VZCZCXRO7076
PP RUEHAT
DE RUCNDT #2180/01 3262024
ZNR UUUUU ZZH ZFR ZFR ZFR ZFR ZFR ZFR ZFR ZFR ZFR ZFR ZFR
P 222024Z NOV 06
FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0801
INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHZJ/HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 1388
RUEHKN/AMEMBASSY KOLONIA PRIORITY 0015
RUEHKR/AMEMBASSY KOROR PRIORITY 0081
RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI PRIORITY 0519
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA PRIORITY 0828
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY 1319

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 USUN NEW YORK 002180 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: KUNR AORC UNGA PREL IS
SUBJECT: UN BUDGET: FIFTH COMMITTEE VOTE ON BUDGET 
IMPLICATIONS OF EMERGENCY SPECIAL SESSION RESOLUTION 
 
USUN NEW Y 00002180  001.6 OF 003 
 
 
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USUN NEW Y 00002180  002.3 OF 003 
 
 
mission that would be created by the draft resolution and the 
mission created by the Human Rights Council in its recent 
resolution.  Australia also inquired about the possible 
duplication between the resolution under consideration in the 
General Assembly and the one adopted by the Human Rights 
Council.  South Africa noted that he respected the right of 
delegations to ask questions, but that it appeared that the 
Committee was now caught up in politics and asked the 
Chairman to take action.  The EU noted that they were ready 
to adopt the draft decision, which would not give rise to 
additional requirements at the present stage and allow for 
additional resources to be reported in the context of the 
performance report. 
 
¶6.  After a few further clarifications, the Chairman asked 
the Committee whether it could adopt the draft decision. 
Ambassador Wallace read the following explanation of vote, 
before the vote, which was drawn from reftel B and Ambassador 
Bolton's explanation of vote following the U.S. veto of the 
draft Security Council resolution (reftel C): 
 
BEGIN TEXT: 
 
Mr. Chairman, 
 
The United States cannot support the resolution that results 
in the statement of program budget implications that the 
Committee is currently considering.  The text is one-sided 
and unbalanced and will not advance the aspirations of the 
Palestinian and Israeli people.  Therefore, we cannot support 
resources to implement this resolution. 
 
My delegation notes that in the last day, the Third Committee 
of the General Assembly adopted a draft resolution that 
stresses the need to avoid politically motivated and biased 
country-specific resolutions.  Yet, today, we see that the 
General Assembly is considering a resolution that is 
politically motivated and biased towards the state of Israel. 
 The draft resolution before the General Assembly today 
answers a significant question -- that of the relevance and 
utility of the United Nations in the twenty-first century. 
We question whether pursuing these types of resolutions 
furthers the goals of the United Nations, as stated in the 
Charter, and whether it is a good use of resources. 
 
My delegation strongly believes in the principle of consensus 
in this Committee.  However, in light of the underlying 
resolution, we cannot join consensus today on this matter and 
therefore seek a vote on this decision. 
 
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 
 
END TEXT. 
 
¶7.  Israel's representative, also speaking before the vote, 
said the reconvening of the tenth emergency special session 
of the Assembly was another example of Member States misusing 
and abusing the procedures of the General Assembly.  He, too, 
supported the Fifth Committee's practice of consensus, but 
the draft decision before the Committee paved the way for a 
one-sided and biased draft to be presented to the Assembly. 
It ignored the fact that Palestinian actors had forced Israel 
to defend itself, and did not call on the Palestinian 
Authority to recognize Israel and curb violence.  If the UN 
was to be useful, genuine negotiations between the parties 
represented the only way to settle the issue.  Israel could 
not support expending additional financial resources for the 
implementation of political agendas, he said.  The headline 
of the resolution was politically biased, he noted, even 
before the fact-finding mission was initiated.  The draft was 
also talking about occupied territories, when the actions had 
taken place in the territory that Israel had left over a year 
ago, he said. 
 
¶8. The Committee then proceeded to a recorded vote on the 
draft decision: 143 in favor, 5 opposed (U.S., Israel, 
Australia, Micronesia, and Palau), and 2 abstentions (Canada 
and Kenya).  After the vote, Australia's representative, 
explaining his negative vote on the draft decision, said the 
fact-finding mission that the Assembly set up by its text 
would not serve any useful purpose in resolving the conflict 
in the Middle East.  He therefore recommended that the 
 
USUN NEW Y 00002180  003.3 OF 003 
 
 
inquiry should not be funded, even if from existing 
resources.  Australia had also voted against an inquiry that 
had already been set up by the Human Rights Council.  Thus, 
if he disagreed on the inquiry in the first place, he would 
certainly object to two such inquiries.  Finland (on behalf 
of the European Union) and Japan regretted that the Fifth 
Committee deviated from its usual practice of taking 
decisions by consensus. 
 
¶9.  COMMENT: The EU and Japan spent the day trying to lobby 
the U.S. (both at the Ambassadorial and delegate level) to 
disassociate from the consensus rather than call for a vote 
on the PBI.  The representatives of these nations said that 
the PBI was simply a technical issue and that politics should 
not be involved, although they acknowledged that the Fifth 
Committee and General Assembly as a whole were in fact 
political bodies.  Australia and Canada were sympathetic to 
the U.S. position, though also concerned about the precedent 
that would be set by another vote in the Fifth Committee, 
especially one called for by a major contributor. 
 
¶10.  COMMENT CONTINUED: Both the G77 and the EU found 
themselves in difficult positions during the discussions. 
The G77's frustration at the pace of work in the ACABQ put 
them on the brink of calling for Fifth Committee action 
without an ACABQ report, a position and precedent that would 
not normally be suggested by the Group. The EU wanted the 
costs to be absorbed and were waiting for the ACABQ to make 
such a recommendation.  They were therefore dependent on 
having an ACABQ report before the Fifth Committee.  In 
addition, the EU argued that they did not want to set any 
precedents in the Fifth Committee and moving ahead without an 
ACABQ report would be precedent-setting, putting them in an 
difficult position.  At the height of discussions, the 
Finnish EU Presidency approached Ambassadors Bolton and 
Wallace and asked again if the U.S. would disassociate from 
the consensus in the Fifth Committee.  Ambassador Wallace 
asked whether that would cause the EU to abstain on the vote 
on the underlying resolution, to which the response was "no." 
 Ambassador Bolton stated that he heard that the EU might 
even co-sponsor the resolution before the Emergency Special 
Session.  One of the Finnish delegates offhandedly remarked 
that they might do that, given the U.S. position in the Fifth 
Committee.  END COMMENT. 
BOLTON