VZCZCXRO0470
RR RUEHAG RUEHROV
DE RUEHHE #1215/01 3421516
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 081516Z DEC 06
FM AMEMBASSY HELSINKI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 2808
INFO RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE
RUEHBW/AMEMBASSY BELGRADE 0017
RUEHBM/AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST 0551
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 4721
RUEHSA/AMCONSUL JOHANNESBURG 0005

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 HELSINKI 001215 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/08/2016 
TAGS: PREL PGOV MOPS FI RS YI
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR WARE'S MEETING WITH PRESIDENT AHTISAARI 
 
REF: HELSINKI 1210 
 
Classified By: AMBASSADOR WARE FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D) 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: UN Special Envoy Martti Ahtisaari told 
Ambassador Ware that he remains determined to deliver his 
recommendations for Kosovo's final status within two 
weeks of Serbia's Jan. 21 election, fearing that any 
delays will "destabilize" Kosovo.  Ahtisaari "would find 
it rather strange" if Moscow used its veto in the UNSC; 
however, he is not yet as confident as Washington and 
Berlin are that Russia will abstain.  Like the Finnish 
Government, he is working hard to maintain EU unity and 
is "pressuring" the incoming German EU Presidency to 
continue that effort.  He continues to dialogue with 
other UNSC members to ensure their support, but President 
Putin has not responded to his offer to meet.  As for 
Serbia, Ahtisaari said that PM Kostunica is "hopeless" 
and will press Belgrade to stall as long as possible. 
The international community also "lost some credibility 
on ICTY" when NATO offered PfP to Serbia, although he 
acknowledged that the gesture did serve the important 
function of shoring up President Tadic.  Ahtisaari 
expressed great appreciation for USG support of his 
efforts and for the collaboration with Ambassador Wisner. 
End Summary. 
 
Russian Uneasiness 
------------------ 
¶2. (C) UN Special Envoy for the Future Status Process in 
Kosovo and former Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari 
called on Ambassador Ware Dec. 7.  Ambassador opened the 
discussion by telling Ahtisaari that President Halonen 
-- who has had several conversations with President Putin 
over the course of Finland's EU Presidency -- had expressed 
"uneasiness" (reftel) about how Russia might respond 
should Serbia reject Ahtisaari's recommendations regarding 
Kosovo's final status. (Halonen has previously told the 
Ambassador that Putin's views stem from his "experiences" 
in the Caucuses and with Islamic extremism.) 
 
¶3. (C) Ahtisaari responded that Halonen has communicated 
that view to him as well and that in many ways he shares 
her concerns.  Putin fears a "shrinking of the Orthodox 
world," Ahtisaari explained, in this case the 
establishment of a small Muslim state in the Balkans to 
which the international community will pay attention for 
five years, then abandon.  More disturbingly, Russia 
continues to argue that Kosovo's independence would set a 
precedent for the "frozen conflicts" on Russia's borders 
-- an argument Ahtisaari views as a signal that Russia 
has joined Serbia in seeking "to deny what occurred in 
1999."  He noted that his report to the UN will argue 
specifically that if Moscow and Belgrade want to "send a 
message that what Milosevic did was OK and that sovereign 
borders are holy," that will prove a sad commentary on 
both countries' values.  Given the gravity of other 
problems facing Russia, "I would find it rather strange, 
at the end of the day, if Moscow did not cooperate" on 
Kosovo, Ahtisaari said.  Nevertheless, he added, 
Washington and Berlin are confident that Russia will 
abstain in the UNSC, but "I am not yet so confident." 
 
Lining up Support 
---------------------- 
¶4. (C) Ahtisaari has requested a meeting with President 
Putin to discuss his concerns and to help move Russia 
toward at least an abstention in the UNSC.  However, he 
said, Putin has not yet accepted the offer, saying there 
are no new points that he has not heard already.  Ahtisaari 
is also directly lobbying EU member states and current or 
incoming UNSC members.  Some (he named South Africa, 
Spain, Romania, Sweden and Slovakia) have needed more 
persuading than he would have expected, while Italy, the 
UK and the US have provided the strongest voices of 
support.  Finland has done a good job of maintaining EU 
unity during its Presidency, Ahtisaari added, and he is 
"pressing Germany" to continue that effort. 
 
¶5. (C) In the end, of course, everything depends on the 
main protagonists, with Serbia continuing to stall and to 
press for unrealistic concessions from the Kosovars. 
Ahtisaari believes that any delay would "destabilize 
Kosovo;" to emphasize the seriousness of his point, he 
has begun arguing that he will recommend that the Finnish 
Government withdraw its troops from Kosovo if there is 
any delay beyond the late January/early February 
timeframe he has established.  As for Serb intransigence, 
PM Kostunica "is hopeless" and continues to lobby Russia 
 
HELSINKI 00001215  002 OF 002 
 
 
and neighboring states for delays.  President Tadic "is 
the only democrat left" and needs to be supported, 
Ahtisaari said.  In that regard, he specifically raised 
NATO's offer of PfP membership to Serbia, saying that 
while Europe and the US "lost some credibility on ICTY 
cooperation," the decision did have the upside of 
supporting Tadic. 
 
Comment 
------- 
¶6. (SBU) Going into the home stretch, Ahtisaari appeared 
about as confident as could be expected.  He expressed 
great appreciation for US support, noting specifically 
that the naming of Amb. Wisner as the Secretary's Special 
Representative was a "marvelous stroke" and that 
collaboration with the US has been "first class."  The 
Ambassador offered the Embassy's assistance if it should 
in any way prove useful. 
WARE