VZCZCXRO7033
PP RUEHBZ RUEHDBU RUEHIK RUEHLN RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUCNDT #2181/01 3262109
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 222109Z NOV 06
FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0804
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 0919
RUEHSI/AMEMBASSY TBILISI PRIORITY 3829

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 USUN NEW YORK 002181 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL GG YI
SUBJECT: GEORGIAN PERMREP HOLDS BRAINSTORMING SESSION ON 
ABKHAZIA WITH NEW YORK FRIENDS 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary:  The Georgian Mission to the UN is getting 
busy.  On November 3, Georgian Permrep Irakli Alasania hosted 
the New York Friends for a discussion titled "on a 
comprehensive peaceful solution to the conflict in Abkhazia." 
 Alasania made obvious efforts to be accommodating to the 
Russian representative, as Russia's UN Mission had refused to 
attend the discussion under its original billing "on 
internationalizing the peacekeeping format for Abkhazia." 
The Russian representative, although presenting his views in 
a collegial fashion throughout, focused his comments almost 
entirely on calls for Georgia to speedily implement portions 
of UNSCR 1716 addressing Georgia's Kodori operation.  In a 
November 17 meeting with poloffs, scheduled at his request, 
Alasania advocated the internationalization of police in Gali 
as a first step toward a more general internationalization of 
foreign security forces.  End summary. 
 
Alasania Seeks Input, Including Criticism 
 
¶2. (SBU) On November 3, Georgian Permrep Irakli Alasania 
hosted the New York Friends (US, UK, France, Germany, Russia 
and Slovakia) at his mission for a brainstorming session on 
the subject of "a comprehensive peaceful solution to the 
conflict in Abkhazia."  Throughout the meeting Alasania made 
an obvious effort to be as accommodating as possible to 
Russia's views; the Russians had declined to attend the 
meeting under its original billing as a discussion on 
"internationalizing the peacekeeping format for Abkhazia." 
Alasania opened the meeting by expressing pleasure that 
Russia agreed to participate, saying that "as a member of the 
Friends and as facilitator, Russia's involvement is 
indispensable."  Alasania noted that the meeting between 
Foreign Ministers Bezhuashvili and Lavrov in Moscow earlier 
in the week had helped Georgia and Russia understand one 
another's concerns on important issues, including Abkhazia. 
 
¶3.  (SBU) Alasania then invited the Friends to help him think 
about how to proceed in New York and produce new, effective 
approaches on Abkhazia.  By way of example, Alasania 
suggested that now that controversy surrounding Georgia's 
Kodori operation had settled down, the Friends might revisit 
the once-promising agreement on non-resumption of hostilities 
to see if it were ripe again for discussion.  Alasania raised 
UNSCR 1716 that renewed UNOMIG's mandate, saying it had to be 
implemented, including portions calling for improved 
conditions for returnees and opening a human rights office in 
Gali.  He invited input on what the New York Friends thought 
could be achieved at the next Friends meeting in Geneva and 
what actions Georgia might take to show its commitment to 
solving the problem only through peaceful means.  Alasania 
likewise invited ideas on how Georgia could work with the 
Abkhaz to ensure they follow through on previous Geneva 
commitments.  Furthermore, Alasania said we should also 
reflect on how Russia could be more successful as a 
facilitator because he thought it obvious that the present 
arrangement with Russian CIS peacekeepers alone was not 
successful.  He thought in particular that we ought to 
consider tackling law enforcement in Gali or even DFM 
Karasin's suggestion of expanding the CIS force to include 
other CIS countries. 
 
New York Friends Offer Questions and Suggestions 
 
¶4. (SBU) Germany's Deputy Permrep asked Alasania what 
internationalization within the CIS might look like. 
Alasania replied that no other CIS countries had volunteered 
to be troop contributors and, in fact, no non-CIS countries 
had volunteered either.  He said Russian peacekeepers clearly 
were needed at some level to give the Abkhaz a sense of 
security.  However, it was a heavy burden for Russia alone as 
evidenced by the fact that over a 100 of its peacekeepers had 
been killed in the past ten years.  He stated that it had 
been a brave step for the Russians to come in alone in the 
90's.  However, we couldn't stick just with the format of 12 
years ago, said Alasania, because the region had evolved.  On 
criminality in Gali in particular, Alasania noted that even 
the head of the CIS force had said he could not grapple with 
criminality as his forces were not trained to handle it. 
 
