Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 64621 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 06KABUL5665, PRT/QAL-E NOW: NGOS VIEWS ON SECURITY AND

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #06KABUL5665.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06KABUL5665 2006-12-04 07:26 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Kabul
VZCZCXYZ0002
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHBUL #5665/01 3380726
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 040726Z DEC 06
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4384
INFO RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 3368
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 3316
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RHMFIUU/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
UNCLAS KABUL 005665 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR SCA/FO, SCA/A, S/CR, S/CT 
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG 
NSC FOR AHARRIMAN 
OSD FOR KIMMITT 
CENTCOM FOR CG CFC-A, CG CJTF-76, AND POLAD 
RELEASABLE TO NATO/ISAF/AUS/NZ 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV SNAR AF
SUBJECT: PRT/QAL-E NOW: NGOS VIEWS ON SECURITY AND 
GOVERNANCE 
 
1. (SBU) SUMMARY:  Security in Badghis provincial capital of 
Qal-e Now has always been considered good and to-date there 
have been no insurgency related incidents there.  While 
attacks in Badghis are currently rare, the security situation 
is tenuous in many districts.  NGOs have limited or changed 
their programs to protect their employees and are concerned 
that this has limited their ability to reach the most at-risk 
(predominantly Pashtun) segments of the province.  Some NGOs 
allege security forces and government officials are often 
more a part of the problem than the solution.  The provincial 
capital is generally peaceful now, but poverty and lack of 
effective governance make the districts ripe recruiting 
grounds for insurgent groups and could lead to further 
insecurity.  The aid community looks to the PRT to improve 
the ANP's capability.   END SUMMARY. 
 
---------------------------------------- 
Provincial Capital Security "Manageable" 
---------------------------------------- 
2.  (SBU) Security in the sleepy provincial capital of Qal-e 
Now has always been considered good.  Currently, both 
civilian and military members of the PRT frequently walk to 
meetings with as little as a two-man armed escort.  The 
military contingent continually evaluates the current threat 
level and it has not increased its security protocols for 
operations in the capital.  On a recent visit to the 
province, UNAMA's regional security officer stated that the 
threat level in the capital was "manageable" and recommended 
going forward with the planned UNAMA office opening in Qal-e 
Now by the end of the year. 
 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
ANP Struggling to Provide Security in Districts 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
3. (SBU) While attacks in the capital city are currently 
rare, night letters are becoming more common in many 
districts.  Although UNAMA will soon open an office in Qal-e 
Now, there are no plans to base employees outside of the 
city.  Several aid workers opined that there are few attacks 
in the districts because there are virtually no foreign 
workers living outside the capital.  The NGO and development 
workers interviewed by PRToff agreed that security had 
deteriorated in the districts.  The ANP's and the National 
Directorate of Security's (NDS) limited capacity outside of 
Qal-e Now, especially in the districts of Murghab, Gormach 
and Jarwan, contributes to the uneven security situation. 
 
------------------------------- 
Security Concerns Restrict NGOs 
------------------------------- 
4. (SBU) NGOs have reduced or changed their programs to 
protect their employees and are concerned this has limited 
their ability to reach the most at-risk (predominantly 
Pashtun) segments of the province.  World Vision will 
continue to evaluate and fund projects in the districts, but 
will rely on provincial ministries to staff and administer 
programs outside of the capital.  It has reportedly agreed to 
remain in Qal-e Now in part due to a plan to create a 
radio-based warden system in Qal-e Now.  Each NGO would 
purchase or receive a radio with a frequency monitored 
24-hours-a-day by the PRT.  The NGO community welcomed this 
plan and believes it will provide much needed additional 
security in the capital area. 
 
5. (SBU) BRAC, an NGO from Bangladesh, runs the province's 
medical network and has the widest exposure throughout the 
province.  The NGO administers 24 hospitals and clinics, many 
of them inherited from other NGOs when they left the province 
due to security reasons.  On November 4, BRAC's director told 
PRToff he had recalled all of his doctors in Gormach and 
Murghab districts, and from one clinic in Jarwan district.  A 
few locally-trained nurses are responsible for medical care 
in a large part of the province.  (Note: All of BRAC's 
doctors and nurse are Afghans, but the doctors are from other 
provinces and are, therefore, viewed as outsiders by locals. 
 
End Note.). The BRAC director said if things worsen he would 
be forced to close more clinics, effectively eliminating the 
province's health care system. 
 
----------------------------------- 
NGOs Deride Governmental Corruption 
----------------------------------- 
6. (SBU) Some NGOs allege that security forces and government 
officials are often more a part of the problem than the 
solution.  Their reports assert that the recent attack 
against the World Vision office in Murghab was ordered by 
Murghab District Governor Aga Khan and the furniture taken 
from World Vision's office was divided among his supporters. 
Recently, two of the six district governors were removed on 
corruption-related charges, but the aid community views such 
actions with skepticism.  For example, several aid workers 
suggested that Aga Khan's decision to order the looting of a 
World Vision office was not what got him into trouble; 
rather, it was not giving the furniture he looted to the 
"right people" that caused local officials to get involved. 
 
7.  (SBU) The local government regularly complains that the 
Spanish Agency for International Development (AECI) often 
awards contracts to companies from other provinces, pointing 
out that keeping the contracts local would provide jobs to 
locals.  AECI Director Pablo Yuste maintains that local 
officials push to keep the jobs local because they are less 
able to extort money from companies not based in the 
province.  Recently, the provincial Head of Economy Abdul 
Baez Surjabi approached Yuste regarding AECI's vehicle rental 
arrangements.  Surjabi came to the PRT alone and requested to 
speak with the AECI director without the aid of a nearby 
translator "to allow him to practice his English."  He 
suggested that if AECI canceled its current vehicle contract 
and contracted with him, he could provide vehicles for less 
and would return the surplus cash directly to AECI. 
 
------- 
COMMENT 
------- 
8. (SBU) Badghis is a relatively calm province, but it is 
also one of the nation's poorest.  The lack of security 
limits NGOs from reaching the poorest (often Pashtun) 
segments of the province.  This creates a vicious cycle: 
increased dissatisfaction with the government in the district 
creates more unrest and worsens the security situation, which 
increases dissatisfaction.  In the past, increased insecurity 
was attributed to rising ethnic tensions and general 
criminality, but the increase in the appearance of night 
letters purportedly posted by Taliban and the recent murder 
of several district employees seems to indicate an up-tick in 
anti-government and insurgency activity in the province.  The 
aid community is looking to the PRT to improve the ANP's 
capacity.  (Note:   The recent arrival of U.S. police 
training units was warmly welcomed and is viewed as a key 
element in improving provincial security.  END COMMENT. 
NEUMANN