VZCZCXYZ0011
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHEG #7200/01 3541301
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 201301Z DEC 06
FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3006
INFO RUEILB/NCTC WASHINGTON DC

UNCLAS CAIRO 007200 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
S/CT FOR RHONDA SHORE, NEA FOR NEA/ELA, AND NCTC 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PTER ASEC EG
SUBJECT: EGYPT: 2006 COUNTRY REPORTS ON TERRORISM 
 
REF: SECSTATE 175925 
 
Egypt 
 
¶1.  Egypt is an ally in the Global War on Terrorism.  The 
Egyptian and U.S. Governments maintained close cooperation on 
a broad range of counter-terrorism and law enforcement issues 
in 2006 and exchanged information on a variety of terrorism, 
security, and law enforcement matters during the course of 
the year.  In February 2006, Egypt hosted the second session 
of the US-Egypt Counter-Terrorism Joint Working Group, and 
the next meeting of the group will likely be held in early 
2007 in Washington. 
 
¶2.  Egypt was a victim of domestic terrorism in 2006.  On 
April 24, three suicide bombers detonated their explosive 
charges in rapid succession at three popular tourist 
locations in the Sinai resort town of Dahab.  The bombers 
killed 24 people, including six foreigners.  At least 87 were 
injured, among them four Americans and 25 other foreigners. 
As with the 2005 triple bombing in Sharm el-Sheikh, the 
attacks seemed to target the Egyptian tourist industry, not 
Americans or foreigners specifically. 
 
¶3.  On April 26, two suicide bombers attacked a vehicle 
belonging to the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) in 
North Sinai, and an Egyptian police vehicle on the same day, 
but did not kill or injure anyone other than themselves.  In 
the first attack, a suicide bomber wearing a belt bomb threw 
himself on the hood of an unarmored MFO Chevy Blazer, 
shattering the windshield.  In the second attack, occurring 
several kilometers away, another man with a belt bomb rode up 
to an Egyptian police vehicle on a bicycle and blew himself 
up.  The police vehicle was responding to the attack on the 
MFO vehicle.  It is unclear if the primary target was the MFO 
or local police forces. 
 
¶4.  Following these attacks, Egyptian police made major 
security sweeps of the Sinai region.   Police suspect that 
the group responsible for the Sinai bombings is Al-Tawhid wa 
al-Jihad ("Unity and Holy War").  The ATAJ is an indigenous 
group comprised of young Bedouin men.  The group has a pro 
Al-Qa'ida, disaffected Salafist ideology. There are no 
indications that the group is specifically targeting 
Americans.  Egyptian authorities believe they have arrested 
or killed most of the ATAJ's leadership and operational 
planners, but it is likely that there are still members at 
large in the Sinai.  Although ATAJ is the only terrorist 
group to have committed attacks in Egypt in 2006, the 
Egyptian government broke up two other alleged terrorist 
groups in late 2006 - one group was reportedly planning 
attacks in Egypt, while the other was reportedly planning to 
send foreign fighters to Iraq. Members of both groups were 
arrested before moving beyond the planning stages for their 
operations. 
 
¶5.  The Egyptian government's active opposition to Islamist 
terrorism and effective intelligence and security services 
makes Egypt an unattractive safe haven for terror groups. 
There is no evidence of active foreign terrorist groups in 
the country.  However, Egypt's northern Sinai region is a 
haven for the smuggling of arms and explosives into Gaza, and 
a transit point for Gazan Palestinians.   Palestinian 
officials from Hamas have also carried large amounts of cash 
across the border.  The smuggling of weapons and other 
contraband through the Sinai into Israel and the Gaza Strip 
have created criminal networks that may be associated with 
terror groups in the region.  The apparent recent 
radicalization of some Sinai Bedouin may possibly be linked 
in part to these smuggling networks and Egyptian efforts to 
dismantle them. 
 
¶6.  In the past three years, Egypt has tightened its terror 
finance regulations in keeping with relevant UN Security 
Council Resolutions.  Egypt passed strong anti-money 
laundering legislation in 2002, established a financial 
intelligence unit in 2003, and ratified the latest UN 
Convention to Combat Terror Finance in 2005.  The government 
of Egypt also keeps up open, regular lines of communication 
with U.S. Embassy officials concerning terrorist finance 
information.  Egypt maintained its strengthened airport 
security measures and security for the Suez Canal, and 
continued to institute more stringent port security measures. 
 
¶7. The Egyptian judicial system does not allow plea 
bargaining, and terrorists have historically been prosecuted 
to the full extent of the law.  Terrorism defendants may be 
tried in military tribunals or emergency courts. In terms of 
evidence for counter-terrorism cases in the U.S., the 
judicial system is cooperative in the framework of the Mutual 
Legal Assistance Treaty.  A formal mechanism exists for the 
United States to request from Egypt evidence which can be 
used in American courts. 
 
¶8. Many of the Egyptian President's far-reaching powers in 
the realm of counter-terrorism come from a decades-old 
Emergency Law, which was renewed by Parliament for two years 
in 2006.  President Mubarak and Prime Minister Ahmed Nazif 
have both called for new anti-terrorism legislation to 
replace the Emergency Law, noting that Egypt should follow 
the example of other countries that have recently passed 
comprehensive laws to combat terrorism.  Such legislation is 
reportedly currently being drafted by a governmental 
interagency committee. 
 
¶9. Embassy Point of Contact:  Embassy Officer Yael Lempert at 
lemperty@state.gov. 
JONES