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PP RUEHBC RUEHBZ RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUCNDT #2157/01 3191934
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 151934Z NOV 06
FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0756
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA PRIORITY 1067
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 0759
RUEHKH/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM PRIORITY 0475
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 1066
RUEHNJ/AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA PRIORITY 0214
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 USUN NEW YORK 002157 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR IO, AF, PRM 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER UNSC SU KPKO
SUBJECT: P5 MEETING ON UN SYG SUDAN PROPOSAL 
 
 
¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: UN D/SYG Mark Malloch Brown briefed the P5 
on November 14 regarding the UN's planned approach with the 
Government of Sudan (GOS) at the November 16 meeting of the 
UN, P5, African Union, and Arab League in Addis Ababa.  The 
UN SYG plans to put forward the Phased Approach Paper (please 
see paragraph 12 for text) as the basis for discussions with 
the Sudanese on a peacekeeping deployment compromise.  During 
discussions following the briefing, several delegations, 
including Russia and France, expressed a willingness to 
accept a hybrid command or AU-led force.  The UK PermRep 
expressed support for an AU force as well.  END SUMMARY. 
 
-------------------------- 
The Phased Approach Paper 
According to Malloch Brown 
-------------------------- 
 
¶2. (SBU) Malloch Brown indicated that UN SYG intends to use 
the phased approach paper as the basis of discussion with the 
GOS.  While the November 16 meeting with the GOS is only 
scheduled to last two hours, UN SYG will let discussion go on 
as long as is necessary to reach a compromise on a 
peacekeeping deployment in Darfur. 
 
¶3. (SBU) The UN SYG intentionally left language regarding the 
third phase, hybrid command, vague so that the GOS would 
engage in the process.  Malloch Brown conceding that the 
price of this flexibility was putting UNSCR 1706 "into play." 
 Language regarding the objectives -- able to protect 
civilians, implement DPA, ensure humanitarian access -- is 
intended to preserve the key elements of UNSCR 1706. 
 
------------------- 
Discussion Timeline 
------------------- 
 
¶4. (SBU) Malloch Brown said that SYG Annan had convinced the 
parties that the November 16 meeting is a "crossroads moment" 
and that the GOS in particular had to realize that the best 
opportunity to compromise on a peacekeeping deployment is 
now, at the end of the AU's mandate and before Annan leaves 
office.  Malloch Brown added that "Nothing has been given 
away" (in UNSCR 1706) until all parties agree to a deal. 
 
¶5. (SBU) Regarding approach, Malloch Brown said UN SYG hopes 
to come to a deal on key issues with the GOS at the November 
16 meeting.  All the key players and those with the most 
influence, such as the Egyptians, will be present. 
Afterwards, the package would be presented to the AU PSC at 
the November 24 meeting.  UN SYG will then follow up with a 
high-level visit to Khartoum to work out remaining details. 
DPKO U/SYG Annabi is currently in Khartoum working out 
details of the light assistance package, i.e. phase one of 
the UN SYG paper. 
 
---------------------- 
Sudanese Participation 
---------------------- 
 
¶6. (SBU) Notably, neither SYG nor the P5 had yet received 
confirmation that Bashir had decided to send appropriate 
representation to the November 16 meeting.  UKUN reported 
that Mustafa Isma'il, the Sudanese Darfur Envoy is currently 
in London.  HMG is encouraging Isma'il to attend the Addis 
Ababa meeting.  All participants agreed that high-level GOS 
participation is essential for the success of the meeting and 
would be an important barometer of Sudanese seriousness. 
 
