VZCZCXYZ0024
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHBS #4099/01 3461643
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 121643Z DEC 06
FM AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3839
INFO RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 0530
RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS BRUSSELS 004099 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: KISL SOCI PGOV BE
SUBJECT:  MUSLIM ENGAGEMENT STRATEGY 2006-2007 FOR BELGIUM 
 
REF:  STATE 185834 
 
Background 
---------- 
 
¶1.  (U) The Muslim populace in Belgium, a country of 
just over 10 million people, forms nearly five percent 
of the total population.  Although the Government of 
Belgium does not keep statistics on ethnicity or 
religion, most estimates for the total population of 
Muslims in Belgium range from 450,000 to 500,000.  The 
largest representations of Muslims in Belgium are from 
Morocco (approximately 300,000) and Turkey (roughly 
160,000). 
 
¶2. (U) Muslim integration and participation in Belgian 
society, like elsewhere in Europe, is an evolving and 
complex issue.  In some communities, there are now 
three or more generations of Muslims: foreign-born 
grandparents who migrated to Belgium during the '60s 
and their Belgian-born children and grandchildren. 
Muslim integration into other cultures and societies 
has not always been easy.  Some Muslims face 
documented discrimination in employment or housing as 
well as social prejudice based upon a combination of 
complex factors that may include: family name, outward 
religious symbols (such as a veil or scarf), or a 
perceived desire to "remain separate" or even a 
"refusal" to integrate. 
 
¶3. (SBU) Some far-right parties, most notably the 
Flemish Vlaams Belang, have anti-immigrant elements as 
part of their platforms.  The party has earned up to 
25 percent of the vote in Antwerp and it remains a 
very real force in Flemish politics. In Wallonia, so 
far the gains of extreme right party the Front 
National have been limited (15 percent of the vote in 
industrial city of Charleroi) mainly because of poor 
tactics and legal restraints on party activities, not 
entirely because of a lack of public receptiveness to 
their message.  As a result even some mainstream 
Belgian politicians, sensitive to their 
constituencies, have taken a harder line against 
immigrant communities.  Whether the perception is real 
or not, there are some Belgians who do feel threatened 
by concentrations of "non-Western foreigners" who have 
different customs and values and who stand out as 
separate from the relatively homogeneous society. 
 
¶4. (SBU) Belgium is further burdened with a very 
complex political system.  It is a federal state with 
three regions: Flanders in the north where Dutch is 
the official language; Wallonia in the south where 
French is the official language and Brussels, the 
capital, where French and Dutch are both official 
languages. In addition, there is a small German- 
speaking minority of 70,000 in the south.  The regions 
are empowered with a high level of autonomy, 
especially in the educational and cultural spheres. 
Many Moroccan immigrants can be found in Brussels and 
in the Walloon region while Turks often settle in 
Flanders.   Integration policies differ from region to 
region with Flanders adopting what many Belgians 
consider a more "Anglo-Saxon" integration model, 
Wallonia following the French example and Brussels, a 
mix of the two.   Neither system has worked well. 
Muslims in urban centers face high unemployment, 
particularly among the youth.  All non-EU nationals, 
including Muslims, have higher rates of unemployment 
than their EU citizen counterparts.  Muslim immigrants 
are often further handicapped by limited education or 
language proficiency in Belgium's two official 
languages.  These very real educational and socio- 
economic factors can inhibit full integration. 
 
¶5. (U) Embassy Brussels has been actively engaging the 
Belgian Muslim community since early 2002.  Post soon 
discovered that there was nothing to be gained by 
discussing foreign policy.  This would only exacerbate 
their suspicion and confirm their negative images 
about the U.S. and the U.S.G. in particular.  Instead, 
Post focused on issues that affected them most, 
namely, religion and empowerment.  In 2002 ? 2003, the 
Embassy-invited speakers such as Imam Yahya Hendi, 
civil rights leader Rev. Soaries, and "Karamah: Muslim 
Women Lawyers for Human Rights" founder Azizah Al- 
Hibri were all extremely well-received.  In 2004, a 
first ever Iftar dinner was organized by the 
Ambassador.  Based on this experience, the Embassy 
organized a major conference which brought together an 
impressive group of 32 American Muslims to meet with 
an equally impressive group of 65 Belgian Muslims to 
discuss everyday, practical matters regarding Muslim 
participation in society.  This two-day conference, 
titled "Muslim Communities Participating in Society: A 
Belgian-U.S. Dialogue" took place in Brussels on 
November 16 & 17, 2005 and was highly successful.  It 
built trust and constituted a tremendous boost to our 
credibility with this highly critical, suspicious and 
sometimes even hostile audience. 
 
