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Viewing cable 06MANAGUA2442, OAS EOM EXPECTS VOTE TRANSMISSION PROBLEMS ON

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06MANAGUA2442 2006-11-02 20:18 2011-06-01 08:00 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Managua
Appears in these articles:
http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-30/Mundo/NotasSecundarias/Mundo2758456.aspx
http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-30/Mundo/NotasSecundarias/Mundo2758467.aspx
http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-30/Mundo/NotasSecundarias/Mundo2758468.aspx
http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-30/Mundo/NotasSecundarias/Mundo2758464.aspx
http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/4103/la-embusa-y-el-gabinete-de-ortega
http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/4104/d-rsquo-escoto-en-onu-ldquo-un-desafio-de-ortega-a-ee-uu-rdquo
http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/4102/estrada-y-la-ldquo-doble-cara-rdquo-ante-ee-uu
http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/3966/la-ldquo-injerencia-rdquo-de-ee-uu-en-el-2006
http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-23/Mundo/Relacionados/Mundo2758764.aspx
http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-23/Mundo/NotaPrincipal/Mundo2758753.aspx
http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/4041/millones-de-dolares-sin-control-y-a-discrecion
http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/4040/la-ldquo-injerencia-rdquo-de-venezuela-en-2006
http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/4047/rodrigo-barreto-enviado-de-ldquo-vacaciones-rdquo
http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-16/Mundo/NotasSecundarias/Mundo2757239.aspx
http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-16/Mundo/NotaPrincipal/Mundo2746658.aspx
http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-16/Mundo/Relacionados/Mundo2757244.aspx
http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-16/Mundo/Relacionados/Mundo2746673.aspx
http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/3991/dra-yadira-centeno-desmiente-cable-diplomatico-eeuu
http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/3968/pellas-pronostico-a-eeuu-victoria-de-ortega-en-2006
http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/3967/barreto-era-ldquo-fuente-confiable-rdquo-para-eeuu
VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMU #2442/01 3062018
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 022018Z NOV 06
FM AMEMBASSY MANAGUA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8109
INFO RUEHZA/WHA CENTRAL AMERICAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L MANAGUA 002442 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR WHA/USOAS, WHA/CEN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/02/2016 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR KDEM NU
SUBJECT: OAS EOM EXPECTS VOTE TRANSMISSION PROBLEMS ON 
ELECTION DAY 
 
REF: A. MANAGUA 02074 
 
     B. MANAGUA 1593 
     C. MANAGUA 1555 
     D. MANAGUA 0565 
     E. 2005 MANAGUA 2806 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Paul A. Trivelli. Reasons 1.4 (B,D). 
 
1.  (C) SUMMARY:  The OAS issued a communique factoring in 
the Ambassador's recent observations to OAS Election 
Observation Mission (EOM) chief Gustavo Fernandez.  The OAS 
EOM is coordinating closely with other observation groups and 
will meet with the White House delegation.  Fernandez 
believes that potential problem areas include vote 
transmission delays/failures; systematic contesting of the 
vote results; early declaration of victory by one candidate; 
and, marked differences between quick count and CSE results. 
While he is confident that the OAS will detect any major 
manipulations of the vote count, he admits that changes 
affecting the results of the National Assembly seats will be 
harder to detect.  He also believes that, regardless of 
election outcome, democracy here will advance to some degree; 
however, Nicaragua's constitutional changes will seriously 
limit Eduardo Montealegre's ability to govern if he wins the 
election.  The Sandinista Front (FSLN)-dominated CSE could 
exploit data transmission interruptions to enable the early 
results to favor FSLN candidate Daniel Ortega, who in turn 
could use these results as justification to declare early 
victory.  END SUMMARY. 
 
OAS ISSUES COMMUNIQUE, WILL RELEASE FOUR PRESS RELEASES 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
2.  (C) As OAS EOM Chief Gustavo Fernandez had assured 
Ambassador on 01 November, the OAS issued a communique 
through dailies La Prensa and El Nuevo Diario on 02 November. 
 The communique factors in the Ambassador's observations to 
Fernandez regarding the need for the CSE to facilitate cedula 
and temporary voter card documents, to dissuade political 
parties from engaging in disinformation campaigns 
(specifically the PLC's claims that Montealegre has withdrawn 
his candidacy), and to urge all political parties to refrain 
from declaring early victory.  Highlights of the communique 
follow: 
 
--the CSE, political parties, media, and institutions should 
ensure the maximum participation possible on November 5 by 
doubling their efforts to urge Nicaraguans to pick up their 
cedulas and temporary voting documents before election day; 
 
--the CSE must guarantee that any remaining cedulas/temporary 
voting cards in its possession are properly secured; the OAS 
will accompany the CSE in the process; 
 
--Nicaraguans should be prudent and wait for the CSE's 
official vote results; 
 
--Nicaraguans should avoid rumors and pronouncements of 
actions that could affect the normal development of the 
electoral process; 
 
--political actors should reduce their level of verbal 
confrontation. 
 
