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Viewing cable 06KABUL5971, PRT/HERAT: ONGOING SECURITY ISSUES

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06KABUL5971 2006-12-27 12:23 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Kabul
VZCZCXRO4647
PP RUEHDBU RUEHIK RUEHYG
DE RUEHBUL #5971/01 3611223
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 271223Z DEC 06
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5091
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 3483
RHMFIUU/COMSOCCENT MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RHMFIUU/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 005971 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/FO DAS GASTRIGHT, SCA/A, S/CRS, SA/PB, S/CT, 
EUR/RPM 
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG 
NSC FOR A HARRIMAN 
OSD FOR KIMMIT 
CENTCOM FOR CFC-A, CG CJTF-76, POLAD, JICCENT 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: MARR PGOV PINR PINS PREL AF IR
SUBJECT: PRT/HERAT: ONGOING SECURITY ISSUES 
 
1. (SBU) SUMMARY: The normal tranquility of Herat has been 
disturbed in recent weeks by political cross-currents that 
exist below the surface.  The tribal tensions in the 
aftermath of Amanullah Khan,s murder in Shindand District, 
Iranian nervousness over border training activities at a U.S. 
facility near the border, and Night Letters delivered to ISAF 
Forces all suggest the potential for increased tensions.  END 
SUMMARY. 
 
SHINDAND DISTRICT TENSIONS: AMANULLAH KHAN FALLOUT 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
2. (SBU) The death of Shindand warlord Amanullah Khan (AK) on 
October 22 created a political void in Shindand district. 
AK,s son has formally been annointed as his successor, but 
few expect him to be able to fend off competitors for local 
control.  During the 30-day truce following the murder, AK,s 
elder brother Arbab Dawlat assumed some of Amanullah Khan's 
roles. 
 
3.  (SBU) While the tribal tensions that led to the murder 
have been tamped down by GOA intervention, this is a stopgap 
measure.  A delegation of 20 Barakzai and Noorzai elders met 
recently in Kabul with GOA officials, including with 
President Karzai.  In the end, this conflict will probably be 
settled locally.  A local Jirga has been proposed and this 
may offer a way forward. 
 
4. (SBU) In Kabul, key figures who have been involved in this 
mediation include former Karzai advisor Asadullah Wafa 
(former Deputy Minister of Boundaries and Tribal Affairs and 
newly appointed Governor of Helmand Province), and another 
Karzai advisor, Shahzadeh Massoud.  Their principal concern 
remains the security of Shindand district.  Another of AKs 
brothers in Shindand, Nasrullah Khan, has been approached by 
Aref Noorzai (a Noorzai tribal leader who also serves as 
Deputy Speaker of the Wolesi Jirga) to use his influence in 
the district to calm tensions.  Shindand district is the 
largest in Herat Province and important in terms of its 
location on the border of Iran. 
 
5. (SBU) A new District Governor from a Pashtun Herati 
family, Haji Na'eem Mohmand, has been installed in Shindand. 
The Zir-e-Koh area of Shindand has long been relatively 
lawless; in that sense little has changed.  The concern is 
that anti-coalition elements from both Farah and Helmand 
provinces have filtered north to Herat Province.  ANA, ANP 
and ABP elements in the area are cooperating closely with 
ISAF forces to counter any threats.  The Herat PRT has 
stepped up patrols in recent weeks and visits Shindand to 
perform Key Leader Engagement (KLE).  Shindand borders Iran 
and is a conduit for the illegal narcotics flow to Iran.  It 
has one formal border crossing point at Kaleteh Nazar. 
Completion of the Kabul-Kandahar-Herat road project will 
leave many men in the district unemployed and may create 
opportunities for anti-government forces to recruit.  Thus 
far, violence has been limited in scope.  There have been 
several VBIED and IED attacks which injured ANA soldiers, and 
the Shindand Police Chief and several colleagues were 
murdered recently, but so far Coalition and ISAF forces in 
the area have been unscathed. 
 
U.S. PRESENCE NEAR THE IRANIAN BORDER 
------------------------------------- 
 
7. (SBU) Five miles from the Iranian border, a USG facility 
has been erected which will house around seventy mentors from 
Dyncorps, DHS, other USG agencies and the Italian Guardia di 
Finanza.  This eleven million dollar facility is in the 
border village of Islam Qala, where many local residents have 
contacts with Iranian counterparts.  The Iranians are 
apparently spreading rumors among the villagers about this 
USG compound.  The situation is complicated by the smuggling 
trade between the two countries that may be disturbed by the 
 
KABUL 00005971  002 OF 002 
 
 
new compound, since it lies near the road utilized by 
smugglers.  One local rumor is that the new facility will be 
used for offensive operations against Iran by U.S. Special 
Forces in the region.  According to Afghan sources, the 
Iranians have issued pamphlets in the Islam Qala area 
suggesting that villagers there are &in the jail of the 
foreigners8.  Not enough has been done by GOA to assure 
villagers that this border training facility will assist the 
GOA and the Afghan people.  Governor Anwari publicly 
chastised a senior U.S. military officer assigned to the PRT 
on local TV for not informing him in greater detail about the 
border training facility, and local residents of Islam Qala 
filed a petition claiming the land for the facility was 
acquired illegally. 
 
8. (SBU) The consensus by PRT contacts is that falsehoods 
regarding the facility are propagated by businessmen and 
border officials who will lose an important revenue stream 
when border controls are tightened and oversight of the 
customs collection process is improved.  Currently, tax 
collection is spotty at best, since vouchers are often forged 
to indicate a reduced quantity of goods imported.  Many 
residents of the area may fear the new facility because they 
owe their own livelihoods to Iran, where they commute for 
work. 
 
NIGHT LETTERS 
------------- 
 
9. (SBU) The PRT in Herat has received two Night Letters 
within the last several weeks, one allegedly authored by 
Mullah Omar and the second by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar.  Both are 
now public record, since they were released by the 
intelligence service to the media.  These letters were the 
subject of discussion by a panel of government officials and 
political analysts on television. 
 
10. (SBU) The letter credited to Mullah Omar makes an open 
appeal for volunteers.  In contrast, the letter from 
Hekmatyar appeared conciliatory towards the GOA, as it 
condemned the murder of GOA officials and school teachers. 
In Herat political circles, however, there is considerable 
doubt that the second letter was actually authored by 
Hekmatyar.  Local speculation says it may have been written 
by parties with an interest in sabotaging political stability 
in Herat, possibly the same people responsible for recent IED 
attacks. 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
11. (SBU) A few key events could have a strong impact on 
Herat Province.  Recent steps by the GOA, such as the 
announcement of the Afghan-Pakistan Jirga and Attorney 
General Sabit,s anti-corruption campaign have played very 
well locally.  In addition, thus far, security forces have 
kept a lid on renewed violence in Shindand.  The new Shindand 
district governor was hand-picked by Karzai and seems to be 
enjoying both credibility and support. 
NORLAND