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RR RUEHBC RUEHDA RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHGB #4620/01 3531336
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 191336Z DEC 06
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8587
INFO RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC
RUEHRC/DEPT OF AGRICULTURE WASHDC

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 004620 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ECON EAGR IZ IR
SUBJECT: PRT TIKRIT: FARMERS STRUGGLING IN IRAQ,S 
BREADBASKET 
 
¶1. (U) This is a PRT Tikrit, Salah ad Din cable. 
 
¶2. (SBU) SUMMARY.  The growth of the agricultural sector is 
essential in Salah ad Din, a rural province in the Sunni 
heartland largely lacking many of the natural resources of 
its neighbors.  Farmers in Salah ad Din face a number of 
significant challenges: high prices and unavailability of 
inputs, reduced access to markets to sell their goods, and an 
often unresponsive central bureaucracy -- Sunni farmers 
strongly believe the area is purposefully neglected by the 
Ministry of Agriculture in Baghdad.  Increasing basic 
agricultural production is the most direct means of 
increasing general prosperity and a necessary precondition 
for future agribusiness development.  Enhanced GOI support to 
attain this will likely be crucial to establishing sustained 
economic growth in the Sunni heartland. END SUMMARY. 
 
 
------------------ 
Untapped Potential 
------------------ 
 
¶3. (SBU) Agriculture is the foundation of the economy of 
Salah ad Din (SaD), a rural province in the Sunni heartland 
north of Baghdad.  Improving access to basic inputs and 
secure markets for farmers could provide significant benefits 
for SaD - increased employment, a more diverse business 
climate through the development of agribusiness, and it is 
hoped, decreasing support for insurgent activity.  Increasing 
yields would also help to achieve a precondition (along with 
improved security) to attracting foreign and domestic 
agribusiness investment.  But market dynamics are probably 
not sufficient to ensure short-term success - the GOI may 
need to actively subsidize and encourage local farmers 
through initiatives focusing on basic needs. 
 
¶4. (SBU) Khalaf Hamad, Director General of Agriculture for 
SaD, told PRT representatives on November 8 that vast tracts 
of arable land today in SaD are unused.  Of 2.6 million 
arable acres in the province, only 348 thousand acres, or 13 
percent, are presently farmed - due in part to insufficient 
irrigation.  Hamad provided the following data regarding the 
acreage of the principal crops of SaD: 
 
-- Citrus, 170,909 acres 
-- Corn, 94,401 acres 
-- Barley, 32,701 acres 
-- Sunflower, 29,616 acres 
 
In addition, tomatoes, cucumbers, eggplant, potatoes, sesame, 
and watermelon are also produced in lesser quantities. 
 
¶5. (SBU) Considered an affront by many residents, SaD imports 
nearly all of its processed food from Iran, Syria, and 
Turkey.  Local leaders often suggest agribusiness concepts 
such as reopening the tomato paste processing plant in Balad 
or the construction of a citrus jam factory in Tikrit. 
However, many of the prerequisites for substantial industrial 
development - cold storage, improved security, reliable 
distribution - do not yet exist.  Most importantly, local 
agricultural yields may need to be strengthened before 
large-scale agribusiness initiatives would meet with success. 
 
----------------------------------------- 
Inputs More Expensive, Less Market Access 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶6. (SBU) The high price and unavailability of fuel, 
equipment, fertilizer, pesticides, and other inputs 
constrains agricultural production in SaD.  According to 
Kareem Kurdi and Ayad Daham, leaders of the provincial 
planters union, higher operational costs leave many farmers 
unable to purchase necessary equipment or hire additional 
employees.  Kurdi provided IPAO several examples: 
 
----Cost of a tractor in 2003 - 6 million ID (4,000 USD) 
----Cost of a tractor in 2006 - 30 million ID (20,000 USD) 
 
----Cost of onion seed in 2003 - 30 thousand ID (20 USD) per 
kilogram 
----Cost of onion seed in 2006 - 60 thousand ID (40 USD) per 
kilogram 
 
¶7. (SBU) Frequent shortages of diesel fuel result in 
dependence upon black market sources which typically charge a 
rate at least three times higher than the official price. 
The Ministry of Agriculture (MoA) provides each farmer with 
220 liters per month of diesel fuel; however, this total is 
only sufficient for about one day of operation on a 
medium-sized farm.  In addition, Daham expressed concern that 
 
BAGHDAD 00004620  002 OF 002 
 
 
a rival farmers union, created by the MoA, was diverting 
diesel intended for farmers to be sold on the black market. 
 
¶8. (SBU) Iraq suffers from an acute shortage of fertilizer. 
While the situation was partially alleviated by the 
restarting of production at the Bayji Fertilizer Plant on 
November 21 after it had been dormant for two years, only 
approximately 15 percent of needed fertilizer was distributed 
in 2005, with a similar result expected for 2006.  At its 
present reduced capacity, Bayji will produce an additional 12 
percent of national demand.  SaD farmers consistently name 
the shortage of fertilizer as the biggest impediment to 
increasing crop yields and obtaining overall growth.  The 
deficiency drives up the black market price and forces most 
farmers to rely upon lower quality Iranian imports. 
 
¶9. (SBU) The deteriorating security situation has also taken 
its toll.  Many SaD farmers who previously transported their 
goods to profitable markets in Baghdad or Mosul are now 
unable to do so.  In interviews, SaD farmers often express 
their belief that the MoA ensures Shia access to Sunni 
markets but not the reverse. 
 
--------------- 
Poor Irrigation 
--------------- 
 
¶10. (SBU) Although approximately one-half of all Iraqi arable 
land is irrigated; in many areas of SaD canals transmit 
minimal amounts of water due to blockage.  In an interview on 
November 13, the Director General for Water Resources in SaD 
told PRT members that canal clearing is a top federal 
priority, but is currently delayed by the security situation. 
 However, on November 14, Kurdi and Daham told IPAO that 
local farmers offered to provide complete security - but the 
Ministry of Water Resources (MoWR) had refused their offer. 
In addition, all CF and PRT canal clearing proposals 
submitted to the MoWR have been rejected. 
 
------------------------------------ 
Confidence Low in Central Government 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶11. (SBU) Kurdi and Daham also strongly conveyed to IPAO 
their view of the MoA as an anti-Sunni bureaucracy 
unresponsive to the needs of the farmers of SaD.  Many 
examples were cited, including failures to make good promised 
deliveries of fertilizers, pesticides and other products. 
During a November 30 meeting, Tikrit farmer and city council 
member Matham Al-Qaim described the MoA as incompetent and 
unresponsive.  Al-Qaim and community leaders from Samarra 
expressed that the negligence was deliberate and left only 
one option - subsidizing farming inputs and products through 
provincial and local government.  Programs of this type would 
be difficult to support locally due to the inability of 
provincial and municipal governments to raise revenue. 
However, it illustrates the general dissatisfaction with the 
Sadrist-controlled MoA in SaD and the awareness of the 
importance of agricultural development here. 
 
------- 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶12. (SBU) Practical and timely GOI policies which provide 
farmers greater access to basic inputs such as fuel, 
fertilizer, seed, and water and ensure that they have a 
market for their products will be critical for the short-term 
economic recovery and political stabilization of Salah ad Din 
and other agricultural provinces.  While an important 
long-term strategy, market-based agribusiness is not an 
immediate panacea given the current circumstances. END 
COMMENT. 
 
¶13. (U) For additional reporting from PRT Tikrit, Salah ad 
Din, please see our SIPRNET Reporting Blog: 
http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Tikrit. 
KHALILZAD