¶6. (U) This dialogue, in turn, led to a number of 
follow-on initiatives which Post promised it would 
help materialize.  Some of the follow-on activities 
have taken place already such as Belgian participation 
in the ISNA Education Forum (April 2006), Belgian 
participation in the Karamah leadership program (July 
2006), and a one-day seminar on Media Portrayal of 
Minorities (June 2006).  Others will take place 
throughout 2007.  In order to maintain the momentum of 
this goodwill and our credibility, we must continue 
the dialogue with moderate Belgian Muslims, and expand 
our contact base, as we continue these follow-on 
initiatives.  Our Muslim strategy for the future, 
therefore, will reflect this. 
 
¶7. (U) The Embassy also works closely (and will 
continue to work closely) with the Muslim Executive 
Council which was founded by Royal decree in 1998 and 
which consists of a 17-member "Executive" and a 68- 
member "General Assembly", all of whom are elected by 
the Muslim communities of Belgium (the elections for 
the current Executive and Assembly took place in 
March, 2005).  The Muslim Executive of Belgium is 
officially recognized as the interlocutor for the 
Belgian authorities (a) at the federal level, to deal 
with the administrative management of the religion 
(nominations of imams and chaplains, management of 
local communities), and (b) at the regional level, 
with regard to Islamic education (appointment and 
inspection of Islam teachers, curriculum oversight, 
etc.). 
 
¶8. (SBU) As the October 2006 local elections in 
Belgium demonstrated once again, Belgian Muslims have 
become a real political force and the Embassy works 
with Muslim members of Parliament and local government 
on a variety of political issues.  Also, whenever 
there's a crisis affecting the Muslim communities 
(e.g., the Cartoon crisis), the Embassy is able to 
draw on its Muslim conference alumni and Muslim 
political contacts to obtain first-hand information on 
the reactions inside the various Muslim communities. 
 
Negative Narrative: 
------------------- 
 
¶9. (SBU) Overcoming suspicions of mainstream as well 
as Muslim audiences:  The integration (or lack 
thereof) of Muslim communities in Belgian society is a 
very sensitive topic.  The Embassy's engagement with 
Belgian Muslims is seen by some members of the 
majority community, and some Muslims also, as 
interference in Belgium's internal affairs; a majority 
of Belgian Muslims remain highly suspicious of the 
USG.  Yet, more and more Belgians, including Muslims, 
see the U.S. model as a better example for integrating 
minorities than most European countries.  We will 
therefore continue to inform Muslim as well as 
mainstream Belgian audiences about America's 
experience in dealing with multicultural issues. 
 
¶10. (SBU) By doing so we not only hope to advance the 
integration of Muslims into Belgian society but also 
increase our credibility with both Muslims and 
mainstream Belgians with the ultimate goal of creating 
a more positive image of the US, its policies, 
society, and values. 
 
Media Environment: 
------------------ 
 
¶11. (U) Brussels has a complex media climate.  As the 
capital of Europe, Brussels hosts one of the largest 
press contingents in the world, with more than 1,000 
accredited journalists.  The media we wish to reach 
are those who cover the problems of this small country 
which straddles the Anglo-Saxon/Latin divide in 
Europe.  In fact, it often seems that from a public 
diplomacy point of view, Belgium is really two 
countries -- Dutch speaking Flanders and French 
speaking Wallonia -- united by little more than the 
King, the postal system, the railroads, and social 
security.  Each language group marches to a different 
drummer.  The Dutch-language press is more often than 
not inspired by the Anglo-Saxon media; the 
Francophones take their cues from Paris.  Issues that 
make prominent headlines in one media may, or may not, 
merit mention in the other.  Depending on one's 
expectations, one might be surprised either by the 
magnitude of the gap between the two linguistic 
communities or by the fact that they manage to coexist 
in a more or less harmonious fashion. 
 