------------------- 
Disagreement on 
Command and Control 
------------------- 
 
¶7. (SBU) In response to objections from the U.S. regarding 
the problematic nature of a hybrid command structure, Malloch 
Brown argued that there is no point in insisting on UN 
command if the P5 is prepared to agree to a peacekeeping 
force composed of only AU countries, "putting the UN top of 
an AU mission won't help anybody."  Instead Malloch Brown put 
forward the idea of a strategic cell based Addis Ababa to 
give the AU needed capacity.  USUN PolMinister Counselor 
responded that the USG remains concerned that the AU may be 
unwilling or unable to take on the demands of an expanded 
 
USUN NEW Y 00002157  002 OF 004 
 
 
Darfur mission.  UN leadership of the operation is essential 
both for force effectiveness and to guarantee funding.  The 
question at hand is whether the Sudanese will reject any 
option that will restrain their military campaign.  Malloch 
Brown responded that the SYG appreciated U.S. sensitivities 
on the issue, but "everyone needs to come to Addis prepared 
to make a deal." 
 
¶8. (SBU) UKUN AMB Jones Parry agreed that unity of command is 
essential, but surprisingly concluded that HMG could accept 
either a UN or an AU-led force and command structure.  French 
AMB de la Sabliere responded that France is willing to accept 
a hybrid command structure or AU-led force.  PRC Wang, who 
gave few specifics about the Chinese position, emphasized the 
need for a common approach in advance of discussions with the 
Sudanese. 
 
---------------- 
P5 Role in Addis 
Discussions 
---------------- 
 
¶9. (SBU) Delegations pushed Malloch Brown for details on what 
is expected from the P5 at the Addis Ababa meeting. Malloch 
Brown asked delegations to deliver the message to the 
Sudanese that "now is the time to make a deal" in advance of 
discussions and serve as "witnesses, participants and 
enforcers" during the meeting.  Malloch Brown proposed a 
series of pre-meetings with the P5 and the AU in Addis Ababa 
to "divide up the script." 
 
------------- 
Core Problems 
------------- 
 
¶10. (SBU) In addition to the disagreement over command 
modalities, Malloch Brown identified two areas where there 
are broad differences of opinion and extended discussions can 
be expected.  The AU wants to retain control over the 
political aspects of the DPA and hand military matters over 
to the UN.  The GOS strongly insists on the opposite.  A 
hybrid force would entail non-African UN troops on the 
ground, which the Sudanese have indicated is a red line. 
 
¶11. (SBU) UKUN AMB Jones Parry pressed hard regarding the 
status of TCCs for the first two phases of the UN SYG 
proposal, "Are the troops there if we reach an agreement?" 
After some initial waffling, Malloch Brown conceded that 
there was much work to be done in this area, but expressed 
optimism that clarity on the command issues would convince 
more countries to contribute.  Malloch Brown repeated that an 
African-only force was a "clear, bright, red line for the 
Sudanese."  The U.S. and others insisted on the need to leave 
open the possibility of pQticipation by traditional 
peacekeeping contributors, noting aloud that it would be 
difficult, if not impossible, to put together the necessary 
troop capacity and command structures from only African TCCs. 
 
¶12. (SBU) Begin Text of UN SYG Phased Approach Paper: 
 
Darfur: The Phased Approach 
 
In order to strengthen the international community's response 
to the ongoing tragedy in Darfur, a possible phased approach 
to a strengthened peacekeeping presence in the region should 
be adopted.  The envisioned sequence of steps in this 
approach should be consistent with the recommendations of the 
joint AU-UN technical assessment mission, which visited 
Darfur on 9-23 June 2006, as well as recent decisions of the 
African Union Peace and Security Council requesting United 
Nations, assistance in enhancing AMIS.  Agreement on this 
approach could form the basis for a joint position of the 
international community in advance of the 24 November meeting 
of the African Union Peace and Security Council. 
 
As a component of any of the steps elaborated below, an 
enhanced UN involvement in Darfur's reconciliation and 
economic rehabilitation processes would be crucial.  To this 
end, the UN could assume a greater role in efforts to assist 
in the implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement and 
facilitate the inclusion of non-signatories to the Agreement. 
 Enhanced UN involvement in the implementation of the bodies 
and processes envisioned by the Darfur Peace Agreement would 
 
USUN NEW Y 00002157  003 OF 004 
 
 
also be a natural extension of this function.  It would be 
crucial to prevail upon the parties to the conflict to 
implement a full cease-fire so as to enable these political 
processes to take root. 
 
