Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 64621 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 06KABUL5864, PRT/SHARANA: GOA WEAKNESS IN THE FACE OF THE ENEMY

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #06KABUL5864.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06KABUL5864 2006-12-16 11:04 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Kabul
VZCZCXRO6974
PP RUEHDBU RUEHIK RUEHYG
DE RUEHBUL #5864/01 3501104
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 161104Z DEC 06
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4912
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 3410
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RHMFIUU/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 005864 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR SCA/FO, SCA/A, S/CR, S/CT, SCA/PAB, EUR/RPM 
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE 
NSC FOR AHARRIMAN 
OSD FOR KIMMITT 
CENTCOM FOR CG CFC-A, CG CJTF-76, AND POLAD 
RELEASABLE TO NATO/ISAF/AUS/NZ 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV AF
SUBJECT: PRT/SHARANA: GOA WEAKNESS IN THE FACE OF THE ENEMY 
 
1. (SBU) SUMMARY: Naka district, a remote district in 
Northeast Paktika province, came under control of 
insurgent/Taliban forces in early summer 2006.  Irregular 
contract police forces recruited by Paktika,s Governor 
Ekhpulwak regained control of the district later the same 
month.  To date, no regular Afghan National Police (ANP) or 
Afghan government leadership have been permanently stationed 
in the district.  The inability and refusal of Afghan police 
and government leaders to reoccupy Naka highlights the 
weakness of the ANP in Paktika and the lack of competent and 
determined leaders in the present provincial government. END 
SUMMARY 
 
-------------------- 
GOA Presence Limited 
-------------------- 
 
2.  (SBU) Naka, located in the wooded mountains of Paktika,s 
extreme northeast, is a remote district in an area of strong 
Taliban and Haqqani influence.  Naka was lost to insurgents 
on June 15.  It was recovered in late June by former Taliban 
and Haqqani supporter Mohammed Akbar and thirty of his 
followers who had been deputized and were paid by Governor 
Ekhpulwak for this operation.  On October 10, American 
military forces from Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) 
Sharana and the State PRTOff visited Naka,s district center 
in conjunction with Governor Ekhpulwak,s visit the same day. 
 The visit confirmed that Naka does not have any conventional 
Afghan government forces in the district.  Instead, another 
old Mujahideen commander, Mohammed Jan Sidiqi, and 53 of his 
loyal followers have been recruited from neighboring Khost 
Province to serve as the district Commissioner and contract 
police in Naka. 
 
---------------------------------- 
Lack of Safety Impedes Development 
---------------------------------- 
 
3. (SBU) Naka is a sparsely populated and mountainous 
district which has historically seen little Afghan government 
presence or influence under any Afghan government.  Located 
in the Zadran tribal homeland shared by neighboring districts 
of Paktika, Paktia, and Khost Provinces, Naka was at one time 
home to Jalaluddin Haqqani.  That Taliban and Haqqani 
elements are still active in the area was aptly demonstrated 
on October 10, when the PRT ground convoy going to Naka was 
attacked by small arms and RPG fire as it entered the 
mountain pass leading to Naka from Zeruk.  Governor Ekhpulwak 
arrived later that day, at the district center, by U.S. Army 
helicopter, addressed a crowd of some 300 local people, and 
met with elements of the District Tribal Shura.  Only five of 
12 District Shura members attended the meeting with the 
governor, and none of the district's famous and influential 
religious leaders were present.  Provincial Chief of Police 
General Abdul Baqi Nuristani was also conspicuously absent. 
The Governor explained that, unless the people of Naka could 
guarantee the safety of contractors working for the coalition 
and the Afghan government in Naka, the district would get no 
development assistance.  The Shura members present agreed and 
the Governor departed, by air, after three hours on the 
ground. 
 
4.  (SBU) Naka district has been one of Paktika,s most 
difficult districts to secure.  It was lost to insurgent 
forces this year along with Dila district in the far 
southwest of the province.  Both were recovered this summer. 
Dila now has official Afghan police and a District 
Commissioner, and the District Tribal Shura has opened 
dialogue with the Provincial government and the PRT.  The 
Head of the Dila Shura recently traveled to the PRT to 
request projects and food aid for the district.  The 
difference between Dila and Naka is that the coalition has 
established a military base in Dila.  The fact that no Afghan 
government civil administrator has been willing to take the 
job as Naka District Commissioner and that no serving Afghan 
 
KABUL 00005864  002 OF 002 
 
 
police officer or patrolman has accepted assignment to serve 
in Naka is telling of the poor state of discipline, 
confidence, and leadership in the ANP and Afghan civil 
administration in Paktika province.  The performance of 
Provincial Chief of Police Baqi, in refusing to send police 
officers and men to Naka district, and thus ignoring the 
security problem there -- and even refusing to travel to the 
district under U.S. military guard -- is troubling.  This is 
unlikely to be reversed and Naka will likely remain a 
difficult district with strong ties to insurgent forces until 
the Afghan government or coalition forces garrison the 
district with military forces. 
 
------- 
COMMENT 
------- 
5.  (SBU) The failure of more than half of the district's 
Shura members to attend the Governor's meeting and the 
apparent refusal by the Naka religious community to heed the 
Governor's invitation is indicative of the government's lack 
of influence in the district.  CSTC-A has an Afghan-led 
program to identify, remove and replace Afghan police unit 
commanders who have demonstrated the lack of will and ability 
to lead.  PRToff sees a need for a similar program applied to 
Afghan provincial administrators, including the use of 
embedded trainers at provincial and district levels. 
NEUMANN