¶12. (U) State-owned radio and television stations RTBF 
and VRT, which historically ran closely associated 
French-language and Dutch-language operations, have 
long become completely independent from each other. 
The only vestige of their common past is that they 
share the same premises and some technical 
installations.  The other television stations, RTL/TVI 
and AB3 on the French-language side, VTM and VT4 on 
the Dutch-language side are completely independent 
from each other. 
 
¶13. (U) Belgium has a very well-developed information 
network.  There are some 20 dailies, with a combined 
circulation of some 1,700,000, and numerous 
periodicals.  Several dozens of local low-powered FM 
radio stations are in operation.  Four state-owned 
television channels broadcast in Belgium -- two 
francophone (RTBF) and two Dutch-language (VRT) -- in 
addition to one independent francophone channel 
(RTL/TVI) and two independent Dutch-language channels 
(VTM and VT4).  All have editorial autonomy. 
Legislation governing the broadcast industry is 
different for the French and Dutch-language sectors, 
since it is determined by the two language communities 
and not the national government. 
 
¶14. (U) Almost 100 percent of Belgian homes subscribe 
to cable and, depending on the region they live in, 
are able to receive TV broadcasts from England (BBC 1 
and 2; ITV and Channel 4 also in the coastal area), 
France (TF1, France 2, France 3, Arte and TV5), 
Germany (ARD, ZDF and WDR), Italy (RAI), the 
Netherlands (Holland 1, 2 and 3), Spain (TVE), 
Portugal (TPE), Turkey (TRT) and the USA (CNN).   In 
addition, there are several local TV stations -- such 
as, for instance, TV Bruxelles/TV Brussels for the 
Brussels region -- as well as economic stations (Canal 
Z, CNBC.) 
 
Strategic Goals: 
---------------- 
 
¶15. (SBU) OVERALL GOAL: Improving understanding and 
perception of the United States, its society, its 
values and its policies by 
 
-- Deepening of already existing relationships within 
the Muslim communities of Belgium 
-- Widening of our network of Muslim contacts with 
more focus on youth 
-- Maintaining the dialogue about integration between 
Belgian Muslim and non-Muslim communities 
 
Top Humanitarian Assistance Goal:  N/A 
 
Target Audiences and suggested programs for each 
Strategic Goal: 
 
Goal 1: Deepening of already existing relationships 
within the Muslim communities of Belgium 
 
Target Audience: Members of the Muslim Executive 
Council and Muslim community leaders (including 
political leaders, businessmen, imams, political 
activists, journalists, NGO leaders, educators and 
field workers and other multipliers).  Their 
perception of our activities shapes the way the 
members of their communities view our outreach 
efforts, which in turn determines the level of access 
and success we can have. 
 
Suggested Programs: 
 
-- Inviting Muslims and other minorities to various 
Mission events, not only Muslim-oriented events: All 
Mission elements will continue to include Muslim 
contacts on guest lists for representational events as 
appropriate. 
-- Bringing over American Muslim speakers: Both in- 
depth discussions with past speakers who have 
successfully engaged with Belgian Muslims, and 
bringing over new speakers who can elaborate on issues 
of genuine interest to the community (e.g., Post has 
re-invited Karamah Founder Azizah Al-Hibri to come to 
Belgium in May ?07). 
-- Sending Belgian community leaders to the U.S. on 
IV, Volvis, and other exchange programs; 
-- Co-sponsoring (with the Islamic Society of North 
America, one of our 2005 conference participants) 
travel by five Belgian imams to attend ISNA?s Summer 
Imam training program in Chicago. 
 
