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Viewing cable 06PARAMARIBO723, SURINAME: 2006-2007 INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06PARAMARIBO723 2006-11-09 18:38 2011-08-26 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Paramaribo
VZCZCXRO5043
RR RUEHGR
DE RUEHPO #0723/01 3131838
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 091838Z NOV 06
FM AMEMBASSY PARAMARIBO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8892
RUCNCOM/EC CARICOM COLLECTIVE
RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA 0486
RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 1459
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 1585
RUEHTC/AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE 1576
RUEHGE/AMEMBASSY GEORGETOWN 2016
RUEHSP/AMEMBASSY PORT OF SPAIN 1798
RUEHAO/AMCONSUL CURACAO 1086
RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 PARAMARIBO 000723 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR INL/LP, WHA/CAR - LLUFTIG, KWILLIAMS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: SNAR KCRM NS
SUBJECT: SURINAME: 2006-2007 INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS 
CONTROL STRATEGY REPORT (INCSR) PART I, DRUGS AND CHEMICAL 
CONTROL 
 
REF: STATE 249035 
 
PARAMARIBO 00000723  001.2 OF 004 
 
 
1. Post presents its 2006 INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS 
CONTROL STRATEGY REPORT (INCSR), Part I, Drugs and Chemical 
Control. 
 
Suriname 
 
I. Summary 
 
Suriname is a transit point for South American cocaine en route to 
Europe and, to a lesser extent, the United States, and has been a 
transit country for MDMA (ecstasy) from Europe to the U.S. market in 
the past.  The Government of Suriname's (GOS) inability to control 
its borders, lack of a law enforcement presence in the interior, and 
lack of aircraft or patrol boats allow traffickers to move drug 
shipments via sea, river, and air with little resistance. 
Nevertheless, in 2006, GOS law enforcement continued its strong 
anti-narcotics performance, once again demonstrating the capacity to 
arrest and convict high-profile narco-traffickers.   The principal 
obstacles to effective narcotics law enforcement efforts are 
inadequate resources and limited training for law enforcement. 
Suriname is a party to the 1988 United Nations Drug Convention but 
has not implemented legislation to bring itself into full conformity 
with the Convention. However, in October 2006, the country hosted an 
international anti-narcotics conference showing its commitment to 
combat drug trafficking. 
 
II. Status of Country 
 
Suriname is a transshipment point for cocaine destined primarily for 
Europe and, to a lesser extent, the United States.  Evidence 
available in 2006 did not indicate that a significant amount of 
drugs entered the U.S. from Suriname.  The GOS is unable to detect 
the diversion of precursor chemicals for drug production, as it has 
no legislation controlling precursor chemicals and hence no tracking 
system to monitor them. The lack of resources, limited law 
enforcement capabilities, inadequate legislation, drug-related 
corruption, a complicated and time-consuming bureaucracy, and 
overburdened and under-resourced courts inhibit GOS ability to 
identify, apprehend, and prosecute narcotic traffickers.  In 
addition, sparsely populated parts of its coastal region and the 
country's isolated jungle interior, together with weak border 
controls and infrastructure, make narcotics detection and 
interdiction efforts difficult.  However, the Ministry of Justice 
and Police and law enforcement institutions in Suriname are 
increasingly more active and effective in pro-actively targeting 
large trafficking rings and working with international partners. 
 
III. Country Actions Against Drugs in 2006 
 
Policy Initiatives. Senior GOS officials and GOS law enforcement 
officials consistently express concern regarding the extent of drugs 
transiting Suriname - as do the media and the citizenry - and point 
to the lack of resources as the primary obstacle to Suriname's 
counternarcotics efforts. Resources can be interpreted as financial 
as well as the lack of trained personnel. Suriname's National Drugs 
Master Plan (2006-2010) was approved in January 2006.  The plan 
covers both supply and demand reduction and includes calls for new 
legislation to control precursor chemicals. The development of the 
plan through multi-sectoral consultation was a significant step in 
fostering national coordination to address Suriname's drug problem. 
To coordinate implementation of the Master Plan, the Executive 
Office of the National Anti-Drug Council was established. 
 
