VZCZCXRO0866
RR RUEHBZ RUEHDU RUEHGI RUEHJO RUEHMA RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHRN RUEHROV
DE RUEHNJ #1306/01 3101546
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 061546Z NOV 06
FM AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4546
INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE
RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA 0867
RUEHKH/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM 0352
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0917

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 NDJAMENA 001306 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: CD PGOV PREF PREL SU KPKO
SUBJECT: DPA DISENCHANTMENT AMONG CHADIAN OFFICIALS AND 
SUDANESE REBELS 
 
REF: NDJAMENA 01272 
 
¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY. Representatives of both the Chadian 
Government refugee agency (speaking unofficially) and a 
Chad-based Darfur rebel group had common interpretations of 
the ineffectiveness of the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) and 
of the responsibilities of the international community, 
namely the United Nations (UN), in protecting Sudanese 
refugees in Chad.  Their November 2 and 3 comments were 
indicative of a growing restlessness and frustration on this 
side of the border with Sudan with the continued consequences 
of protracted Darfur fighting.  END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2. (SBU) On November 2 Poloff spoke with Nour Abdoulaye, 
First Secretary of the N'Djamena Office of the Chadian 
National Commission for Refugee Assistance (CNAR), which 
oversees the 235 Chadian gendarmes divided among each of the 
12 refugee camps in the eastern part of the country.  On 
November 3 Poloff met with Adam Shogar, spokesman for the G19 
faction of the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA). 
 
DPA Disenchantment 
------------------ 
¶3. (SBU) Neither Abdoulaye nor Shogar had kind words for the 
DPA's prospects for success, with Abdoulaye noting that the 
Darfur crisis had persisted and in fact worsened in spite of 
the Abuja Accords, making them a "bad solution" to the 
problems of western Sudan.  A "good solution," Abdoulaye 
contended, would come from continued dialogue among 
non-signatories to the DPA, a dialogue to be brokered by 
either the African Union or the UN. 
 
¶4. (SBU) Shogar vowed that his group would never commit to 
the DPA without assurances from the Sudanese Government of 
National Unity (GNU) on the issues of power-sharing, 
wealth-sharing, compensation for conflict-affected 
populations (the biggest bone of contention for 
non-signatories, according to Shogar) and integration of 
rebel fighters into the Sudanese national forces. 
 
¶5. (SBU) Shogar acknowledged "rumors" that the GNU had 
indicated it would re-open discussions of the DPA with 
non-signatory groups, but he dismissed such claims as 
disingenuous.  Shogar argued that the GNU was not ready to 
accept a democratic system in the Sudan, one that would 
ultimately grant every citizen a vote, which would mean the 
end of the ruling minority National Congress Party (NCP). 
Shogar asserted, however, that the NCP must be removed from 
power for progress to be made in Sudan. 
 
¶6. (SBU) Shogar remarked that the DPA's only real tangible 
result was "to give a job to Minni" (Minni Minawi, leader of 
the SLM/A faction that signed the DPA) and to grant 
unwarranted power to both Minawi and Sudanese President 
Bashir, contrary to the will of Darfurians.  For these 
reasons, Shogar insisted that DPA implementation NOT form the 
basis of the mandate of any eventual UN force in Darfur. 
 
UN Role in Darfur Crisis = Pick Up the Slack 
-------------------------------------------- 
¶7. (SBU) Both Abdoulaye and Shogar agreed that a UN presence 
in Chad was necessary to protect the refugees in the camps 
along the border, something which Abdoulaye admitted the 235 
gendarmes at a ratio of one per thousand refugees lacked the 
capacity to do.  Nor could the gendarmes ensure border 
security: Abdoulaye argued the UN should assume this 
responsibility so that the GOC could concentrate on ensuring 
its own territorial integrity in the face of cross-border 
incursions by Sudanese groups in violation of the Tripoli 
Accords. 
 
¶8. (SBU) Shogar agreed that a UN presence in Chad would be 
helpful in protecting refugees from attacks by the Janjaweed 
and Chadian rebels.  He was explicit in identifying what he 
considered key aspects of the mandate of a UN Darfur force, 
reiterating that it not be based on DPA implementation. 
Instead, Shogar contended the UN focus on protection of 
civilians, disarmament of the Janjaweed where Khartoum had 
failed to do so, and accountability for human rights 
violators through collaboration with the International 
Criminal Court.  Such discussion, however, was useless, 
according to Shogar, given Bashir's resounding no to UN 
Security Council Resolution 1706.  "Let us fight the Sudanese 
Government ourselves," Shogar offered, given what he saw as 
the UN's "failure" in this regard. 
 
Comment 
 
NDJAMENA 00001306  002 OF 002 
 
 
------- 
¶9. (SBU) There is clearly a disconnect between the upper and 
lower echelons of the GOC regarding both the DPA and a 
possible UN presence on this side of the border.  Despite the 
fact that senior GOC officials are currently leery of UN 
personnel in Chad, some lower-level GOC officials, including 
CNAR representatives and several prefets and sous-prefets, 
nevertheless retain the view that a UN deployment would be in 
Chad's best interest.  The same discrepancy exists with 
regard to the DPA, which the high levels of the GOC formally 
support.  However, the DPA disillusionment recently expressed 
by CNAR and G19 representatives illustrates the pervasiveness 
of such sentiment, not only among refugees (reftel) but among 
lower-ranking government officials and rebels alike.  This 
attitude does not bode well for the success of an eventual UN 
Darfur deployment, which would be charged with DPA 
implementation.  While imperfect, the DPA still represents 
the best way forward on Darfur peace and must accordingly not 
be cast aside while a more "attractive" alternative is 
sought.  END COMMENT. 
WALL