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Viewing cable 06KABUL5841, PRT BAMYAN: SINGAPORE CONSIDERS PROVIDING

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06KABUL5841 2006-12-14 01:33 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Kabul
VZCZCXRO4623
OO RUEHDBU RUEHIK RUEHYG
DE RUEHBUL #5841 3480133
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 140133Z DEC 06
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4877
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE
RUEHGP/AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE 0096
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 3394
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RHMFIUU/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
UNCLAS KABUL 005841 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/FO, SCA/A, S/CR, S/CT, SCA/PAB, EUR/RPM, 
EAP/FO 
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE 
NSC FOR AHARRIMAN 
OSD FOR KIMMETT 
CENTCOM FOR CG CFC-A, CG CJTF-76, AND POLAD 
RELEASABLE TO NATO/ISAF/AUS/NZ 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV AF
SUBJECT: PRT BAMYAN: SINGAPORE CONSIDERS PROVIDING 
ASSISTANCE 
 
 
1. (SBU) Following internal discussions between Singapore and 
New Zealand, a four person military delegation from Singapore 
visited PRT Bamyan the week of November 26.  The delegation 
came to explore the feasibility of pursuing the Singapore 
government,s stated interest (to the New Zealand government) 
in possibly joining an established PRT in Afghanistan. 
(Note: Singapore is particularly interested in joining the 
Bamyan PRT, based in part on Bamyan,s permissive security 
environment and Singapore,s strong military relationship 
with New Zealand.  Both countries have worked together 
cooperatively in East Timor.  End Note.). 
 
2. (SBU) The four Singapore officers, Colonel Yeo See Peng, 
Lieutenant Colonel Chua Wei Chng, Major Ming Fook Kuen and 
Major Lim Meng Soon, held extensive meetings with all PRT 
heads of sections.  They also participated in a one-day 
patrol within the province and met with key provincial 
officials to assess the province,s needs and what Singapore 
might be able to contribute to such an ongoing mission. 
They expressed particular interest in engineering and medical 
projects within Bamyan, in concert with the New Zealanders. 
 
3. (SBU) COMMENT: It appears that the Singaporeans are pretty 
far along in their planning to provide assistance to 
Afghanistan.  The question remains as to how substantial 
their contribution might be.  Some encouragement and or 
pressure might help tip the balance in favor of more rather 
than less involvement by Singapore. END COMMENT 
NEUMANN