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O 091241Z NOV 06
FM AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7383
INFO RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
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UNCLAS THE HAGUE 002429 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR ISN/CB, VCI/CCB, L/ACV, IO/S 
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISP 
JOINT STAFF FOR DD PMA-A FOR WTC 
COMMERCE FOR BIS (GOLDMAN) 
NSC FOR DICASAGRANDE 
WINPAC FOR WALTER 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PARM PREL CWC
SUBJECT: CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC): WRAP-UP FOR 
WEEK ENDING NOVEMBER 3 
 
This is CWC-102-06. 
 
--------------------------------------- 
EXTENSION REQUEST INFORMATIONAL MEETING 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶1. (U) On October 31, EC Vice Chair Alexander Petri (Germany) 
chaired a discussion of requests for extension of the 
deadline for completion of destruction of 100% of Category 1 
CW.  The meeting was very widely attended across all regional 
groups, and had to be moved to the much larger Ieper Room as 
the attendees exceeded the capacity in the Ooms Room. 
Discussions were collegial and went along expected lines. 
 
¶2. (U) Russia was clear in their initial statement and during 
later discussions they did not want to put any reference to 
visits into their decision language.  They stated they were 
willing to consider visits, under certain conditions: the 
visits need a uniform criteria, they should be on a 
case-by-case basis, there should be sufficient grounds, there 
should be no automatic annual visits, the visits should not 
be funded from the OPCW budget, and they should not be a 
burden on the possessor states. 
 
¶3. (U) The UK made clear several times that references to 
visits should be in the approval of the extension requests, 
while leaving the EC Chair to work out the specifics later. 
They also want the EC and CSP to reaffirm to possessor states 
the need to finish all destruction by April 29, 2012, 
indicating that if they do not, it could mean there is a 
problem with the Chemical Weapons Convention.  They further 
noted that approval of the decisions would be the best way to 
formally enforce these deadlines. 
 
¶4. (U) There were several expressions of concern regarding 
references to the U.S. national paper in the U.S. draft 
decision language preambular paragraphs 6-8, that destruction 
could go beyond 2012, and into 2017.  Iran noted that this 
calls into question the legality of the extension request, 
and further noted its concern that the U.S. had been 
premature in its transparency.  Amb. Javits informed 
delegations that under U.S. law, the Secretary of Defense 
must inform Congress of both the possibility of missing the 
Convention deadline and, through the budget process, the 
implications for out-year expenditures, all of which are 
available in the public domain.  He reminded delegations that 
there is no reference beyond 2012 in the actual draft 
decision language, and that the U.S. had in fact included 
preambular and operative language indicating this decision in 
no way relieved it of its obligations to complete destruction 
by 2012. 
 
¶5.  (U) Austria questioned whether it might be helpful to 
remove references to the extension request from the draft 
decision.  Amb. Javits said the U.S. request incorporated 
language analogous to the extension requests of the other 
major possessors, and was concerned that removal of these 
references might imply the U.S. is amending its national 
paper.  However, he would inform Washington of the views of 
the Austrian delegation. 
 
¶6. (U) Germany questioned Russia's draft decision text on the 
reference to the need for international donations for their 
destruction program. Germany noted that language acceptable 
to all delegations had been agreed for the 45% extension 
request, and Russia should use this as a model for references 
to international assistance in this draft decision.   After 
conferring, the Russian delegation indicated it could 
consider incorporating similar language.  The Netherlands 
requested information from the Russians on when they 
anticipate reaching specific deadlines.  The Russians 
responded to these questions by referring delegations to 
their upcoming presentation at the November 6 destruction 
informals. 
 
