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DE RUEHMU #2617/01 3352224
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P 012224Z DEC 06
FM AMEMBASSY MANAGUA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8335
INFO RUEHZA/WHA CENTRAL AMERICAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC

C O N F I D E N T I A L MANAGUA 002617 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR WHA A/S SHANNON, WHA/CEN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/29/2016 
TAGS: ECON KDEM NU PGOV
SUBJECT: BOLANOS TO A/S SHANNON: "WE HAVE TO CORRAL ORTEGA" 
 
Classified By: classified by Ambassador Paul Trivelli for reasons 1.4 b 
, d 
 
¶1.  (C) SUMMARY: During a November 28 lunch hosted for 
Assistant Secretary Thomas Shannon, President Bolanos and his 
advisors shared their insights and concerns about an Ortega 
presidency and outlined the key points of a liberal 
opposition strategy.  President Bolanos opined that Ortega 
has little room to maneuver and that paying his "social debt" 
will be very difficult without collapsing the economy. 
Political advisor Frank Arana acknowledged that Ortega, thus 
far, has delivered all the right messages, but he remains 
leery of Ortega,s true commitment.  Concerned about Ortega's 
dictatorial ambitions, Bolanos and his advisors stressed the 
need to "control" Ortega through a unified opposition party 
in the National Assembly, greater empowerment of civil 
society, and a strong performance in the 2008 municipal 
elections.  They admitted, however, that the challenge is 
daunting because the liberals have no experience as an 
opposition party.  END SUMMARY. 
 
Ortega Can Talk the Talk, but Can he Walk the Walk? 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶2.  (C) In a November 28 lunch meeting hosted by President 
Bolanos for A/S Tom Shannon, President Bolanos opined that it 
would be impossible for Ortega to pay his "social debt" -- 
the promises he made during the campaign -- while maintaining 
economic growth.  According to Bolanos, if Ortega fails to 
deliver on these promises, he will lose the core of his 
party,s supporters -- but delivering on them will cause the 
economy to collapse.  He added that the FSLN, while adept at 
activism and organizing, does not know how to administer. 
Further, Political Advisor Frank Arana quipped that Ortega,s 
presidency may be "legal", but it is not "legitimate" because 
he was elected with only 38 percent of the vote.  As a 
result, there will be more pressure on Ortega to perform and 
less room for error. 
 
¶3.  (C) Arana also conceded that Ortega,s initial 
conversations with the economic sector, the banking 
community, and the other Central American presidents have 
been very positive.  He noted that Ortega is hitting all the 
right points, talking about CAFTA, the Millennium Challenge 
Account, closer cooperation among Central American countries, 
and improving relations with the United States.  However, 
Arana warned, Ortega is highly skilled at telling people what 
they want to hear. 
 
Liberals Fear Ortega Dynasty 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶4.  (C) Bolanos, Arana, and Foreign Minister Norman Caldera 
conveyed their concerns that Ortega will not relinquish power 
at the end of his term and will do what he can to establish 
himself as "dictator".  Bolanos pointed out that Ortega 
controls many of the State,s critical institutions including 
the Supreme Electoral Council (CSE), Supreme Court (CSJ), and 
the offices of the Attorney General and Comptroller.  Bolanos 
lamented that controlling Ortega without a functioning system 
of State checks and balances will be difficult, declaring 
that, "all hangs in the balance between democracy and 
dictatorship." 
 
¶5.  (C) Also referencing the FSLN,s institutional control, 
Lindolfo Monjarretz, spokesperson for the presidency, 
cautioned that the FSLN is well-prepared and could use its 
control to impede reforms.  He also admitted that former 
President Arnoldo Aleman, who continues to control the 
Liberal Constitutionalist Party,s (PLC), is a complicating 
factor (in the liberal opposition's ability to control 
Ortega).  According to Monjarretz, everyone knows Aleman is a 
problem, but no one knows what to do about him. 
 
¶6.  (C) Ambassador Trivelli proffered that the liberal 
opposition must convince Ortega that working with Aleman is 
no longer essential or even advantageous, and that the 
Nicaraguan Liberal Alliance (ALN), as the acknowledged second 
political force in Nicaragua, is the key to the future. 
 
Strong Opposition is Key, but Liberals Have Little Experience 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶7.  (C) Bolanos and Arana emphasized that the opposition,s 
strategy must be to build a "corral" around Ortega in order 
to restrain his actions, reduce the influence of negative 
outside forces, and to force him to work within the existing 
system of democratic institutions.  All agreed that a strong 
unified opposition is necessary to implement this strategy. 
Arana urged immediate consolidation of the liberal forces as 
a first step in order to provoke and promote reforms in civil 
society and in the National Assembly. 
 