Law Enforcement Efforts.  In 2006, Surinamese law enforcement 
continued to focus attention on dismantling large criminal 
organizations and reflected an increased capacity to arrest and 
secure convictions of well-connected narcotics traffickers.  In 
2006, GOS law enforcement agencies arrested numerous people carrying 
drugs on or in their bodies or in their luggage at the international 
airport, primarily passengers on the three to six weekly flights 
(varying seasonally) to Amsterdam; through September, 112 of those 
arrested had ingested cocaine.  Many who evade detection in Suriname 
are arrested at the airport in Amsterdam, which since 2004 has 
implemented a 100 percent inspection of all passengers and baggage 
arriving on all inbound flights from Suriname. 
 
In a major success in 2006, Surinamese authorities arrested Shaheed 
"Roger" Khan, a Guyanese national suspected of narcotics 
 
PARAMARIBO 00000723  002.2 OF 004 
 
 
trafficking, on charges of false documentation. He was set to return 
to Guyana via Trinidad and Tobago, and while en route was turned 
over to Drug Enforcement Administration officials from the United 
States in Port of Spain after being denied entry to Trinidad and 
Tobago by Trinidadian officials.  Khan was then brought to the 
United States, where he is currently awaiting trial for trafficking 
narcotics into the U.S. 
 
A special Surinamese police unit, the Special Investigative Team 
(BOT) continued to cooperate closely with Dutch law enforcement 
authorities and investigated numerous criminal organizations 
smuggling drugs and laundering money between Suriname and the 
Netherlands.  The cooperation culminated in the investigation and 
arrest of two long-suspected, major drug traffickers and several of 
their associates during an operation named "Ficus." In December 
2005, one trafficker was sentenced by a Dutch court to ten years 
imprisonment for drug trafficking, money laundering and fraud. 
Another high profile suspect arrested during "Operation Ficus" is 
still on trial in Suriname. He owns a prominent rice export business 
in Suriname and was arrested in connection with the December 2003 
confiscation of 296 kilograms of cocaine from one of his vessels 
that was en route to Portugal, and for being a suspected member of a 
criminal organization. 
 
In February and March 2006, Surinamese law enforcement officials 
destroyed major marijuana fields in the interior, consisting of four 
and two hectares, respectively. In March a joint operation of police 
in the two western districts, Nickerie and Coronie, led to the 
arrest of two men in connection with the seizure of 100 kilograms of 
cocaine hidden in a Texaco oil-storage tank. In June 2006, Police 
seized 215 kilograms of cocaine in batches of 104 and 109 kilograms 
respectively at two separate residences in Paramaribo.  Six 
Surinamers and five Guyanese were arrested at the scene; one of the 
Guyanese later proved to be Roger Khan and three to be ex-policemen. 
 In August 2006, a joint operation of the police "Arrest Team" 
(A-Team) and the Narcotics Brigade led to the arrest of three men, 
among them a relative of former military strongman Desi Bouterse. 
Also in 2006, police confiscated 95 kilograms of cocaine from two 
residences in Paramaribo. The BOT is currently investigating a 
possible money laundering link in this case. Bank accounts of those 
involved in the case have been frozen. 
 
There are criminal organizations operating arms-for-drugs activities 
in Suriname that have connections to the Colombian terrorist group 
the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). 
 
In 2006, the judiciary handed down several stiff sentences in other 
high-profile drug cases. In March, a judge convicted and sentenced 
two men to eight and four years imprisonment, respectively, based on 
the April 2005 seizure of 118 kilograms of cocaine. The cocaine was 
hidden in a container of lumber, which was shipped to France. French 
authorities followed the shipment to the Netherlands via Belgium. In 
July, three men were convicted and sentenced to nine, six, and five 
years imprisonment, respectively, for trafficking 215 kilograms of 
cocaine that were seized by a joint unit of the Surinamese police 
and army in a boat on a creek near the Saramacca River, in the 
northwestern quadrant of Suriname. In January, two men received 
sentences of six and two and a half years in connection with the 
April 2005 seizure of 335 kilograms of cocaine, four hand grenades, 
and live ammunition. 
 
