VZCZCXRO1481
RR RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHNJ #1376/01 3331447
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 291447Z NOV 06
FM AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4623
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 NDJAMENA 001376 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR AF, D, DRL, PRM; LONDON AND PARIS FOR 
AFRICAWATCHERS; GENEVA FOR CAMPBELL 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREF ASEC CD SU
SUBJECT: INTER-ETHNIC VIOLENCE IN SOUTHEASTERN CHAD: 
PERSPECTIVES FROM HUMAN RIGHTS GROUPS 
 
 
¶1.  (SBU) SUMMARY: The recent inter-ethnic violence in 
southeastern Chad, which has its roots in historical 
divisions and competition for land resources, has been 
amplified by deteriorating relations between Chad and Sudan, 
according to human rights researchers groups visiting the 
region.  While an international peacekeeping force may deter 
future violence, a long-term solution must address land 
resource management and develop an appropriate conflict 
resolution mechanism.  END SUMMARY. 
 
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ORIGINS OF INTER-ETHNIC VIOLENCE 
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¶2.  (SBU) Researchers from Human Rights Watch and Amnesty 
International recently met with the Ambassador to discuss 
their findings following weeks of research in southeastern 
Chad.  These weeks have witnessed a series of inter-ethnic 
clashes that left hundreds of civilians dead and prompted 
Chadian authorities to institute a state of emergency in 
November.  According to these researchers, the conflict in 
eastern Chad is a result of dwindling land resources, and a 
breakdown in traditional conflict resolution mechanisms. 
Historically, conflicts over land resources have occurred 
between Arabic nomadic groups and the sedentary pastoralists 
belonging to the Dadjo and Moro ethnic groups.  Arabs have 
asserted that the land is theirs for grazing, and the 
pastoralists claim the land is theirs for agricultural 
activity.  In the past, when disputes arose, conflicts were 
resolved through the traditional resolution mechanism, in 
which local leaders rendered decisions after hearing claims 
by the parties.  In most cases, regardless of the ethnicity 
of the arbitrator, the decisions were respected by the 
parties. 
 
¶3.  (SBU) Recently, as arable land becomes more difficult to 
come by, the competition for resources has become more 
fierce.  Arab nomads interviewed by these researchers claimed 
that Dadjo pastoralists shot and killed many of their cattle, 
and were cornering off land using barbed wire, with the 
intention to injure their livestock.  Dadjo claimed that the 
Arab nomads were overgrazing the land, and allowing their 
livestock to destroy critical food crops.  Amplifying the 
tension was the perception among the Arab communities that 
Dadjo local leaders were rendering decisions in disputes in 
favor of their Dadjo kinsmen.  Several arabic nomads 
interviewed argued that their claims of Dadjo attacks on 
their cattle were ignored by the local Dadjo leaders. 
 
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INVOLVEMENT OF CHADIANS AND SUDANESE GOVERNMENTS, REBEL GROUPS 
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¶4.  (SBU) In this environment, clashes between Arabic nomads 
and Dadjo pastoralists took place.  The researchers point out 
that while some assert that the Government of Sudan is 
supporting Arab attacks against the Chadian communities to 
destabilize the Deby regime, they themselves see no evidence 
of such a strategy.  They do observe assistance from Sudanese 
Arab groups (many of whom come from the Janjaweed militas in 
Darfur) for Chadian Arab groups.  This support is driven by 
the belief that Chadian and Sudanese Arabs are one in origin 
(a notion referred to as the Wahediya) and should support 
each other in times of crisis.  The researchers have been 
able to confirm Sudanese arms and munitions used by these 
militas, indicating that the GOS does provide some level of 
support that arrives in the hands of the Arab groups.  They 
also point out that while that they have no evidence of 
direct links between Chadian rebels groups coming from Sudan 
and these Arab militas, Chadian rebels are probably taking 
advantage of the power vacuum left after the attacks to 
secure areas as a possible base to launch attacks against the 
Chadian national army. 
 
¶5.  (SBU) The Dadjo's support base is more multi-faceted in 
scope.  The researchers have identified instances of the 
Chadian national army arming popular and local defense forces 
 (the Toroboro) trying to combat attacks by Arab nomads. 
They do note that the support is minimal, and consists more 
of weapons and munitions sales to local groups in exchange 
for food supplies.  The researchers claim that support by 
Sudanese rebel groups is much more prevalent and wide-spread. 
 They point out the example of Hassan Yunus, a local Dadjo 
warlord, who, in response to an attack by Arab militas, 
turned to Nouri Minnawi, a field commander Justice and 
Equality Movement, who provided arms and munitions to Yunus. 
In return for these weapons and munitions, Sudanese rebel 
groups are permitted by local leaders to recruit members of 
 
NDJAMENA 00001376  002 OF 002 
 
 
the Dadjo community to fight for the Sudanese rebel groups 
(such as the JEM and National Redemption Front) in Darfur. 
In some cases, Chadian officials assist in these efforts. 
The researchers point to Bechir Djabir, an informal advisor 
and relative of President Deby, as a Chadian authority aiding 
the JEM and NRF's recruitment efforts. 
 
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PEACEKEEPING FORCE NOT ENOUGH 
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¶6.  (SBU) While the media reports paint a picture of Arab 
militas killing sedentary African villages, the researchers 
point out that the level of violence does go both ways: Arab 
groups are killing Dadjo, and vice versa.  It is true that 
nature of the killing is asymmetrical, according to these 
researchers, probably rooted in the Arabic nomadic groups' 
belief that one Arab death should result in the death of 10 
Dadjo, to deter the Dadjo from engaging in further attacks. 
 
¶7.  (SBU) This mentality of violence to deter further 
violence, according to the researchers, may be minimally 
deterred by the presence of an international peacekeeping 
force, but the bloodshed will continue.  In order to address 
the issues of the conflict, any international peacekeeping 
presence must be coupled with an active and intelligent 
engagement with local communities to address land resource 
issues and rebuild confidence in the traditional conflict 
resolution mechanisms.  An international force, according to 
the researchers, can be a band-aid to the problem, but will 
do little to fully heal the wounds of a conflict deeply 
rooted in ethnic divides and a competition for resources. 
 
¶8.  (U) Tripoli Minimize Considered. 
WALL