¶8.  (C) Lindolfo Monjarretz pointed out, however, that the 
liberals have no history or experience as an opposition party 
because the liberals have been in power, in one form or 
another, for the past sixteen years.  In contrast, the FSLN, 
after losing the elections in 1990, retreated, retrenched, 
and solidified power in key areas such as education and 
justice.  Thus, advised Monjarretz, the liberals must take a 
step back and reflect before moving forward as an opposition 
party. 
 
¶9.  (C) A/S Tom Shannon agreed that having a strong 
opposition force will be important, but warned that it is not 
easy to build.  He commented that 16 years in power have made 
the liberals good at administering the State, but have 
degraded their ability to build grassroots constituencies and 
express a long term vision for Nicaragua. Shannon further 
stated that the liberals must develop messages that civil 
society understands and continue to advance democracy to 
ensure that civil society does not fragment under an Ortega 
presidency. 
 
Enabled Civil Society Will Act as Check on Ortega 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶10.  (C) Bolanos echoed Arana,s emphasis on building and 
re-enforcing civil society as a tactic to control Ortega. 
Commenting that he will use his seat in the National Assembly 
to vote on what he deemed the "10 percent of the legislation 
that is important," Bolanos plans to focus his attention on 
building Nicaragua,s first presidential library and a 
political think tank in order to facilitate greater 
participation of civil society.  The "virtual" library will 
include, in an electronic searchable format, contributions 
from the Central Bank, Central American University (UCA), and 
Ave Marie College as well as Bolanos, history as a public 
servant and his brother's extensive collection of historical 
documents.  (NOTE: Bolanos' brother Alejandro, who passed 
away earlier last year, was a renowned Nicaraguan historian 
with an extensive collection. END NOTE.) 
 
2008 Municipal Elections: Another Check on Ortega 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶11.  (C) Citing the close correlation between municipal-level 
voting outcomes in the presidential election and party 
control of municipal governments, Monjarretz suggested that 
the liberal,s containment strategy must also focus on 
winning in the 2008 municipal elections.  He stressed that 
the opposition should use the next two years to build the 
mechanisms to enable victory in 2008 to position the party 
for victory in the 2011 presidential elections.  Arana 
agreed, adding that the liberal opposition must find and 
develop "acceptable" candidates because municipal elections 
are often decided by only a few votes. (COMMENT: Arana,s 
emphasis on "acceptable" is in likely reference to finding 
candidates who can bridge the bitter divide between the ALN 
and the PLC created during the elections to represent the 
broader liberal opposition ideals.  END COMMENT.) 
 
Controlling the National Assembly 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶12.  (C) Monjarretz and Arana also highlighted that the 
liberal opposition,s ability to consolidate power in the 
National Assembly in order to wrest control for high level 
appointments from Aleman and the PLC will be another way to 
keep Ortega,s ambitions in check.  Monjarretz specifically 
mentioned the appointment of judges to the Supreme Court, a 
key institution in the legal enforcement of future reforms. 
 
Shannon - Praises Bolanos, Sees Room for Dialogue with Ortega 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶13.  (C) Shannon confirmed our commitment to Nicaragua and 
recognized Bolanos for the accomplishments of his 
administration including ratification of CAFTA, debt 
reduction, and the Millennium Challenge Account.  To 
inquiries about his meeting with Ortega earlier in the day, 
Shannon responded that now is the time to open dialog with 
the President-elect.  He reported that Ortega,s message was 
disciplined, raising points in the meeting related to support 
for CAFTA, democracy and positive relations with the United 
States and the need to form a good basis for future dialog. 
Shannon noted that we will go into a relationship with the 
Sandinistas with our eyes wide open, adding that it will take 
time to determine whether or not Ortega has changed. 
However, Shannon stressed that there is no doubt that 
Nicaragua has changed, and now has the political structures 
and civil society to restrain Ortega and protect Nicaraguan 
Democracy.  Shannon re-iterated that Nicaragua is very 
important to us and that "we will continue to work together." 
 
¶14. (U) Participants 
 
Nicaragua: 
President Enrique Bolanos 
Foreign Minister Norman Caldera 
Chief of Staff Leonardo Somarriba 
Political Advisor Frank Arana 
Private Secretary Lincoln Escobar 
Presidential Spokesman Lindolfo Monjarretz 
Political Advisor Pedro Solorzono 
 
U.S.: 
Assistant Secretary Tom Shannon 
Ambassador Paul Trivelli 
DCM Peter Brennan 
Political Counselor Victoria Alvarado 
Poloff Eric Mehler (note-taker) 
TRIVELLI