VZCZCXRO0910
OO RUEHAG RUEHAST RUEHBC RUEHBZ RUEHDA RUEHDBU RUEHDE RUEHDF RUEHDIR
RUEHFL RUEHIK RUEHKUK RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHLN RUEHLZ RUEHROV RUEHSR
RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUCNDT #2123/01 3101742
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 061742Z NOV 06
FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0690
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA IMMEDIATE 0599
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/DOD WASHDC IMMEDIATE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 002123 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ETTC PARM PREL UNSC PGOV IR
SUBJECT: UNSC/IRAN: NOVEMBER 3RD MEETING P5 PLUS ONE 
 
REF: STATE 178693 
 
¶1.  Summary:  The P5 plus one met on Friday, November 3, at 
the UK Mission at 11:30 to discuss the EU3 draft resolution 
on Iran. Russia reiterated its complaints about the EU3 text 
and circulated its extensive &corrections8 (emailed to 
State and NSC), which Ambassador Churkin described as 
consistent with the overall P5 plus one strategy agreed by 
Foreign Ministers. China claimed it had not studied the 
Russian revisions, but Ambassador Wang said they could 
possibly alleviate many of China's concerns regarding the EU3 
draft.  When Ambassador Bolton asked for an explanation as to 
where the EU3 draft oversteps the &elements8 paper agreed 
by Political Directors, Churkin and Wang ) drawing a clear 
distinction between &agreements8 reached by Foreign 
Ministers and &discussions8 between Political Directors - 
said their Political Directors never agreed to the elements 
paper.  German Ambassador Matussek contended that Political 
Directors had indeed reached agreement in Vienna on specific 
elements, and the agreed &methodology8 merely called on New 
York to translate the elements paper into a Security Council 
resolution.  Specific revisions were not debated in detail, 
as P3 Ambassadors first wanted to report back to capitals. 
Following the meeting, USUN circulated U.S. edits to the EU3 
draft to P5 plus one Missions, so capitals could review them 
along side Russia,s extensive revisions.  End Summary. 
 
¶2.  Churkin began the meeting by circulating Russia's 
extensive revisions to the EU3 text.  He then read from 
prepared remarks, which began by criticizing the EU3 draft as 
going beyond the P5 plus one framework and certain to 
antagonize Iran.  The resolution should convince Iran to 
comply with the IAEA, not cause Iran to refuse cooperation 
with the IAEA, which, in turn, would leave the world without 
any monitors.  The measures should be imposed stage-by-stage, 
commensurate with Iran's actions, and they should be 
reversible. 
 
¶3.  Churkin then reviewed Russia's edits to the text.  He 
said a blanket reference to Chapter VII would send the wrong 
signal to Iran and raise fears about the use of force. 
Regarding the EU3,s subtle reference to the UNSC,s role in 
addressing threats to peace and security, he said there is no 
present threat to address.  (Note: The UK and Germany made 
similar comments when the U.S. deployed its guidance on 
inserting a threat determination during P3 plus one 
discussions.  End note.) 
 
¶4.  Moving to the resolution's operative paragraphs, Churkin 
said that the current draft is too broad and would deny Iran 
what it needs to develop peaceful nuclear power.  The focus 
of the resolution,s demands should be narrowed to preventing 
Iran from receiving assistance that would help with sensitive 
elements of a nuclear fuel cycle.  He said pages five through 
eight should be deleted because the measures, such as a 
travel ban and assets freeze, go beyond what was agreed to by 
Foreign Ministers.  The measures would antagonize Iran and 
back it into a corner.  Limits on IAEA assistance are 
inappropriate in this context because the IAEA is independent 
and the Council should not instruct it.  The measure would 
also provoke Iran to cease cooperation with the IAEA.  The 
Bushehr exemption is no longer necessary in light of the 
Russian edits to the paragraph on preventing the transfer of 
nuclear items.  If an item were deemed safe for Bushehr, then 
certainly it would be safe for other peaceful projects as 
well.  New Russian paragraphs would give a clearer impulse to 
a negotiated solution to the Iran problem. 
 
¶5.  Amb. Bolton responded by showing Churkin the &elements8 
paper agreed to by Political Directors in Vienna.  He asked 
what in the EU3 text is not found in elements paper. 
Ambassador Bolton then said Russia has produced a text today 
that if not 180 degrees opposite to what Political Directors 
agreed upon, it was at least 135 degrees.  Churkin and Wang 
) drawing a clear distinction between &agreements8 reached 
by Foreign Ministers and &discussions8 between Political 
Directors - replied that their Political Directors did not 
agree to the elements paper because their concerns were never 
taken into account.  German Ambassador Matussek claimed that 
Political Directors had indeed reached agreement in Vienna on 
specific elements, and the agreed &methodology8 merely 
called on New York to translate the elements paper into a 
Security Council resolution.  French Ambassador de La 
Sabliere and U.K. Ambassador Jones Parry also took turns 
arguing against Churkin,s version of the outcome of 
 
USUN NEW Y 00002123  002 OF 002 
 
 
Political Director discussions, while conceding that they 
were not present during those meetings. 
 
¶6.  Ambassador Churkin responded that Foreign Ministers had 
reached agreement and the "philosophy" that emerged from 
those discussions was a phased approach. The P5 plus one 
package for Iran remains in effect and UNSC efforts should be 
focused on getting Iran back to the table.  The resolution 
should reflect the spirit of the IAEA resolutions.  Churkin 
went on to say that some Political Directors had attempted to 
alter agreements reached by Foreign Ministers and &we here 
in New York8 are just trying to make the best of the 
situation.  Churkin agreed that certain ideas were discussed 
by the Political Directors, but Russia reserves its right to 
take what it believes is the right approach.  He believes the 
Iranians are interested in continued dialogue and suggested 
that the UNSC should foster a negotiated solution. 
 
¶7.  Ambassador Bolton suggested that to expedite matters it 
would be useful to explore where differences or 
misunderstandings exist in the &elements8 paper, and report 
to capitals.  The U.S. views the EU3 draft as generally 
consistent with the broad agreements reached by Foreign 
Ministers and Political Directors, but if there is 
disagreement on what was agreed by capitals the P5 plus one 
would have a difficult time moving forward in New York.  He 
suggested that Political Directors might want to talk again 
and discuss what was and was not agreed.  Churkin at first 
said that he could try, but then reconsidered.  He replied 
that the Russian edits reflect Russia's official response to 
the EU3 draft. 
 
¶8.  Ambassador Wang made brief remarks.  He believes that 
Political Directors had a general exchange.  The elements 
were presented by the EU3, but that does not mean the P5 plus 
one reached agreement.  China supports efforts by the EU and 
Solana to reach agreement.  Any UNSC action should leave room 
for a diplomatic solution.  Sanctions have a role but they 
are not the objective.  The UNSC should support the IAEA and 
not weaken it because the Iran problem should be resolved 
within the IAEA framework.  Iran is not North Korea, yet the 
EU3 text relies too much on 1718 language.  Wang then said he 
was in Beijing last week, and the general feeling is of 
concern about the consequences of this text.  Wang claimed 
that China is still studying the text, and it will study the 
Russian text as well, but at first glance the Russian text 
should be considered because it would alleviate many of 
China's concerns. 
 
¶9.  As the meeting came to a close, Ambassador Bolton said he 
would send electronically the US edits to the EU3 resolution 
later that day, so that capitals would be able to review U.S. 
edits along side Russian revisions.  Ambassadors agreed to 
discuss next steps after conferring with capitals. 
BOLTON