Through September 2006 the GOS seized 577 kilograms of cocaine and 
42 kilograms of cannabis. A total of 571 people were arrested for 
drug-related offenses. Seizures and arrests have significantly 
decreased compared to those of 2005; law enforcement sources 
attribute this to the GOS' focus on combating narcotics: within the 
past five years GOS law enforcement has rounded up eight of the ten 
known major criminal organizations operating in the country. 
 
Corruption.  The GOS does not facilitate the production, processing, 
or shipment of narcotic and psychotropic drugs or other controlled 
substances, and does not discourage the investigation or prosecution 
of such acts. Moreover, the GOS has demonstrated some willingness to 
undertake law enforcement and legal measures to prevent, 
investigate, prosecute, and punish public corruption.  Public 
corruption is considered a problem in Suriname and there are reports 
of drug use and drug sales in prisons. During 2006 the GOS arrested 
police officers suspected of involvement in trafficking narcotics 
and membership in criminal organizations, including five in May 
2006. Reports of money laundering, drug trafficking, and associated 
 
PARAMARIBO 00000723  003.2 OF 004 
 
 
criminal activity involving current and former government and 
military officials continue to circulate, but the government has a 
track record of prosecuting or terminating corrupt officials. 
According to Customs reports, the GOS loses roughly $45 million 
annually in uncollected Customs revenues due to corruption and false 
invoicing. Investigations show that false invoicing occurs daily, 
despite heavy fines.  Former military strongman Desi Bouterse and 
former rebel leader Ronnie Brunswijk, who have both served in the 
National Assembly since 2005, have been convicted in absentia in the 
Netherlands for narcotics trafficking.  Brunswijk was also convicted 
in a French court in absentia for the same crime. 
 
Agreements and Treaties.  Suriname is party to the 1961 United 
Nations Single Convention as amended by the 1972 Protocol, and the 
1971 U.N. Convention on Psychotropic Substances. Suriname is also a 
party to the 1988 U.N. Drug Convention and has accordingly passed 
legislation that conforms to a majority of the convention's 
articles, but it has failed to pass legislation complying with 
precursor chemical control provisions. The GOS ratified the 
Inter-American Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters. 
Since 1976, the GOS has been sharing narcotics information with the 
Netherlands pursuant to a Mutual Legal Assistance Agreement. In 
August 1999, a comprehensive six-part, bilateral, maritime 
counter-narcotics enforcement agreement with the U.S. entered into 
force. The U.S.-Netherlands Extradition Treaty of 1904 is applicable 
to Suriname, but Suriname's Constitution prohibits the extradition 
of its nationals.  Therefore the extradition relationship between 
the United States and Suriname is inactive, but it was a topic of 
discussion in July when the United States requested Khan's 
extradition.  In January 2006 Suriname, the Netherlands Antilles, 
and Aruba signed a Mutual Legal Assistance Agreement allowing for 
direct law enforcement and judicial cooperation between the 
countries, thereby no longer requiring the process to be first 
routed through The Hague. Parties met in October to discuss progress 
in implementing the agreement, which covers cooperation with regard 
to drug trafficking, trafficking in persons, and organized crime. 
Suriname has also signed bilateral agreements to combat drug 
trafficking with neighboring countries Brazil and Guyana, as well as 
with Venezuela. Suriname is an active member of the Inter-American 
Drug Abuse Control Commission of the Organization of American States 
(OAS/CICAD), to which it reports regularly. In October 2006, 
Suriname hosted an anti-narcotics conference attended by many 
regional and international players, including the United States. The 
"Paramaribo Declaration," which was endorsed in principle by the 
participants at the end of the conference, proposes a framework to 
establish an intelligence-sharing network, coordinate and execute 
sting operations, and tackle money laundering. Suriname has signed 
agreements with the United States, Netherlands and France which 
allow for police attachs to work with local police. Suriname is not 
a party to the U.N. Convention Against Transnational Organized 
Crime. 
 
