VZCZCXRO7843
OO RUEHIK RUEHYG
DE RUEHVI #3401 3281419
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 241419Z NOV 06
FM AMEMBASSY VIENNA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5625
INFO RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHSW/AMEMBASSY BERN PRIORITY 1086
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE PRIORITY 3922
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0173
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 0486

UNCLAS VIENNA 003401 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EUR/RPM AND EUR/AGS - SAINT-ANDRE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PBTS EUN NATO OSCE MO GG RU AU
SUBJECT: DEMARCHE TO AUSTRIA:  UNIFIED APPROACH TO 
GEORGIA/MOLDOVA CONFLICTS 
 
REF: STATE 190264 
 
¶1.  (SBU) Post conveyed reftel points on November 22 to 
Thomas Mayr-Harting, the Austrian MFA's Political Director. 
Charge met with Mayr-Harting on November 24 to discuss the 
issue.  Austrian OSCE Political Affairs Director Christophe 
Ceska, Eastern Europe Director (DAS-equivalent) Josef 
Litschauer, and Eastern Europe desk officer Ursula Fahringer 
also participated. 
 
¶2.  (SBU) Mayr-Harting said Austria agrees with U.S. views on 
the status of the territories in question (Transnistria, 
South Ossetia and Abkhazia).  Austria would like the 
international community to find a solution to compatible with 
international law and with the integrity of the states of 
which they are a part, Mayr-Harting said. 
 
¶3.  (SBU) Ceska said there was agreement among EU members 
that it was important to win consensus on a Ministerial 
Declaration this year.  It had been five years since this had 
been possible, he noted.  However, there were diverse views 
on whether there should be different regional declarations on 
Georgia and Moldova.  There was some support for avoiding 
mention of Russia's Istanbul Commitments in a declaration on 
Georgia, he noted. 
 
¶4.  (SBU) Mayr-Harting said it would be difficult, in a 
consensus-based organization such as the OSCE, to induce 
Russia to sign on to a text to which the EU and U.S. could 
agree.  In practical terms, he mused, Russian acquiescence to 
such a text in early December would effectively give away a 
point the Russians think they could use (much as we all 
disagree) in connection with Kosovo early in 2007. 
Tactically, if there is no chance for a consensus text this 
year, it would seem to make sense for the EU and U.S. to 
resist offering compromises to the Russians at all.  He 
undertook to work out a definitive position to share with us. 
 
¶5.  (SBU) Ceska and Litschauer said they had not/not been 
able to locate the Russian text that reftel cites (para. 2, 
tic 4).  They asked if we had a copy we could share with them. 
Phillips