VZCZCXRO5070
OO RUEHDBU RUEHIK RUEHYG
DE RUEHBUL #5853/01 3481115
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 141115Z DEC 06
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4897
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RHMFIUU/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHMFIUU/COMSOCCENT MACDILL AFB FL
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 3405

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KABUL 005853 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SA/FO, SA/A, S/CR, SA/PAB, S/CT, EUR/RPM 
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG 
NSC FOR AHARRIMAN 
OSD FOR KIMMIT 
CENTCOM FOR CG CFC-A, CG CJTF-76, POLAD 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER AF MARR SNAR
SUBJECT: PRT/KHOST: KHOST EAGER TO CONVERT ARBAKI INTO ANAP 
 
REF: KABUL 5632 
 
¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY:  Provincial and Ministry of Interior (MOI) 
officials had selected the first 460 members of a future 
Afghan National Auxiliary Police (ANAP) force for Khost, but 
MOI, implementing a November 11 agreement under the direction 
of the Policy Action Group (PAG), has since told Khost Afghan 
National Police (ANP) leadership to cease recruiting until 
further notice.  The final number of Khost's future force 
remains in question, but will range between 460 and 920. 
Governor Arsala Jamal is frustrated Khost was not included in 
the first round of ANAP deployments and continues to make the 
case that Khost has more at stake than other approved 
provinces.  Provincial leaders are optimistic locally 
recruited ANAP, like the tribal Arbaki, can draw local 
communities closer to the government.  Khost's ANAP forces 
will be as broadly representative as logistically possible 
and will be deployed outside of the districts they are 
recruited from as needed, according to the Khost ANP 
leadership.  End Summary. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
Governor Makes Case for Expedited ANAP Deployment 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
¶2. (SBU) Khost Governor Arsala Jamal told PRTOff December 3 
he was disappointed Khost did not make the priority list for 
expediting deployment of Afghan National Auxiliary Police 
(ANAP).  Jamal requested PRTOff press the urgency of a Khost 
ANAP deployment with the Embassy, stressing the province's 
importance as a regional center and security lynchpin.  He 
said the symbolic value of losing control of Khost, outside 
of the Taliban's traditional southern strongholds, would hit 
the country much harder than isolated districts in other 
prioritized provinces.  Jamal said the 460 selected ANAP 
candidates would "not wait forever" to be called to duty, 
adding that if MOI waited too long they would have to start 
the selection process over again, although he did not specify 
how long that would be.  Jamal said some overzealous district 
ANP commanders were encouraging candidates to show up for 
work and take uniforms under the assumption they would be 
paid out of the Governor's emergency fund used to pay Arbaki 
until MOI ANAP funding begins.  "I had to tell them to stop 
and keep only the existing Arbaki force and send others home." 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------------- 
MOI Mixed Signals to Khost: Slow Down, Increase Force Size 
--------------------------------------------- ------------- 
 
¶3. (SBU) An MOI-commission toured selected districts to 
screen the first 460 Khost ANAP candidates from mid-October 
to mid-November, according to Deputy ANP Commander Colonel 
Zaman on November 29.  The Khost ANP submitted paperwork on 
this first round of ANAP, but MOI contacted Khost ANP in late 
November to "slow down" and not call any candidates to duty 
prior to securing of funding to ensure salaries.  "The last 
thing we need is problems from the start with wages and 
people walking off the job," said Zaman.  This has also put 
on hold plans to recruit an additional 190 ANAP Governor 
Jamal claimed he had convinced MOI in writing to provide 
(Zaman claimed it was 150 additional).  Jamal and Zaman 
confirmed ANP Commander Gen. Ayub was in Kabul lobbying MOI 
for a total 800-man ANAP force.  Jamal added MOI also agreed 
to approve an additional 100-plus ANAP for security on the 
Khost-Gardez Road once construction begins.  This would be a 
special force that would not count against either Khost,s or 
Paktia,s official roles.  Neither Jamal nor Zaman could 
explain if the increased Khost total would be taken from 
other provinces or added to the national 11,271 total.  Jamal 
was likewise at odds to reconcile conflicting signals from 
MOI about the size and speed of the deployment.  "We need 
help, who gets what and when is still a fluid thing," he said 
December 3, in contrast to a more assured posture he had 
following an October 28 meeting at MOI, when he told PRTOff 
Khost was on the fast track to first-round consideration. 
 
