VZCZCXYZ0005
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHNR #4868/01 3191409
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 151409Z NOV 06
FM AMEMBASSY NAIROBI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5483
INFO RUEHAE/AMEMBASSY ASMARA 4853
RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA 8930
RUEHDJ/AMEMBASSY DJIBOUTI 4445
RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS 1746
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 4051
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 2059
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 5039
RUEHRC/USDA FAS WASHDC 1378
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RHMFIUU/CJTF HOA

UNCLAS NAIROBI 004868 
 
SIPDIS 
 
AIDAC 
 
USAID/W DCHA, MHESS; WGARVELINK, LROGERS 
USAID/W DCHA/OFDA, GGOTTLIEB; AFERARO; ACONVERY; 
CGOTTSCHALK; KCHANNELL, ATRACY; NCLARK; LPOWERS; PMORRIS 
USAID/W DCHA/FFP, WHAMMINK; JDWORKEN; TANDERSON; 
SGILBERT; PBALAKRISHNAN 
USAID/W DCHA/DG, LFEINBERG; DLOCKETT 
USAID/W DCHA/CMM, JSINGH 
USAID/W AFR/A/AA, KALMQUIST 
USAID/W DCHA/OTI, RJENKINS 
USAID/NAIROBI REDSO/FFP, NESTES 
OFDA/ECARO, JMYER; GPLATT 
USAID/ROME, RNEWBERG 
GENEVA FOR NKYLOH 
STATE FOR PRM/AFR 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: 
 
SUBJECT:  SOMALIA HUMANITARIAN SITUATION UPDATE 
 
 
SUMMARY 
 
¶1.  South central region of Somalia is the most unstable 
area of the country where insecurity exists primarily 
due to interclan fighting, tensions brought about by the 
spread of the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC), and the 
ineffective governance of the Transitional Federal 
Government (TFG). 
 
¶2.  While the current short rains are essentially ending 
the multiyear drought, recovery and rehabilitation 
activities in the south central region are being 
hampered by ongoing insecurity and fighting between UIC 
and TFG, resulting in internal displacement and 
migration of populations across regional borders. 
Localized flooding is also impeding critical farming 
activities in Juba and Shabelle valleys.  While access 
to vulnerable populations in UIC controlled areas by 
humanitarian stakeholders has improved, registration 
requirements for NGOs by the newly formed UIC Department 
of Planning and Development may soon impede NGO 
operations in UIC held regions.  END SUMMARY 
 
BACKGROUND 
 
¶3.  The south central region of Somalia was severely 
affected by the recent drought that was felt throughout 
the Horn of Africa in 2005 and 2006. More than 1.1 
million pastoralists and agro pastoralists in southern 
and central Somalia experienced an acute food and 
livelihood crisis and humanitarian emergency brought 
about by three consecutive failed rainy seasons and 
ongoing civil insecurity that resulted in crop failure, 
extensive livestock death, high food prices, abnormal 
population movement and extreme shortages of and limited 
access to water and food. 
 
¶4.  The lack of a functioning central government, civil 
strife, inter-clan conflicts, and confrontations between 
Somali warlords and militias associated with the UIC, 
further complicated the humanitarian situation and 
limited access to affected areas. 
 
¶5.  In response to the Somalia drought, the United 
States Government provided more than 91 million dollars 
in humanitarian assistance comprising food donations and 
distribution as well as emergency water, health, 
nutrition and livelihood support interventions 
facilitated by UN agencies and non-government 
organizations (NGOs). 
 
GOOD SEASONAL RAINFALL BUT- 
 
¶6.  According to Famine Early Warning Systems Network 
(FEWSNET), heavy rains are ongoing throughout most 
regions of Somalia, with the heaviest reported in Juba 
and Shabelle valleys, Gedo, Bay and Hiran Regions in 
southern Somalia with less rainfall in central Somalia 
and the northern regions. 
 
¶7.  Some districts in southern Somalia are experiencing 
torrential rains with flash flooding.  Due to heavy 
rains in the upper catchments of the Ethiopian 
highlands, downstream flooding has been reported in the 
riverine areas of Gedo, Juba and Shabelle valleys.  This 
flooding has resulted in population displacement, crop 
damage and destruction of infrastructure in several 
districts including areas around Mogadishu.  In Lower 
and Middle Shabelle Regions, about 2000 hectares of 
maize and sorghum crops were destroyed by cresting of 
the Shabelle River according to FSAU. 
 