¶7. (U) Discussion then focused on the visits aspect of the 
extension requests.  The Netherlands began by pointing out 
that neither the U.S. nor Russian draft decisions put all the 
points from the UK non paper into their language, and asked 
 
how we would address these discrepancies.  The UK outlined 
their view that visits should be in the context of the 
verification annex (pushing back on Russia's implication that 
the UK was asking for "additional verification"), while 
allowing the EC Chair to decide the details.  They stated 
visits would reinforce the need for the U.S. and Russia to 
redouble their efforts on destruction.  The UK welcomed the 
U.S. proposal to conduct annual visits, and indicated they 
want similar language in the Russian decision.  South Africa 
indicated their view that visits do not add anything to the 
process, saying that if the TS is doing their job well we 
should trust them and should not need to do visits of our 
own.  Amb. Javits then invited delegations to share their 
views on what benefits they might expect from a visit. The 
Russians agreed with the U.S., saying they were open to 
visits but did not want a "pig in a poke."  They want 
specifics. 
 
¶8. (U) Canada, Iran, France, Germany, Switzerland, Kenya, 
India, Australia, Korea, Mexico, Pakistan, Ireland and China 
all intervened to express support for the concept of visits. 
Most delegations indicated visits should only pertain to the 
major possessors, the U.S. and Russia.  They all noted the 
need to continue to look at the modalities of visits.  They 
also said reference to visits should be in each of the 
decision documents.  India reiterated that visits should only 
apply to the major possessors and not themselves.  Mexico 
also suggested inviting independent experts along on the 
visits so someone who understand the issues at destruction 
sites would be there. 
 
¶9. (U) Russia expressed their view that they would not put 
language regarding visits into their decision document, but 
noted their willingness to work on some other arrangement. 
They further noted that if delegations wanted more 
transparency, it must mean they do not trust their fellow 
member states, or that the CWC is not working (in particular, 
the verification regime).  They felt that visits to just the 
U.S. and Russia was discrimination, and that this requirement 
should fall to all states requesting extensions. 
 
¶10. (U) The U.S. noted that visits could be useful as less 
than a handful of people on the EC have ever gone to a 
destruction facility.  They could show the EC the enormity of 
the task ahead, give them the ability to assess what can be 
done and provide a better understanding of timeframes.  Amb. 
Javits also noted that we have to be careful of details and 
have a measured process in place.  Several delegations, most 
notably Iran, began discussing the need for further detailed 
discussion of site visits, and the fact that this is not a 
decision that should be taken in haste.  Iran's implication 
was that the extension requests should not be considered 
until there is approval by all delegations of site visit 
parameters. Amb. Javits noted the focus should be on agreeing 
on the decisions themselves, and emphasized this should be 
achieved without becoming bogged down in the details of the 
visits.  Russia expressed full support of that position.  The 
UK reiterated that decision language does not have to cover 
all details regarding visits.  A mention of the acceptance of 
the idea was sufficient.  They also stressed that the primary 
concern should be agreeing on the two decisions, and that the 
details of site visits can be worked later. 
 
¶11. (U) Amb. Petri suggested delegations ponder the points 
made in this meeting and reconvene later to further discuss 
the issue. 
 
----------- 
ARTICLE VII 
----------- 
 
¶12. (U) Facilitator Maarten Lak (Netherlands) held a November 
2 consultation on his proposed EC-47 report language, noting 
that only five states have yet to update their status with 
the Technical Secretariat (EIF 1997: Niger, Paraguay and 
Swaziland. EIF 2000: Eritrea. EIF 2003: Timor Leste).  Iran, 
India, and South Africa noted that if the Follow On Plan was 
to be extended for another year, there was no need for 
additional elements such as tasking the Executive Council to 
 
consult with implementing states.  It would be better to task 
the Director General to consult with them.  Delegations asked 
for consolidation and reorganization of the text, to better 
distinguish between EC report language and recommendations 
from the EC to the Conference. 
 
-------------------------------------- 
INDUSTRY CLUSTER: SCHEDULE 3 TRANSFERS 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶13. (U) The consultation on the transfer of Schedule 3 
chemicals successfully ended in a decision and recommendation 
to refer this issue to EC-47.  Del rep deployed guidance, 
specifying that the facilitator's editorial changes to the 
U.S. proposal were acceptable.  The UK, Iran, and Germany all 
joined in stating their acceptance of the language and desire 
to refer it to the EC.  A couple of misspellings were 
corrected in the text, as well.  The facilitator will now 
transfer a clean version of the decision to the TS for 
preparation for EC-47.  The group also expressed their thanks 
to the facilitator (Arya Sandeep of India) for his two years 
of effort on this issue.  He will be leaving The Hague at the 
end of November. 
 