KABUL 00005853  002 OF 003 
 
 
(Comment:  In response to mounting international community 
concern that the expedited ANAP force-generation program was 
failing to attract recruits representative of the tribal and 
clan balances of the districts to which they will be deployed 
as well as in recognition that limited training resources 
should be concentrated for best effect, MOI, at the direction 
of the Policy Action Group (PAG), ceased recruitment in other 
than the &six priority provinces,8 Farah, Ghazni, Helmand, 
Kandahar, Uruzghan and Zabul.  MOI will resume recruiting 
outside the initial six priority provinces when a Combined 
Security Transition Command ) Afghanistan (CSTC-A)-led Joint 
Planning Group develops program expansion criteria that 
reaffirm ethnic balance as a guiding principle of ANAP 
recruitment.  End Comment.) 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
ANP Plans to Transplant Arbaki Legitimacy to ANAP 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
¶4. (SBU) Provincial leaders are overwhelmingly supportive of 
converting existing tribal elder-backed and -selected Arbaki 
("village defenders") being used by ANP and paid by the 
Governor into ANAP.  They believe international community 
fears that the force constitutes rearming militias do not 
apply to Khost or neighboring provinces with historic 
tribal/regional Arbaki traditions -- in contrast to provinces 
where militias have traditionally been strong with loyalty 
vested in personalities.  General Ayub said he hoped to 
transplant the built-in local credibility of the Arbaki to 
the ANAP, to which he expected all existing Arbaki to 
transfer.  Zaman discounted concerns of a couple of district 
commissioners that some Arbaki would object to working 
directly for the GOA instead of through their village elders. 
He said Arbaki were among the ample interested candidates, 
many of whom had to be turned away.  Zaman said the fear of 
stripping Arbaki of the local legitimacy they enjoy by 
converting them into ANAP was mitigated by a selection 
process that requires candidate sponsorship from both a GOA 
official and two village elders.  He was confident the 
selection board, which also includes an NDS representative, a 
Kabul MOI general, and various MOI personnel officials, would 
produce a quality force. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
Deployment vs. Recruitment; Arbaki Shopping Rumors 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
¶5. (SBU) Zaman said the 460 selected candidates represented a 
broad swath of tribes, noting even some Kuchis had applied in 
Tere Zayi District, although they were still 
underrepresented.  He said MOI was responsible for picking 
the districts from which people are recruited, including 160 
from a single district (Sabari) and none from others, such as 
troubled Spera District.  General Ayub explained November 4 
that ANAP would not necessarily be stationed from where they 
were recruited, although this would be optimal, and he would 
assign ANAP "wherever I need them most," including Spera.  He 
also rejected rumors the disproportionate Sabari numbers were 
due to significant numbers of Arbaki moving to Ghazni, where 
Governor Pathan was paying Arbaki more than ANAP or Arbaki in 
Khost.  Jamal said this was a rumor generated to sour his 
relationship with Pathan, who was the Khost governor until 
August. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------------- 
District Feedback: Ready for Any Help, But Will They Stay? 
--------------------------------------------- ------------- 
 
¶6. (SBU) Hazrat Mir, District Commissioner of Jaji Maidan, 
told PRTOff November 30 the entire 10-man Arbaki force at the 
district center had applied for 40 district ANAP positions. 
He said authorities tried to get a good geographic mix of 
district locals in the new force, but ended up with a 
disproportionate number of applicants from the area 
immediately surrounding the District Center due to commuting 
 
KABUL 00005853  003 OF 003 
 
 
challenges.  District ANP Commander Nobad Khan said the ANAP 
will inherit the advantages and limitations of the locally 
employed Arbaki but that whatever the ANAP shortcomings, the 
Arbaki offers at least a base of a security force to build on 
and the extra numbers ANAP will bring will be a welcome 
improvement.  He sardonically added the ANAP would also face 
the same retention problems his underpaid and under-equipped 
regular ANP force faces. 
NEUMANN