VZCZCXRO7391
PP RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #2863/01 3520745
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 180745Z DEC 06
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5579
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHRN/USMISSION UN ROME

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KHARTOUM 002863 
 
SIPDIS 
 
AIDAC 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
STATE FOR AF/SPG, PRM, AND ALSO PASS USAID/W 
USAID FOR DCHA SUDAN TEAM, AFR/SP 
NAIROBI FOR SFO 
NSC FOR PMARCHAM, MMAGAN, AND TSHORTLEY 
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU 
USUN FOR TMALY 
BRUSSELS FOR PLERNER 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: EAID PREF PGOV PHUM SOCI SU AU
SUBJECT: DARFUR - VISIT OF THE USAID-OFDA DEPUTY DIRECTOR 
 
 
KHARTOUM 00002863  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
------------------- 
SUMMARY AND COMMENT 
------------------- 
 
¶1.  From November 30 to December 2, USAID Office of U.S. Foreign 
Disaster Assistance (USAID/OFDA) Deputy Director Greg Gottlieb and a 
team of USAID Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian 
Assistance (USAID/DCHA) field staff visited Nyala, South Darfur, to 
assess humanitarian conditions and gain a better understanding of 
the situation on the ground.  The USAID/DCHA team included the 
USAID/DCHA Senior Humanitarian Advisor, the USAID Darfur Field 
Office (DFO) Team Leader, the DFO Field Officer for Nyala, and the 
USAID Office of Transition Initiatives (USAID/OTI) Darfur Program 
Manager.  In Nyala, the USAID/DCHA team met with South Darfur State 
Humanitarian Aid Commission (HAC) representatives, the UN Mission in 
Sudan (UNMIS), the UN Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS), the 
African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS), the UN Development Program 
(UNDP), and USAID/OFDA partners.  The team also visited USAID/OFDA 
programs at Otash, Kalma, and Gereida internally displaced person 
(IDP) camps. 
 
¶2.  The situation for IDPs in Darfur is growing more precarious. 
USAID non-governmental organization (NGO) and UN partners face 
rising insecurity as the various armed groups fight across a large 
area, with civilians and their villages bearing the brunt of the 
fighting.  The Government of National Unity (GNU) continues to 
impose unreasonable restrictions and regulations on humanitarian 
organizations.  Considering the violence and bureaucratic 
harassment, it is remarkable that relief agencies continue to 
deliver assistance at reasonable levels to an ever-increasing number 
of IDPs and affected communities.  End summary and comment. 
 
--------- 
HAC-NEYED 
--------- 
 
¶3.  Upon arrival in Nyala, the USAID/DCHA team met with Jamal 
Youseff, the HAC Secretary General for South Darfur.  Youseff 
expressed appreciation for USAID's support and assistance, but noted 
that more assistance was necessary in the sectors of health, water, 
sanitation, and hygiene.  Youseff stressed that donors need to 
provide more assistance outside of IDP camps in order to encourage 
IDPs to return to their areas of origin.  He noted that many IDPs in 
camps enjoy health services that were not available in their places 
of origin, and that IDPs were reluctant to do without these services 
in the future.  Youseff believes humanitarian assistance is keeping 
people in camps unnecessarily and that the international community 
should initiate a process of assisted returns, adding that security 
improvements would allow for such action. 
 
¶4.  Youseff told the USAID/DCHA team that the HAC would do 
everything possible to assist with the humanitarian efforts in South 
Darfur, but expressed concern that international NGOs were enriching 
themselves with donor funds instead of using the funds to assist 
those in need. 
 
¶5.  USAID in turn requested that the HAC lessen its restrictions on 
NGOs to facilitate assistance, instead of imposing unreasonable and 
constantly changing regulations.  (Comment:  The meeting followed 
the expected script with HAC personnel.  The team expected little 
except platitudes, and received exactly that.  End comment.) 
 
-------------------------------------------- 
SPIRALING INSECURITY THREATENS AID OPERATION 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
¶6.  While in Nyala, the USAID/DCHA team met with UNMIS, AMIS, UNDSS, 
and the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 
(OCHA).  Each organization offered information on the security 
situation, and provided the team a better understanding of the 
political and military dynamics at play in Darfur. 
 
¶7.  The security situation in Darfur remains volatile.  Continued 
splintering is occurring within opposition factions, driven by 
government action.  As a result, humanitarian workers have relocated 
from different areas in North and South Darfur.  Those who briefed 
the USAID/DCHA team anticipate that the conflict will continue to 
deepen over the coming three to four months, leading to more 
displacement and increased fighting between factions.  The briefers 
indicated that the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) is insufficient to 
bring peace to Darfur, as the DPA does not include all those whom 
the factions represent. 
 
KHARTOUM 00002863  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
 
¶8.  The month of November brought worsening security in Darfur, with 
significant humanitarian consequences for the wider region, 
including Chad and the Central African Republic.  More than 80,000 
people have fled their homes in the last six weeks alone:  50,000 of 
them in Darfur and 30,000 in Chad.  Several hundred civilians, 
including women, children, and elderly, have been killed, and very 
disturbing reports have surfaced describing mass rapes and other 
gross violations of human rights.  Escalating violence is cutting 
off almost one million people across Darfur from needed humanitarian 
aid.  Recent clashes involving Arab militia, the Sudan Liberation 
Army/Minni Minawi (SLA/Minawi), the National Redemption Front (NRF), 
and the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) have forced the relocation of UN 
and NGO staff.  Relief workers are being attacked on a daily basis, 
and dozens of their vehicles have been hijacked in the last few 
weeks, threatening the humanitarian lifeline for a total of 4.3 
million people in the region. 
 