¶8.  While the rains have wrought havoc on agricultural 
districts, a more positive impact is being felt in 
pastoralists regions with pasture and browse 
regeneration and replenished aquifers.  UN Office for 
the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) is 
monitoring the situation and since the rains are 
expected to continue through November, a comprehensive 
flood impact assessment on crop production is premature 
at this time, however, OCHA is coordinating a multi- 
agency assessment of the impact of the floods on the 
humanitarian situation in Gedo Region, so far the worst 
affected region. 
 
FOOD INSECURITY AND MALNUTRITION - A SLOW RECOVERY 
 
¶9.  Food security and livelihood conditions are 
improving in the northeast and northwest regions of 
Somalia, however, the recent drought and food insecurity 
in the south central regions continues to impact on 
children under five as evidenced by high global acute 
malnutrition (GAM) and severe acute malnutrition (SAM) 
rates above internationally accepted norms. 
 
¶10.  Action Contra Faim (ACF) conducted a nutrition 
survey in Wajid District of Bakool Region in July 2006 
and found very high global and severe acute malnutrition 
rates of 33.5 and 5.4 percent respectively.  Since this 
study was conducted just prior to the main harvest, ACF 
will facilitate another survey later this year to 
monitor trends.  ACF is implementing community 
therapeutic care (CTC) feeding programs in the district 
and also providing a general food ration for families of 
malnourished children.  ACF is also conducting nutrition 
education sessions and promoting kitchen gardens for 
beneficiaries of their feeding programs. 
 
¶11.  International Medical Corps (IMC) is also scaling 
up supplemental and therapeutic feeding programs in Bay 
and Bakool Regions and report unusually high numbers of 
feeding program beneficiaries for this time of year, 
another indication that drought recovery is progressing 
slowly. 
 
INSECURITY AND ITS IMPACT 
 
¶12.  In the last several months there has been increased 
population displacement within Somalia and across 
regional borders due to skirmishes between local, TFG 
backed, and UIC militias.  The UIC has expanded into 
Lower and Middle Juba and Hiran Regions in the south and 
Galgadud and Mudug Regions in central Somalia.  While 
the areas under the control of UIC have experienced 
improved security, fear of outright "war" between the 
TFG, UIC, local militias and external actors continues 
to spur population movement. 
 
¶13.  Most of the first wave of Somalia refugees seeking 
safe haven in Kenya were minority clans and Bantus who 
have no widespread clan support and whose economic 
livelihoods are most at risk during times of insecurity. 
Many of these early refugees were khat sellers, petty 
traders, casual laborers and charcoal venders in urban 
settings and subsistence farmers from riverine districts 
who lacked access to clan support in times of economic 
stress.  More recent arrivals are said to be from middle 
classes and may be seeking refuge in camps to await 
asylum in other countries.  Many refugees interviewed by 
various assessment teams report fear of lifestyle 
restrictions by the UIC. 
 
¶14.  According to UN High Commission for Refugees 
(UNHCR), about 3000 people crossed the border into Kenya 
in August and while 6,200 and 7,000 crossed the border 
into Kenya in September and October.  The refugees are 
mainly coming from Mogadishu, Kismayo, Baidoa, Buale, 
and Doble in southern Somalia.  Since January of 2006, 
UNHCR estimates that about 37,000 Somalis entered Kenya 
seeking refuge, swelling the northeastern Kenya Dadaab 
refugee camp population from about 127,000 to 
approximately 160,000, with an estimated 10,000 
additional refugees waiting to be registered and 
processed. 
 
¶15.  Insecurity and tension in southern Somalia has also 
impeded progress of several US Agency for International 
Development, Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance 
(USAID OFDA) implementing partners operating in Middle 
Juba and Bay Region.  Adventist Development and Relief 
Agency (ADRA) and IMC working in Dinsor District and 
World Concern in Jilib District report slow progress in 
program implementation due to frequent evacuations of 
international staff and disruption of program activities 
due to insecurity.  Squabbling between local actors in 
TFG held territory is also negatively impacting drought 
recovery efforts with some clan cartels seeking control 
of NGO resources such as vehicle and office rental, 
staff hiring and procurement tenders.  While the TFG is 
in control in Bay and Bakool Regions, NGOs report that 
local sentiment is turning in favor of the UIC, citing 
community dissatisfaction with the TFGs failure to 
deliver basic social services and lack of leadership. 
 
¶16.  NGOs operational in Bakool and Hiran Region and in 
Mogadishu report business as usual, movement in and 
around Mogadishu has much improved with UIC eliminating 
banditry and other forms of insecurity within the city. 
NGOs operational in areas near the Ethiopian border in 
Bakool and Hiran Regions report stable security 
conditions at this time. 
 