---------------------------------------- 
INDUSTRY CLUSTER: TRANSFER DISCREPANCIES 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶14. (U) The facilitator began by confirming the progress from 
the previous meeting - that the group would like the 
facilitators to prepare a draft decision document that would 
formalize the use of an absolute threshold (the declaration 
threshold from the Convention) as the trigger for transfer 
discrepancies that require followed-up.  All agreed. 
However, Germany made a very confusing intervention, asking 
that the decision include both an absolute and a relative 
threshold.  The facilitators and TS agreed to meet with the 
Germans bilaterally to sort through the details of their 
request. 
 
¶15. (U) The facilitators introduced a non-paper entitled: 
"Understanding on import and export data for (th)e AND 
declaration for Schedule 2 and 3 chemicals."  This will be 
discussed in detail in a later meeting, but does include the 
definitions of import and export from the legislation of 63 
States Parties, derived mostly from Trade questionnaire 
responses.  The TS also made a presentation on a number of 
scenarios that result in transfer discrepancies.  This 
resulted in a very complicated discussion about scenarios, 
how they were arrived at, recommendations for other 
scenarios, free trade zones, free ports, bonded warehouses, 
etc.  For the next meeting, the facilitators agreed to accept 
new scenarios from SPs and incorporate them into a more 
focused presentation on the two options laid out in the 
non-paper. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------------ 
INDUSTRY CLUSTER: LOW CONCENTRATIONS FOR 2A/2A* CHEMICALS 
--------------------------------------------- ------------ 
 
¶16. (U) The facilitator (Steve Wade, UK) made his last 
attempt to drive through his proposal on this issue.  Germany 
made it clear that they are still not happy with the current 
proposal, and asked that, if any drafts were to be referred 
back to the EC with the facilitator's report, that they 
include all options the Legal Advisor has cleared -- the 
current facilitator's draft and the October 2005 draft.  Del 
rep deployed guidance and supported sending this back to the 
EC.  Canada, the UK, and Switzerland all expressed 
discouragement at this failure, stating their concern that 
there will be "quantities of PFIB much above the verification 
threshold that are not being verified", a point del rep still 
fails to understand, as the same happens under Schedules 2B 
and 3.  (Del rep questioned the Canadian delegate about this 
afterward, and he did not have a response.)  Switzerland said 
their impression from industry is that they desire that a 
concentration be set, whatever it might be, to level the 
playing field, and the UK pointed out that CEFIC (the 
European chemical association) made just this point during 
 
the universality conference in Rome.  China does not have 
final guidance yet, but they expect to be able to support the 
current proposal.  India continues to desire a flat 
one-percent level for all three chemicals. 
 
¶17. (U) Based on the outcome of the meeting, the facilitator 
will prepare a report for EC-47.  With Wade taking a position 
within the TS very soon, the loss of a facilitator is likely 
to leave this issue fallow for some time. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
INDUSTRY CLUSTER: OCPF SITE SELECTION METHODOLOGY 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
¶18.  (U) Facilitator Luis Garcia (Spain) held two 
consultations (30 October and 2 November) on his proposed 
methodology.  The first focused on unresolved issues, 
fine-tuning the presentation.  Delegations agreed that the 
proposal should not specifically mention the A14 methodology 
for the TS component, preferring generic language instead. 
This would allow the TS to change its algorithm without first 
seeking EC or CSP approval.  The discussion got off topic, 
debating on whether the EC ever formally approved the use of 
the A14 algorithm (no) and/or whether it should be formally 
approved (Iran: yes, others disagreed). 
 
¶19. (U) The discussion then moved to whether the facility's 
A14 value should be included on the anonymous list as one of 
the descriptive elements.  The Netherlands, Germany, France, 
Italy, Japan and India all said no.  Switzerland, Canada, 
Australia, the UK and the U.S. indicated flexibility, and 
supported including it as a indicative piece of information 
regarding the facility's relevance to the CWC. 
 