¶9.  The USAID/DCHA team and representatives from Merlin, the 
American Refugee Committee (ARC), and OCHA traveled to Gereida, 
South Darfur, via UN helicopter.  In 2006, the site became Darfur's 
largest IDP camp by population.  Based on the current food 
distribution caseload, the humanitarian community estimates the 
number of IDPs in Gereida to be 128,000, although many believe this 
number is inflated. 
 
¶10.  The IDP settlement is divided into three sections named Aleef 
(old camp), Babanousa (new camp), and Dar es Salam.  Seven 
international NGOs work in Gereida:  Oxfam, ZOA, the International 
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), ARC, Merlin, Action Contre la 
Faim, and CHF International.  USAID/OFDA is funding Merlin for 
health activities, ARC for health, water, sanitation, and hygiene 
activities, and CHF International for shelter activities. 
 
¶11.  Upon arrival at Gereida, the team met with the AMIS Group Site 
Commander, who gave a briefing about the site and shared 
observations about security for IDPs.  The AMIS commander noted that 
the AMIS area of responsibility was very large and that patrols were 
unable to cover the same areas in the camp two days in a row.  AMIS 
stated that it currently lacks the capacity and resources to 
undertake patrols to protect the population from roving Arab militia 
outside Gereida.  The threat of Arab militia attack is especially 
heightened for women, who are responsible for collecting firewood 
outside the camp.  AMIS reported incidents of skirmishes, 
abductions, animal looting, and thefts by armed men.  The AMIS 
commander stated that it was difficult to distinguish between Arab 
militia and bandits in the camp. 
 
¶12.  The team visited an ICRC health center, which is scheduled to 
be transferred to USAID/OFDA partner Merlin at the end of 2006. 
Current humanitarian planning focuses on increasing capacity in 
sectors such as health, water, sanitation, and hygiene. 
Additionally, USAID/OFDA partner CHF International is considering 
expanding shelter coverage. 
 
¶13.  Currently no organization coordinates humanitarian activity for 
the camp.  The Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) was tapped to take 
over as camp coordinator for Gereida, but the organization's 
withdrawal from South Darfur has left Gereida without a coordinator. 
 Several NGOs working in Gereida told the USAID/DCHA team that a 
camp coordinator was unnecessary.  However, they stated that a camp 
manager was needed to help with contingency planning as 
circumstances change. 
 
¶14.  Coordination between NGOs in Gereida is working well.  If and 
when more organizations are present in Gereida, this issue may need 
to be revisited and a camp coordinator identified.  OCHA shared 
plans to send an officer to work part-time with groups in Gereida 
and help deal with local authorities.  (Comment:  Camp coordination 
is important to identify critical gaps in humanitarian coverage and 
conduct effective protection activities.  However, organizations are 
reluctant to take on the role, as the SLA or GNU can intimidate or 
harass an NGO serving as camp coordinator for advocacy related to 
sensitive issues, reducing the organization's ability to operate. 
End comment.) 
 
¶15.  While in Gereida, the USAID/DCHA team met with the SLA's 
Humanitarian Aid Commissioner (SLA/HAC).  The SLA sees itself as the 
protective force for the population.  The biggest concern for the 
SLA/HAC was the perceived minimal level of assistance coming into 
Gereida.  The SLA/HAC would like to see at least 40 NGOs working in 
Gereida providing a range of services, particularly food, education, 
 
KHARTOUM 00002863  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
and health. 
 
---------------------------------- 
WE'RE ALL IN THIS TOGETHER - ALONE 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶16.  In discussions with the NGO community, the USAID/DCHA team 
noted the lack of coordination, or the reluctance among various 
organizations to fully collaborate and cooperate in South Darfur. 
In light of the ever-growing list of demands and requirements that 
the GNU places on NGOs, it was interesting to see how NGOs have 
approached the issue of coordination in the state. 
 
¶17.  NGOs mentioned to the USAID/DCHA team that true coordination 
was difficult, and in some cases, not wise for an organization's 
survival.  An "every man for himself" approach seems to work best 
for the NGOs in South Darfur.  If the HAC is harassing one NGO, it 
is not in the best interest of the other NGOs to take a united 
approach, or stand against the HAC, lest they all be penalized. 
OCHA plays a vital role in taking up some of the more sensitive 
issues on behalf of the NGOs, but fails in the effort to unify NGOs 
in response to HAC demands or insecurity in areas of common 
operations. 
 
--------------- 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
--------------- 
 
¶18.  USAID/OFDA should consider establishing a rapid-response fund 
with OCHA, as done in Liberia and Angola.  The rapid-response fund 
would allow USAID/OFDA and the humanitarian community the 
flexibility to quickly address humanitarian needs during this 
tumultuous period in Darfur.  Additionally, when and if returns 
begin, the fund would allow rapid start-up activities supporting the 
return process in anticipation of accessing other funding 
mechanisms.  The structure of the response fund and the approval 
process would be based on the Liberia model, in which a USAID/OFDA 
representative and the grant manager from OCHA reviewed proposals 
and made funding decisions on the ground. 
 
¶19.  USAID/OFDA, along with other donors, should support a 
verification exercise in IDP camps where substantial inflation of 
camp population figures is suspected, such as Gereida.  OCHA agreed 
that counting IDPs in possible, if donors are willing to support it. 
 The USAID/DCHA team believes this would be a worthwhile exercise to 
give the humanitarian community a better idea of the total number of 
the affected population and adjust the caseload for assistance. 
Caution would have to be taken to prevent the HAC from hijacking the 
exercise to influence IDPs to "voluntarily" return home. 
 
¶20.  USAID/OFDA, along with other donors, should support more 
livelihoods and shelter activities in Gereida, particularly for the 
town population, as IDPs are living on the host community's 
agricultural land. 
 
HUME