VZCZCXRO9914
PP RUEHQU
DE RUEHPU #2202/01 3191754
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 151754Z NOV 06
FM AMEMBASSY PORT AU PRINCE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4598
INFO RUEHZH/HAITI COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA PRIORITY 1283
RUEHSA/AMEMBASSY PRETORIA PRIORITY 1120
RUEHQU/AMCONSUL QUEBEC PRIORITY 0617
RUMIAAA/HQ USSOUTHCOM J2 MIAMI FL PRIORITY
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 1029

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 PORT AU PRINCE 002202 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR WHA/EX AND WHA/CAR 
S/CRS 
SOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD 
STATE PASS AID FOR LAC/CAR 
INR/IAA (BEN-YEHUDA) 
WHA/EX PLEASEPASS USOAS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL ASEC HA KCRM MARR
SUBJECT: MARTISSANT VIOLENT, BUT NOT "OPERATION BAGHDAD" 
 
REF: PAUP 01214 
 
PORT AU PR 00002202  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
¶1. (U) This message is sensitive but unclassified -- protect 
accordingly. 
 
¶2. (SBU) Summary:  Gang violence has increased in the 
Port-au-Prince neighborhood of Martissant during recent 
weeks, and local radio has given a forum to gang members who 
claim they are launching "Operation Baghdad II," referring to 
the violence emanating from Cite Soleil in late summer of 
2004 that paralyzed the capital.  MINUSTAH officials believe 
that the recent violence relates directly to the 
long-simmering gang warfare in Martissant, and dismiss claims 
that the incidents are related to a larger Lavalas movement 
or any other outside forces.  MINUSTAH's Sri Lankan military 
contingent remains stationed in the neighborhood and actively 
patrols, and civil affairs staff are trying to initiate an 
integrated community development and violence suppression 
program.  Martissant remains the GoH's and MINUSTAH's second 
security priority behind Cite Soleil, but the localized 
nature of the violence notwithstanding, insecurity in 
Martissant is a growing concern.  End Summary. 
 
----------------------------- 
Violence Erupts in Martissant 
----------------------------- 
 
¶3. (U) The neighborhood of Martissant on the southern 
outskirts of Port-au-Prince erupted in violence on Friday, 
November 3.  The activities began early in the morning when 
gang members set up roadblocks of burning tires, then 
proceeded to shoot at civilians as well as one police officer 
who was traveling through the area.  The violence resulted in 
the death of one individual and at least three injuries.  The 
police in the area were unable to contain the violence, and 
press reports claimed that MINUSTAH troops did not arrive on 
the scene until late in the day.  The Haitian National Police 
(HNP) arrested approximately a dozen people in association 
with the violence, one of whom the police claim is a known 
gang leader. 
 
¶4. (U) HNP and MINUSTAH forces were reportedly patrolling the 
area starting on Friday evening, although tensions remained 
high throughout the weekend and gang members erected more 
tire roadblocks on Monday morning. The following morning the 
gang members attacked again, setting up barricades of burning 
tires and even holding passengers on a local bus hostage for 
a time.  Martissant residents participated in more 
demonstrations on November 13, blocking the Carrefour road 
that serves as a major thoroughfare and the connecting point 
for all of Haiti's "southern claw".  The protesters again 
demanded the release of the prisoners and asked for 
"dialogue" with the GoH. 
 
--------------------------------------------- 
Has Operation Baghdad II Moved to Martissant? 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
¶5. (U) Gang representatives claiming allegiance to Lavalas 
have made repeated appearances on local radio shows over the 
last week threatening further violence in Martissant.  A 
self-proclaimed spokesperson for militant Lavalas partisans 
made statements on local radio on Friday claiming that the 
violence in Martissant is part of "Operation Baghdad II" and 
that the movement aims to create panic and disorder in the 
area.  This follows declarations in July by militant Lavalas 
supporters that they would launch a second wave of the 
violent fighting know as "Operation Baghdad" if they were not 
given back jobs they had held under the Aristide government 
(ref A).  The unidentified speaker reaffirmed the group's 
readiness to combat police and MINUSTAH forces.  The speaker 
expressed that Friday's violence was just a preview of what 
the real Operation Baghdad II will be like, and invited other 
Lavalas militants in the rest of the country to follow their 
example and mobilize to force President Preval to give their 
jobs back. 
 
