VZCZCXRO7284
RR RUEHDBU
DE RUEHDBU #2222/01 3520507
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 180507Z DEC 06
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 9243
INFO RUEILB/NCTC WASHINGTON DC
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 0759

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 DUSHANBE 002222 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR SCA/CEN 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ASEC EFIN KCRM KPAO PTER KHLS AEMR
SUBJECT: TAJIKISTAN: 2006 COUNTRY REPORT ON TERRORISM 
 
REF: STATE 175925 
 
¶1.  (SBU)  Per ref request, Post provides Tajikistan's 2006 
country report on terrorism. 
 
¶2.  (SBU)  Sharing a 1,400-kilometer border with Afghanistan, 
Tajikistan is well aware of the negative effects of 
state-sponsored terrorism and offered its limited resources to 
assist the United States almost unconditionally.  Following the 
deployment of U.S. troops to Afghanistan, Tajikistan allowed its 
territory and air space to be used for counterterrorist actions. 
 The Tajik Government's main impediment to counterterrorism 
performance remains its lack of resources.  The fact that 
Tajikistan remains the poorest of all the former Soviet 
republics, and per GDP the ninth poorest country in the world, 
puts these funding issues into context.  There were no terrorist 
acts committed against U.S. citizens in Tajikistan during 2006. 
 
¶3. (SBU)  While Tajikistan is not known to harbor any terrorist 
groups, some analysts believe that extremists transit Tajikistan 
to and from Afghanistan and Pakistan.  While the 1,400 kilometer 
Tajik-Afghan border is porous, the border guards are slowly 
working to control it.  The U.S. Government spent over $5.8 
million in 2006 to train and equip the Tajik Border Guards in 
order to increase their border-patrolling capabilities; these 
programs were implemented through  International Narcotics and 
Law Enforcement (INL), Export, Customs and Border Security 
Assistance (EXBS) Office, and the Office of Defense Cooperation 
(ODC).  These border fortifications and related 
capacity-building assistance will help stem the flow of 
potential terrorists attempting to cross the border and allow 
Tajikistan to better monitor its own borders. 
 
¶4.  (SBU) Within the framework of the war on terrorism, 
Tajikistan prohibited extremist-oriented activities and closely 
monitored terrorist groups like the Islamic Movement of 
Uzbekistan (IMU) and extremist groups like Hizb ut-Tahrir (HT). 
HT, an extremist political movement advocating the establishment 
of a theocratic Islamic state throughout the entire Muslim 
world.  The Government of Tajikistan believes HT  is also active 
in Tajikistan, particularly in the northern part of the country, 
which is a part of the Fergana Valley..  In May 2006, a small 
group of armed bandits attacked Tajik and Kyrgyz border posts. 
The fighters killed and seized several weapons, including 17 
Kalashnikov assault rifles, a PK light machine-gun and 3,000 
rounds of ammunition.  The date of the attack coincided with the 
one-year anniversary of the Andijan uprising in Uzbekistan, 
which led authorities to believe that the IMU was responsible 
for these attacks.  Kyrgyz security services killed four 
militants during the attack and arrested one other.  Tajik 
authorities later convicted seven IMU members for their 
participation in the attacks. 
 
¶5.  (SBU) While the United States has no evidence that HT has 
committed acts of international terrorism, the group's radical 
anti-American and anti-Semitic ideology is sympathetic to acts 
of violence against the United States and its allies.  In 2005, 
approximately 74 members of HT were arrested and 44 HT activists 
arrested the previous year were convicted and sentenced to 
prison terms of three to 20 years.  A recent press report stated 
that Tajik authorities have arrested 56 alleged HT members this 
year in Tajikistan.  While the final statistics are not yet 
available, the Tajik legal system has convicted at least 32 of 
these suspects (nineteen men and thirteen women). 
 
¶6.  (SBU) The Tajik government does not keep a list of declared 
terrorist organizations. 
 
¶7.  (SBU)  Tajikistan participated in the counterterrorist 
activities of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), the 
Commonwealth Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), and the CIS 
Counterterrorist Center. 
 
¶8.  (SBU)  Analysts also believe that the Islamic Movement of 
Uzbekistan (IMU) also operates in Tajikistan.  Recent press 
reports indicate that Tajik authorities arrested 30 suspect IMU 
members in Tajikistan in 2006; figures are not available 
regarding how many of them have been convicted.  There is also 
an ongoing trial of 11 alleged IMU members in Dushanbe, who are 
accused of organizing January and June 2005 terrorist bombings 
in Dushanbe, both of which occurred outside the Ministry of 
Emergency Situations.  One of the defendants is a member of the 
Islamic Revival Party of Tajikistan (IRPT), the 
officially-recognized Islamic opposition party.  Tajik 
authorities also arrested five additional alleged IMU members in 
Isfara; during a search of their house, police claim that they 
found 80 kilograms of ammoniac nitrate and four kilograms of 
aluminum powder. 
 
¶9.  (SBU) Post's point of contact for this report is Political 
Officer James Ricker, rickerjb@state.gov, phone 992-37-229-2507, 
 
DUSHANBE 00002222  002 OF 002 
 
 
IVG 752-2507. 
 
 
JACOBSON 
SIGNATURE