The abiding priority of this strategic approach is the 
protection of civilians in Darfur.  With this in mind, the 
phased approach has been developed based on the fundamental 
assumption that any peacekeeping presence in Darfur would 
follow the logic of general proposals on an international 
operation contained in the Secretary-General,s report of 28 
July on Darfur, which proposed parameters, in security terms, 
for effective peacekeeping in the region.  While the 
international community continues consultations with the 
Government of Sudan on creative steps towards the 
implementation of the peacekeeping presence authorized by 
Security Council resolution 1706, the phased approach, as 
described below, could be pursued.  To ensure the fulfillment 
of the international community's key objectives in Darfur, 
this approach would be: 
 
a. Capable of contributing to the restoration of security and 
protection of civilians in Darfur 
 
b. Able to implement the security aspects of the Darfur Peace 
Agreement 
 
c. Ensure full humanitarian access 
 
The mission must therefore: 
 
a. Be logistically and financially sustainable 
 
b. Have a predominantly African character 
 
c. Have the strength and capacities described in the 
Secretary-General,s report on Darfur of 28 July 2006 
 
SIPDIS 
 
d. Enjoy free and unhindered movement in Darfur 
 
The  first step, of this sequence would involve the full 
and expeditious implementation of the short-term UN support 
package to AMIS proposed in the Secretary-General,s 28 July 
report on Darfur (591/2006), and endorsed by President 
Bashir. This $21 million support package is currently being 
delivered to AMIS in full coordination with the Government of 
Sudan. 
 
The Secretary-General has also proposed an enhanced support 
package of UN assistance to AMIS in his 28 July report on 
Darfur, which would be implemented as the  second step, in 
the phased approach.  The enhanced support package, which 
includes the deployment by the UN of several hundred 
military, police, and civilian personnel to AMIS, as well as 
substantial aviation and logistical assets, could be further 
augmented in order to maximize AMIS,s efficiency and impact. 
Discussions on the details of this package, which the 
Security Council has generally approved for delivery, are 
ongoing with the African Union.  The Government of Sudan 
would be fully consulted on these details. 
 
The  third step, would be an AU-UN hybrid operation. To 
this end, a jointly appointed AU-UN Special 
Representative/Envoy could lead the hybrid operation, 
reporting to both the African Union Commission and the United 
Nations. Additionally, the appointment of the Force Commander 
and Deputy Force Commander, as well as other key 
decision-making positions, could be coordinated between the 
African Union and the United Nations. The UN could also 
provide additional operational elements and enabling units in 
the area of logistics and engineering to increase the hybrid 
mission,s operational effectiveness.  A hybrid operation 
would also benefit from substantial UN involvement in its 
command and control structure. 
 
With respect to troop and police generation, African 
countries will be approached as a matter of priority to 
contribute to both the second and third steps of the 
sequence.  Traditional UN troop contributing countries with 
critical peacekeeping experience might also be approached, if 
necessary, to reach required strength and capacity. 
 
The Secretary-General, supported by the international 
 
USUN NEW Y 00002157  004 OF 004 
 
 
community, would be prepared to recommend to the General 
Assembly that the United Nations provide full financing to 
the mission at any step of this sequence, as long as the 
objectives of paragraph 3 are met. 
 
Most importantly, the Government of Sudan will have to be 
fully and transparently consulted in any further development 
and/or implementation of this phased approach. It will be 
important for all stakeholders to continuously assist the 
Government and the people of Sudan in bringing just, 
inclusive and sustainable peace and stability to Darfur, with 
full respect for Sudan,s sovereignty and territorial 
integrity. 
 
As discussions on this phased approach proceed, all 
stakeholders should call for the immediate and complete 
cessation of hostilities and an end to all attacks on 
civilians, as well as full access to populations in need and 
security for humanitarian workers and their supplies. 
 
End Text. 
 
BOLTON