¶5.  (SBU) Vadim Smirnov the Russian Political Counselor in 
New York (who before the meeting started conspicuously joined 
Alasania and the Friends in a glass Georgian wine) stated 
that he was pleased to hear that the Georgian side had taken 
Bezhuashvili's meeting with Lavrov seriously because it had 
laid out "what needed to be done to achieve more normalized 
relations."  He decried, however, that the Georgian Mission 
had originally advertised the day's meeting as one on 
 
USUN NEW Y 00002181  002 OF 003 
 
 
changing the peacekeeping format in Abkhazia, changed it to a 
generalized discussion of the Abkhazia conflict, but seemed 
to be trying to revert the focus to peacekeeping formats that 
Russia preferred not to discuss.  Smirnov said we should 
indeed prioritize and look at what the sides could do, but 
that should come at a later stage only "after UNSCR 1716 was 
fully implemented," including talking about Kodori and 
adherence to the Moscow agreement.  Alasania rebutted the 
Russian, querying him on whether he "meant that we should try 
to bring back Kvitsani" and pointing out that the Kodori 
operation had made possible the resumption of joint patrols. 
On violations, Alasania said he took issue with the UN's 
analysis of the violations, but agreed that there probably 
had been some violations.  Alasania asked Smirnov what steps 
he would recommend, to which the Russian replied that Russia 
was only the facilitator and not a party to the conflict, but 
the resolution had confirmed "the important role of CIS 
forces and cooperation with the UN and these should be fully 
implemented first."  Later, the Russian asked Alasania why he 
thought the Abkhaz were resisting accepting police and 
Alasania answered that he thought the Abkhaz wanted to avoid 
a permanent international presence.  He asked Alasania 
whether Police would still be needed if we increased 
confidence, but Alasania replied that they would be because 
the Abkhaz could not agree to participate in Georgian law 
enforcement structures and would thus need the political 
cover of something international.  Alasania said he hoped 
that Russia would help get the Abkhaz to agree to civilian 
police in Gali because the track record had proved that "when 
Russia wants to get something done in Gali, it gets done." 
 
 
¶6.  (SBU) USUN's Deputy Political Counselor suggested to 
Alasania that instead of looking at the situation on the 
ground from a supply side, perhaps we should step back and 
look at the totality of need in terms of what it would take 
to accomplish our goals on law enforcement and return of 
refugees.  In other words, in addition to the approximately 
1700 CIS forces and 120 UNOMIG observers, what would it take, 
setting aside for a moment the color of the uniforms, to get 
the job done?  USUN also reiterated the US position that and 
all violations of the Moscow agreement by either side should 
be properly recognized, but  that we did not criticize the 
Kodori operation in principle, especially given that the 
joint patrols had resulted from it.  Alasania responded that 
there was an urgent need for police on the ground in Gali as 
there was currently no sense of security there.  He said that 
just a few hundred police would be sufficient. At the same 
time, argued Alasania, we should also get the Abkhaz to agree 
to the 20 civilian police that had been authorized in the 
first place.  The French expert said the situation in 
Abkhazia was frustrating, but we should avoid hasty steps 
that would make things worse.  There were many things in 
UNSCR 1716 that needed to be implemented: the situation in 
Kodori should be "brought back into line with the Moscow 
Agreement, no more, no less", the resumption of joint patrols 
was an important step that "we should welcome and not just 
note with satisfaction", civilian police and international 
police in Gali would be a very good idea that was embraced by 
Jean Arnault.  The UK's expert that he agreed UNSCR 1716 was 
a basis for steps that we should take even if it was not 
agreed with Russia that "the result of the Kodori operation 
had been a situation in breach of the Moscow agreement and 
that this should be addressed as a priority."  The UK expert 
also said he agreed "the Kodori operation had resulted in an 
increase in tension."  If there were unilateral steps the 
Georgian side could take to build confidence that would be 
beneficial.  Talking about internationalizing the 
peacekeeping format was a topic that "raised concern and 
suspicions, but civilian police could be a very good idea and 
were hard to argue against."  At one point in the meeting, 
Alasania also stated that he was lobbying hard to get rid of 
all remaining sanctions on the Abkhaz. 
 
Georgia and Kosovo 
 
¶7.  (SBU) As the meeting drew to a close, Alasania asked 
those present for informal thoughts on how the conclusion of 
the Kosovo Future Status Process could affect Georgia.  This 
precipitated a long debate between the Russian and the UK's 
Deputy Permrep (a Balkans expert) in which the Russians 
argued that the resolution of Kosovo's status could set a 
precedent for other conflicts unless it "is resolved in the 
correct way" and the UK argued that the UN Security Council 
had always viewed distinct problems completely separately and 
that there had never been a single case of linking problems 
in different parts of the world, so we should not risk 
 
USUN NEW Y 00002181  003 OF 003 
 
 
adverse consequences by changing that now.  USUN's Deputy 
Political Counselor cited a recent Wall Street Journal 
article calling Kosovo "a region administered by the UN that 
was formerly part of a state that no longer existed -- hardly 
a precedent for anything." 
 
Alasania Suggests International Police in Gali Might Satisfy 
Tblisi's Concerns 
 
¶8.  (SBU) In a November 17 meeting with poloffs, scheduled at 
his request, Alasania said the internationalization of police 
in Gali could be a first step toward a more general 
internationalization of foreign security forces.  He said 
that if some agreement on this could be reached among all the 
Friends at the next Geneva meeting, he could probably 
convince Tblisi to back off from plans to insist on the 
withdrawal of CIS peacekeepers from Abkhazia.  Alasania said 
that he had in general terms pitched such a compromise to 
Russian Permrep Churkin in a meeting earlier that same day, 
but Churkin had been noncommittal on police in Gali and said 
he needed to consult with Ambassador Bocharnikov. 
BOLTON