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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8133
INFO RUEHZA/WHA CENTRAL AMERICAN COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
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C O N F I D E N T I A L MANAGUA 002459 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR WHA/CEN, WHA/USOAS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/06/2016 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR KDEM NU
SUBJECT: SIT REP 1 - NICARAGUAN ELECTIONS 
 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Paul A. Trivelli. Reasons 1.4 (B,D). 
 
¶1. (U) Summary: With the Liberal vote split between the 
Liberal Nicaraguan Alliance (ALN) and the Liberal 
Constitutional Party (PLC), Sandinista Liberation Front 
(FSLN) presidential candidate Daniel Ortega appears to 
be the likely victor in Nicaragua's November 5 national 
elections.  The latest results from the Supreme 
Electoral Council (CSE) shows Ortega leading by 7 
points over his closest competitor, and thus could 
win the election on the first round unless Ortega's 
numbers drop below 40% and/or the margin between him 
and Montealegre narrows.  We will report following the 
CSE's next release of results. End summary. 
 
Quick Count Suggests First Round Victory for Ortega 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶2. (U) At 6:40 a.m., with only 6 voting tables (JRVs) 
impugned, ET publicly issued the results of their quick 
count: 
 
FSLN - 38.49% 
ALN - 29.52% 
PLC - 24.15% 
MRS - 7.44% 
 
¶3. (SBU) Local NDI Director Deborah Ulmer privately reported 
that 
only six of the 1,042 polling stations sampled by ET 
experienced official challenges -- not enough 
to significantly influence the results.  ET observers 
witnessed some irregularities, but the size and scope 
of these anomalies, according to NDI technical advisors, 
will not change overall results. 
 
¶4. (SBU) Around 10 a.m., Embassy privately received the 
latest 
results from the CSE's vote tally center (Centro de 
Computo) in Managua.  With 33.4% of the votes tallied, 
the FSLN still leads by 5.6%. 
 
FSLN - 38.9% 
ALN - 33.31% 
PLC - 19.95% 
Sandinista Renovation Movement (MRS) - 7.23% 
 
¶5. (U) However, at 12:15 p.m., the CSE released 
its latest figures (with 40.46% of the vote counted). 
Results currently are: 
 
FSLN - 40.01% 
ALN - 32.72% 
PLC - 20.33% 
AC - 0.29% 
MRS - 7.50% 
 
(Comment: The difference between the public 
CSE results and those of the CSE's Centro de Computo 
could suggest that the CSE may be front-loading results 
in its favor to demonstrate that they have reached the 40% 
threshold. End Comment.) 
 
¶6. (C) According to the coordinator of the ALN's quick 
count at 10 a.m., with 60% of the results in (they polled 
820 JRVs), the FSLN leads with a 5.91% margin. 
 
FSLN - 38.86% 
ALN - 32.95% (with a 1.4% margin of error.) 
 
In addition to performing the quick count, the ALN 
is currently tallying the results from each JRV. 
They expect to have 90-95% of the JRVs tallied by 
around 7 p.m. this evening. 
 
¶7. (SBU) According the OAS' quick count, conducted with 
their approximately 200 observers throughout the 
country, the PLC is in the second place in contrast to 
the other quick counts. 
 
FSLN - 36.41% 
PLC - 29.8% 
ALN - 26.8% 
MRS - 6.4% 
Alternative for Change (AC) - 0.37% 
 
The OAS is reporting 70% turn-out, much lower than 
in 2001 when it was over 90%.  (Comment: PLC party 
sources also claim that they are in second place, 
within one point of Ortega.  End comment) 
 
Slow Voting and Other Irregularities Reported by Embassy 
Observers 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶8. (SBU) The biggest problem reported by the media, U.S. 
Embassy observers, and others was that polls opened late 
and in some places even closed early.  Scheduled to open 
at 7:00 a.m. on election day, only 44 percent opened by 
7:30, although the OAS reported that 96 percent opened 
by 9:00 a.m.  Further, JRV officials processed long lines 
of voters very slowly in many areas, a phenomenon the media 
quickly dubbed "la tortuga loca" (the crazy turtle -- a 
reference to the "crazy mouse" debacle during the 2004 
municipal elections, in which many voters were sent 
from JRV to JRV until they gave up). 
 