¶17.  FSAU reports that if widespread conflict was to 
occur, the impact on the humanitarian situation in south 
and central regions would be severe, doubling the 1.8 
million people currently needing humanitarian assistance 
in Somalia. 
 
OLD CASELOAD IDPS - "ONCE AN IDP, ALWAYS AN IDP" 
 
¶18.  Now that access to Mogadishu has improved for 
international NGOs, a number of agencies have entered 
the city to conduct assessments of the humanitarian 
situation of the general population and internally 
displaced persons (IDPs).  United Nations Childrens Fund 
(UNICEF) and FSAU estimate that Mogadishu has about 
250,000 IDPs in about 400 camp sites, who are living in 
abysmal conditions throughout the city.  IMCs recent 
assessment in Mogadishu reports most IDPs have been 
living in the camps and abandoned government buildings 
and compounds in the city center since the early 1990s. 
 
¶19.  IDP camp population is mainly women, children and 
elderly.  The male IDP population engages in petty trade 
or work as porters in the main markets and as casual 
laborers on construction sites. Bantu men return to 
their areas of origin to engage in farming activities 
until after harvest.  IDP camps are divided along clan 
lines, mostly Bantu and other minorities. 
 
¶20.  Prior to the takeover of Mogadishu by the UIC, 
minimal basic services were provided by UN agencies, 
international and local NGOs, and well as a number of 
Islamic relief and development groups.  Reintegration of 
Mogadishu IDPs into general society was never an option 
due to lack of a strong local administration and long- 
standing resistance by majority clans. 
 
¶21.  Since the takeover of the capital by the UIC, the 
general security situation in the city and IDP camps has 
improved with increased access to the camps by 
additional aid agencies.  IDP committees are being 
formed in the camps and they are aggressively seeking 
widespread assistance and support from the UIC and aid 
agencies.  IDPs report significantly less 
discrimination, harassment, and sexual abuse since the 
collapse of the militias and local gangs and takeover of 
the city by the UIC.  IDPs highlight ongoing priority 
needs as food, new shelter, sanitation, income 
generation activities, education and reintegration. 
 
UIC CLAMPING DOWN 
 
¶22.  Local and international NGOs operating in UIC held 
districts are currently negotiating with the UIC on 
issues related to registration and operating permits, a 
situation that many NGOs fear could result in 
operational restrictions and various taxations.  In mid 
October, the Planning and Development Office of the UIC 
sent notice to the NGO community that all local and 
international NGOs must register with the UIC in 
Mogadishu by November 5, 2006.  The UIC also required 
NGOs to purchase their registration applications and 
file NGO profiles and operating plans.  If registered, 
NGOs would be required to pay a registration of fee of 
250 dollars for local groups and 500 dollars for 
international agencies.  On payment of registration 
fees, the NGO would have to purchase their operational 
certificates, again for a fee.  The UIC is also 
requiring NGOs to pay an annual fee for vehicles and 
guard's weapons. 
 
¶23.  Additional conditions of NGOs were listed in the 
notice such as submission of work plans that must be 
approved by the UIC, as well as restricting from 
participating in anti Islamic or political activities. 
 
¶24.  The Nairobi-based NGO Consortium formed a task 
force to negotiate with the UIC. Mogadishu based members 
of the task force met with the UIC in Mogadishu on 
November 5, 2006.  The UIC extended the deadline for NGO 
registration to November 20, 2006 and refused to allow 
the NGOs to register from Nairobi or other UIC held 
districts in Somalia, requiring all to present 
representatives in Mogadishu for the screening process. 
The UIC is now imposing visa requirements for entry to 
Somalia.  The NGO Consortium is drafting a comprehensive 
response to the UIC demands and six NGO representatives 
plan to meet the Planning and Development Committee in 
Mogadishu next week.  The NGO community is seeking 
clarification on a number of issues, not just payment of 
fees. 
 
¶25.  As of now the UIC is showing willingness to 
negotiate with the NGO community however, a number of 
agencies fear the UIC sees the NGO community as resource 
rich, wishing to manipulate vehicle and office rental, 
procurement, impose taxes and direct program 
interventions. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
¶26.  UN agencies, NGOs, and donor agencies are preparing 
contingency plans in the event of further deterioration 
of security and its impact on vulnerable populations in 
Somalia and neighboring countries.  UNOCHA is also 
conducting a best case worst case scenario workshop for 
the Horn of Africa in Nairobi on November 20, 2006. 
 
¶27.  USAID/OFDA regional officers will continue to 
monitor the humanitarian situation and continue to 
report on drought recovery efforts as well as climate 
and security conditions that impact the humanitarian 
situation. 
 
RANNEBERGER