¶20. (U) Garcia then asked whether it should be compulsory for 
all SPs to make selections, and if not, what should be the 
minimum participation necessary to include the SP component 
in the selection methodology.  Japan noted that one way 
forward would be to distribute the points of a SP that 
chooses not to make selections equally over all OCPFs.  This 
proposal was supported by India and Iran.  Iran worried that 
not all regional groups might be represented in such a small 
number of selections.  The UK, supported by Germany, raised 
concerns that if enough states did not make selections, that 
the SP component would never be included.  Perhaps set the 
minimum level of participation at 40 states, and if that was 
not reached, distribute the "missing" points equally across 
all OCPFs. 
 
¶21.  (U) The U.S. noted that there needed to be a balance: 
states with small National Authorities might need to be 
reassured that they would not need to make annual selections, 
that their selections would remain in force until revised. 
If so, more states might be willing to make selections. 
Canada, supported by Italy, made a strong statement, noting 
that every state is equally entitled to make (or not make) 
selections; no state should have its points distributed on 
its behalf.  Canada also noted that it would be unprecedented 
and unacceptable to impose regional group restrictions; all 
member states are alike.  Australia noted that the minimum 
participation should be low, say 25 states.  Finally China 
noted that the easier the methodology is to understand, the 
more states will participate. 
 
¶22. (U) On November 2, the facilitator presented a draft 
decision with the proposed methodology included as an annex. 
India noted that elements of the decision, in particular the 
dates of implementation, were impractical and should be 
removed.  India, supported by Germany, noted its preference 
for a three vice four-year trial period. 
 
¶23. (U) New Zealand, supported by Australia, the UK, Canada, 
China, Switzerland, and the U.S., noted its preference for a 
simple prose-based decision, one that would preclude the need 
for the over four page long annex with mathematical symbols. 
New Zealand noted that bureaucrats and diplomats find 
equations difficult to comprehend and will make reaching 
consensus quickly difficult.  It would be far preferable to 
use prose to explain the methodology.  The facilitator 
 
disagreed, noting that the math is easily accessible to 
everyone and is needed to ensure the methodology is 
implemented accurately. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
INDUSTRY CLUSTER: LATE SUBMISSION OF DECLARATIONS 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
¶24. (U) The facilitator (Denyer, U.S.) received a formal 
legal opinion from the TS Legal Advisor on the concept of 
"nil declarations" on November 1.  This document, together 
with a facilitator's draft decision to implement "nil 
declarations" was the basis for the November 3 consultation. 
 
¶25. (U) It should be noted that Canada, along with several 
other delegations, originally asked for the decision to 
include a provision whereby previous Schedule 3 declarations 
would be treated similarly to OCPF declarations -- that is, 
the TS would assume that previously declarations would 
continue valid until such time that a new declaration were 
received.  This would have given the TS some data for 
verification planning purposes.  However, the LAO informed 
the facilitator that para 3 of Part IX of the Verification 
Annex allowed the TS to implement this practice for OCPF 
declarations, whereas no such language exists for Schedule 3. 
 It was their opinion that, to do something like this for 
Schedule 3, an amendment to the CWC would be needed.  As 
such, that language was removed from the draft decision 
before the November 3 consultation.  If further investigation 
lends an appropriate way forward on this, it could be 
reinserted later. 
 
¶26. (U) The November 3 afternoon consultation was lightly 
attended, presumably because of the scattered scheduling of 
industry cluster meetings throughout the week.  Delegations 
were generally supportive of the "nil declarations" decision 
but needed more time to get formal responses from capital. 
New Zealand and others expressed concern that this be 
implemented in a way to place the least burden possible on 
small NAs.  Switzerland and others reaffirmed that the burden 
on NAs is in the gathering of data to determine whether 
declarable activities exist, not in the preparation of the 
declaration.  France suggested that no new form was needed to 
implement "nils", but this rather could be done through a 
simple cover letter from the NA.  Australia suggested that 
the TS reminders to NAs could provide simple details on 
submitting a "nil declaration." 
 
¶27.  (U) Javits sends. 
ARNALL