Goal 2: Widening our network of Muslim contacts 
 
Target Audience: Youth 
The Muslim population in Belgium is young: up to 35% 
is less than 18 years old and with a population growth 
rate significantly greater than that of the majority 
Belgian community, the number of Muslim youth in 
Belgium is growing rapidly.  Most of them suffer a 
serious identity crisis feeling alienated both at home 
(Belgium) as well as in the country of their families? 
origin where most of them return every summer.  In 
addition, these youth are disadvantaged in comparison 
with their Belgian peers: not only are they less 
likely to succeed in the secondary school system, much 
less likely to pursue post-secondary education, and 
even less likely to find a job, they are already 
economically disadvantaged to start with.  38.7% of 
Turkish immigrants and 25% of people with a Moroccan 
background have to make ends meet with less than 500 
euros ($664) each month.  These findings are even more 
staggering when compared to European poverty line set 
at a monthly income of 777 euros ($1,033) per month. 
Thus, almost 60% of people of Turkish descent and 55% 
of people of Moroccan descent are living in poverty. 
Those who feel the impact of poverty the most are the 
young.  It is critical, therefore, that we concentrate 
more on reaching out to younger generations in order 
to counter the spread of extremism. 
 
Note: Belgian youth in general, not only minority 
youth, will take a more important place in the 
Mission?s public diplomacy efforts so that Muslim 
youth will not only be targeted with specific 
programs, through specific channels, but also through 
programs addressed to youth in general. 
 
Suggested Programs: 
 
-- Setting up a network of young people who can serve 
as multipliers as we develop outreach programs to 
improve their image of the US.  In order to achieve 
this, a mix of outreach tools would be used, including 
speaker programs, cultural events and educational 
exchanges mainly through IV and/or VOLVIS grants. 
-- Empowering existing youth organizations to make 
them more efficient by bringing over their peers from 
the U.S. to share experiences and successful programs. 
-- Co-sponsoring (w/ISNA) six Belgian youth (three 
Turkish, three Moroccan) as summer interns at ISNA 
Headquarters. 
-- Co-sponsoring (w/KARAMAH) a delegation of five 
young women to attend Karamah's three-week Summer 
Leadership Program in WashDC 
 
Goal 3: Maintaining the dialogue about integration 
between Belgian Muslim and Non-Muslim communities. 
 
Target Audience: Journalists, political leaders, 
government and non-government organizations working on 
integration issues 
 
Suggested Programs:  Exploring with host governments 
and local communities the ongoing debate over 
integration, and offering insights and understanding 
into the US struggle with integration for Muslims and 
non-Muslims working on the issues. 
 
In terms of media portrayal, we intend to monitor 
developments with regard to diversity in the 
mainstream press and follow up as well as build on the 
media portrayal conference we organized in June 2006 
entitled "Them and Us: Moving Beyond the Cliches." 
 
In FY 07, half of Post's IVs are Muslims: one 
E 
academic, one journalist/political party advisor, and 
one NGO leader of Moroccan origin as well as one 
Turkish Muslim parliamentarian/Imam.  All will look at 
integration policies and programs. 
 
In FY 08, a series of events centered on the 40th 
anniversary of the killing of Dr. Martin Luther King, 
Jr., highlighting the U.S. civil rights struggle. 
 
Embassy's Top Three Program Priorities: 
 
Following up on successful past outreach program is 
absolutely essential to our credibility.  Post's 
program priorities, therefore, reflect this. 
 
1) Visit of Dr. Azizah Al-Hibri, Founder and Director 
of Karamah: Muslim Women Lawyers for Human Rights, to 
deepen and widen discussions about (a) the role and 
status of women in Islam; (b) setting up a Belgian and 
eventually a European Karamah center. 
 
2) Co-sponsoring (w/ISNA) six Belgian youth (three 
Turkish, three Moroccan) as summer interns at ISNA 
Headquarters. 
 
3) Co-sponsoring (w/KARAMAH) a delegation of five 
young women to attend Karamah's three-week Summer 
Leadership Program in WashDC.  In FY 06 Post co- 
sponsored a group of five Francophone women; in FY 07, 
Post wants to co-sponsor a group of five Flemish 
women. 
 
Measuring Effectiveness: 
 
Post will track media coverage of Post outreach 
programs, program attendance and opinions by our 
Muslim contacts, as well as the number of exchange 
participants, focusing on minority issues.  Since 
effectiveness cannot be measured by statistics alone, 
anecdotal evidence will be collected in order to 
complement this. 
KOROLOGOS