¶9. (C) After the official closing of the polls at 6:00 
p.m., several JRVs in Managua, Matagalpa, Chinandega, and 
other areas shut the gates of the voting centers on 
citizens despite a regulation permitting JRVs to stay open 
to accommodate voters already waiting in line at 6:00.  CSE 
chief of staff Rodrigo Barreto later admitted to poloff 
that up to 15 percent of JRVs in Managua closed with voters 
still in line between 6:00 and 6:30 p.m.  He blamed the 
closures on power outages, which he implied were 
deliberately caused by the PLC to generate chaos. 
ET's quick count sample revealed a nationwide trend 
of 2 percent of the JRVs blocking voters in line 
at the 6:00 p.m. closure.  The actual number of voters 
disenfranchised is still unknown, although estimated 
by ET at around 2%. 
 
¶10. (SBU) The 60-member USG observer team (16 with OAS and 
44 independent) and 20 Embassy FSNs accredited domestically 
with ET reported in Saturday evening throughout the day on 
Sunday from every department and region.  A summary of 
noted anomalies follows: 
 
-- Missing or Unretrieved Cedulas and Temporary Voting 
Documents: ALN and PLC fiscales (poll watchers) in 
Matagalpa and Jinotega complained to observers that the 
Municipal Electoral Councils in those cities "lost" or 
incorrectly distributed (to FSLN agents they claim) 9,500 
cedulas in Jinotega and 6,000 in Matagalpa.  In the 
municipality of Leon, only 5,000 of 11,000 cedulas 
and temporary documents were retrieved.  This information 
from Leon came directly from Oscar Somarriba, president 
of the Leon's municipal CSE authority. 
 
--Admission of Observers and Party Poll Watchers: Some JRVs 
incorrectly refused to admit national and international 
observers and party poll watchers into the opening and 
closing (i.e. vote count) procedures of the JRV. 
In addition of admission of observers and poll watchers, 
it was also noted by Leon electoral president Oscar 
Somarriba that 100 out of 416 electoral police were 
substituted at the last minute (less than 6 hours before 
the polls opened).  According to other sources in Leon, 
most of these were not FSLN supporters. 
 
--Confusing Ballot Boxes: The ballot boxes for departmental 
deputies and Central American Parliament (Parlacen) 
deputies were labeled with black and dark gray stripes, 
which were difficult for most voters to differentiate. 
This led to the inadvertent but incorrect 
placement of ballots in the wrong boxes, delays in the 
vote count, and an opportunity for official vote 
challenges (impugnaciones). 
 
--Application of Ink: Teams reported the inconsistent 
application of indelible ink that is supposed to prevent 
multiple voting.  Some JRV officials would cover the entire 
thumb, while others would apply only a superficial amount 
or mark the wrong (left hand) thumb. 
 
--FSLN Dominance: Observers noticed that the FSLN JRV 
officials and poll watchers were, in most instances, better 
trained and more aggressive than their counterparts from 
the other parties.  Additionally, many Managua and Leon 
JRVs had "observers" from the FSLN-controlled Office of the 
Human Rights Ombudsman (PPPH) who functioned like officials 
and in many cases running the show, even though 
the JRVs are clearly beyond their jurisdiction.  (Note: Human 
Rights Ombudsman Omar Cabezas, a noted human rights abuser 
from the 1980s, warned international observers before the 
elections that they would be monitored by his office.  End 
Note.) 
 
Observer Response 
- - - - - - - - - 
 
¶11. (SBU) Other international and national observer groups, 
such as the OAS, Carter Center, European Union, and IPADE, 
have publicly noted some complaints and irregularities, but 
have generally endorsed the conduct of the elections so 
far.  No group has made a final statement on the fairness 
and transparency of the elections.  Former Peruvian 
President Toledo, with the OAS mission, asked candidates 
and political parties for their patience with respect 
to final election results. 
 
Comment 
- - - - 
 
¶12. (C) Other quick counts conducted by observer groups, 
political parties, and civil society organizations, show 
different results from the ET quick count, but we believe 
none of those are taken from a random, representative 
sampling of JRVs.  We also note with interest that the ALN 
has announced it will wait for 100% of the election returns 
due to irregularities.  Montealegre also observes that this 
election is only the beginning for the ALN, with the ultimate 
goal for the ALN to serve as a new political alternative 
that will transform Nicaragua regardless of the outcome. 
He views this process as a long-term effort.  The composition 
of the National Assembly is certain to change as a result 
of this election. 
TRIVELLI