B.  MANILA 2427 
 
¶1.  The situation on the ground in Mindanao has improved 
significantly over the past year or two, prompting us to revise our 
approach to the incentives to consolidate the peace process.  Given 
the central role of USG assistance in the growth of zones of peace, 
we no longer believe it is in the U.S. interest to withhold 
assistance in the absence of a signed peace accord between the 
Philippine Government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). 
Instead, we should build on our remarkably successful approach to 
establishing peace on the ground, while offering political support 
to the peace negotiations.  Our incentive to the MILF is a 
commitment to redirect a significant portion of our assistance 
toward a livelihood and reintegration program for former combatants 
immediately after a peace accord is signed.  Negotiators for all the 
parties believe this will help fast track a formal settlement. 
¶2. Our investment in peace has begun to create conditions favorable 
to peace and development, and unfavorable to terrorists.  Actual 
peace on the ground has gained serious traction and constituents to 
the point that a return to full-scale fighting is increasingly 
unlikely.  Meanwhile, millions of people in this poorest part of the 
Philippines have now benefited directly or indirectly from these 
programs, whether by gaining access to computers and the internet, 
receiving medical attention (often for the first times in their 
lives), using new ports and roads, and/or gaining livelihood skills 
that allowed them to give up lives of insurgency, to cite only a few 
examples.  USAID projects are exceptionally well coordinated with 
the civil-military and humanitarian operations of Joint Special 
Operations Task Force-Philippines and other USG activities to form a 
cohesive network supporting peace and development. 
¶3.  Our investments in the ongoing peace process in Mindanao are 
central to achieving USG peace, security, and counter-terrorism 
objectives in the Southeast Asia region.   Notably, the visible 
presence and clear success of the flagship Growth with Equity in 
Mindanao ("GEM") initiative demonstrates to the Philippine 
Government , other donors, and even the private sector that it is 
possible to safely carry out real development and build sustainable 
peace in these areas, thus encouraging other actors to become more 
actively engaged in the region. 
¶4.  As both Foreign Secretary Alberto Romulo and MILF Vice Chairman 
Ghazali Jaafar have separately told us recently, the momentum of our 
effective assistance programs has made a huge difference in pushing 
people in the right direction - away from violent conflict and 
terrorism and toward peace and development.  They, and their 
constituents for peace on the ground, want and expect the USG to 
continue to invest in peace, with or without an accord.  The growing 
zones of peace and the growing U.S. influence - based on our 
assistance - have a direct impact on the fight against international 
terrorists in Mindanao and prove that our strategy against terrorism 
in the Philippines is working.  The MILF ejected high value 
terrorists from Mindanao last year, and is increasingly supportive 
of ridding Central Mindanao of all JI and ASG terrorists.  The MILF 
now calls itself a partner in peace with the government, and 
publicly rejects terrorism.  We should no longer threaten to 
withhold assistance in the absence of a formal peace accord, but 
instead build on our successful strategy to foster the conditions 
for peace. 
KENNEY