Cultivation and Production.  Suriname is not a producer of cocaine 
or opium poppy.  While cannabis is cultivated in Suriname, there is 
little specific data on the number of hectares under cultivation, or 
evidence that it is exported in significant quantities. 
 
Drug Flow/Transit.  Much of the cocaine entering Suriname is 
delivered by small aircraft, which land on clandestine airstrips cut 
into the dense jungle interior and sparsely populated coastal 
districts. The lack of resources, infrastructure, law enforcement 
personnel, and equipment makes detection and interdiction difficult. 
 Drugs are transported along interior roads to and from the 
clandestine airstrips. Drugs are also shipped to seaports via 
numerous river routes to the sea or overland for onward shipment to 
Caribbean islands, Europe, and the United States.  Sea-drops are 
also used.  Drugs exit Suriname via commercial air flights (by drug 
couriers or concealed in planes) and by commercial sea cargo. 
European-produced MDMA is transported via commercial airline flights 
from the Netherlands to Suriname (three to six flights per week, 
varying seasonally); in the past drug couriers have transported the 
drugs to the United States. 
 
Domestic Programs.  During 2006, the National Drug Demand Reduction 
Office (DDR) conducted numerous drug awareness and drug prevention 
campaigns. Schoolteachers and police officers were trained in early 
detection of drug use.  The Suriname Epidemiological Network on Drug 
Use (SURENDU), which is a network of governmental and 
non-governmental organizations, was strengthened in the areas of 
drug-use prevention and treatment in 2006. With funding from the 
 
PARAMARIBO 00000723  004.2 OF 004 
 
 
Organization of American States, the National Anti-Drugs Council 
(NAR) embarked on a project to survey drug use in Suriname. Around 
6,000 persons between the ages of 12 and 65 will be interviewed. 
The Council will also do a study on drug use in prisons.  In the 
area of supply reduction, a U.S.-funded computer database was 
established to keep track of drug criminals from their detention up 
to their sentencing. 
 
 
IV. U.S. Policy Initiatives and Programs 
 
U.S. Policy Initiatives. The principle obstacles to effective 
counternarcotics law enforcement efforts in Suriname are inadequate 
resources and limited training for law enforcement.  Therefore, the 
U.S. aims to strengthen the GOS law enforcement and judicial 
institutions and their capabilities to detect, interdict, and 
prosecute narco-trafficking activities through a mix of training and 
equipment and thereby help Suriname to effectively reduce narcotics 
trafficking. 
 
Bilateral Cooperation.  A high level of cooperation exists between 
U.S. and GOS law enforcement officials. In 2006, once again the U.S. 
provided both training and material support to several elements of 
the national police to strengthen their counternarcotics 
capabilities and promote greater bilateral cooperation.  In July 
2006, the DEA intensified its cooperation with Surinamese law 
enforcement by establishing a soon-to-be three person office in 
Suriname.  The U.S. was a participant and presenter at the October 
2006 anti-narcotics conference in Paramaribo. 
 
The Road Ahead.  The U.S. will continue to encourage the GOS to 
pursue large narcotics traffickers and to dismantle their 
organizations; the GOS Ministry of Justice and Police has focused 
repeatedly on this goal in the news media, and the Khan arrest bears 
out its seriousness and commitment. The U.S. continues to urge the 
GOS to focus on port security, specifically seaports, which are seen 
as the primary conduits for large shipments of narcotics exiting 
Suriname. Port security did improve in 2006.  The U.S. will continue 
to provide equipment, training, and technical support to the GOS to 
strengthen its counternarcotics efforts. 
 
SCHREIBER HUGHES