¶6. (SBU) Poloff traveled to Martissant on November 9 with 
MINUSTAH Civil Affairs director Jay Carter and Western 
 
PORT AU PR 00002202  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
Department coordinator Jean-Philippe Laberge.  Laberge noted 
that two of the Martissant gangs are actually known to be 
Lavalas rivals, and since Operation Baghdad II is supposed to 
be a Lavalas movement, the claims that this is the beginning 
of the operation do not hold water.  He also discounted 
claims that gangs from the more heavily-policed Cite Soleil 
and Bel Air slums had moved their operations to the less 
guarded Martissant area. 
 
-------------------------------------- 
Martissant Gang Rivalries Longstanding 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶7. (SBU) According to Laberge, three separate gangs operate 
in Martissant, whose territories converge at the intersection 
where most of the recent conflicts have occurred.  Although 
recent radio statements included a claim by a gang member 
that the rival groups in Martissant have now united to stand 
up to the GoH, Laberge believed this was an empty threat, and 
that the gangs are still fighting amongst themselves for 
control of the area.  He estimated that the Martissant gangs 
have less than 20 members each, compared to hundreds of gang 
members in Cite Soleil. 
 
------------------------------------------ 
MINUSTAH Presence in Martissant 100 Strong 
------------------------------------------ 
 
¶8. (SBU) There is a contingent of approximately 100 Sri 
Lankan troops permanently stationed in Martissant, and their 
presence was visible during Poloff's visit to the 
neighborhood.  Poloff inquired of the troops whether the 
fighting in the area had been unusually bad in the last few 
days, and one soldier replied that "It's always bad."  UN 
Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) Edmond 
Mulet made a statement on November 13 that MINUSTAH would do 
everything possible to prevent the Martissant gangs from 
carrying out their threats of continued violence and 
destruction and reaffirmed the Sri Lankan contingent's 
dedication to keeping order in the neighborhood. 
 
¶9. (SBU) According to Carter, MINUSTAH has an integrated 
community development and violence suppression program 
planned for Martissant.  They are currently seeking a 
building in the center of the neighborhood to serve as 
headquarters for HNP officers, civil affairs staff and the 
troops in the area.  The plan is to use this base of 
operations to permanently integrate police into the community 
and for civil affairs to provide technical assistance to the 
community.  MINUSTAH had originally planned to use the Grand 
Ravine school building as a headquarters, with the 
understanding that they would eventually return the building, 
with improvements, so that it could become an operating 
school (which it has never been).  However, due to protests 
from the community over the use of the school building, 
MINUSTAH is actively seeking an alternate location. 
 
------------------------------ 
GoH Interior Minister Reaction 
------------------------------ 
 
¶10. (U) Interior Minister Paul Antoine Bien-Aime announced 
that the GoH is working to control the Martissant zone and 
will continue their "carrot and stick" method of dealing with 
the Martissant gangs, with the carrot being dialogue and 
forceful interventions only being used "when things get out 
of hand".  The GoH's greatest concern is establishing and 
maintaining security in the area for the December 3 
elections, which Bien-Aime asserted the people of Martissant 
were preparing for despite the violence. 
 
¶11. (SBU) Comment: Long-standing turf battles among the rival 
gangs in Martissant over the past two years have resulted in 
two noteworthy massacres, untold other casualties, and the 
destruction of property.  The violence has also interfered 
with the provision of needed assistance from international 
organizations.  Because the gangs are smaller in number and 
engaged in internecine violence, rather than targeting 
MINUSTAH, Martissant has not received the same level of 
 
PORT AU PR 00002202  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
attention from Haitian and international authorities as have 
Cite Soleil and Bel Air.  The ongoing violence is worrisome, 
however, and could divert HNP and MINUSTAH resources 
currently focused on Cite Soleil.  Nonetheless, declarations 
by the gangs that they are conducting another Operation 
Baghdad are overblown.  They appear more designed to sow fear 
out of proportion to their capabilities and goad the GoH into 
negotiating the gang leaders' demands. End Comment. 
TIGHE