--the media has a special role in helping fortify democracy 
and peace in Nicaragua by disseminating accurate and 
comprehensive information 
 
--the EOM is convinced that Nicaragua's democratic system 
will be consolidated with massive civic participation, 
responsible political leadership, electoral authorities' 
strict adherence to the norms, and civil society's 
transparent and independent observation. 
 
3.  (SBU) According to Fernandez, the OAS EOM will issue four 
press releases on November 5-6.  The first release will be 
issued at 12 noon on Sunday and will cover the overall 
situation at the JRVs, logistics, and security matters.  The 
second will be issued at 5 PM and will cover voter turnout. 
The third will be issued at 10 PM and will include 
observation of the process and the closure process.  The 
fourth release, to be issued around 10 AM on Monday, will 
cover data transmission and impugnaciones. 
 
OBSERVER COORDINATION ON TRACK, SOME CONCERNS REMAIN 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
4.  (C) Fernandez noted that the OAS is coordinating 
information sharing with the EU EOM, Carter Center, the 
Donor's Group, and others supporting the observation process. 
 Responding to the Ambassador's news that a small White House 
delegation will be present for the elections, Fernandez said 
he would be pleased to meet with them.  He then shared what 
he considers could be "minor, isolated incidents and major 
problems": 
 
Minor incidents: 
 
--lack of and/or theft of voting materials in some voting 
tables (JRVs); 
 
--some cases of "raton loco" (redirecting voters to other 
JRVs because they do not appear on the JRV list); 
 
--last-minute changes in JRV locations; and, 
 
--protests over non-delivery of cedulas (he noted most cedula 
delivery problems have occurred in Boaco, Leon/Chinandega, 
and Matagalpa/Jinotega areas). 
 
Major problems: 
 
--probable failures in vote data transmissions (the CSE has 
admitted that its preliminary tests thus far have been flawed 
due both to incompatible equipment and poorly trained 
personnel who are not properly handling fax and scanning 
equipment); 
 
--waves of systematic vote result challenges (impugnaciones) 
by losing parties at particular JRVs; and, 
 
--early declaration of victory by one candidate followed by 
denunciations of fraud; and, 
 
--marked differences between quick count and CSE results. 
 
5.  (C) Fernandez remarked that if the OAS detects serious 
irregularities during any stage of the electoral process, it 
will issue a statement to the effect that it is "analyzing 
the situation to determine whether or not the election is 
legitimate." 
 
VOTE FRAUD - MANIPULATIONS MORE LIKELY FOR ASSEMBLY SEATS 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
6.  (C) Regarding allegations we are hearing that the CSE 
will manipulate vote results at its central computation 
center (see October 30 and November 1 updates), Fernandez 
noted that the observers and the quick count would uncover 
major manipulations.  However, he admitted that minor changes 
affecting the results of the National Assembly seats would be 
harder to detect. 
 
NICA DEMOCRACY WILL PROGRESS REGARDLESS OF THE OUTCOME, BUT 
IF MONTEALEGRE WINS, HE WILL FACE A BATTLE FROM THE START 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
- - - - - - - - 
 
7.  (C) In Fernandez's view, regardless of outcome of 
Nicaragua's November 5 elections, its democracy will advance 
to some degree, as the new National Assembly will include 
members of Nicaragua's emerging parties.  However, he warned 
that the implementation of Nicaragua's constitutional changes 
eroding the power of the executive (effective January 20, 
2007) will seriously limit Eduardo Montealegre's ability to 
govern if he wins the election. 
 
COMMENT 
- - - - 
 
8.  (C) The FSLN-dominated CSE could exploit the expectations 
that data transmission interruptions and delays will occur to 
allow early results to enter from areas favoring FSLN 
candidate Daniel Ortega, who in turn could use these results 
as justification to declare early victory.  And, at polling 
tables where Ortega and/or Liberal Constitutional Party (PLC) 
candidate Jose Rizo are weak, contesting these results 
(impugnaciones) could eliminate votes that favor competitors 
Eduardo Montealegre and Edmundo Jarquin of the Nicaraguan 
Liberal Alliance (ALN) and the Sandinista Renovation Movement 
(MRS), respectively.  While the FSLN appears to possess the 
muscle to assert victory (on 01 November, FSLN militants 
virtually paralyzed Managua for hours as they took control of 
all of the city's major traffic circles and choke points), 
 
the National Police Commissioner Aminta Granera tells us that 
the police only have enough tear gas and rubber bullets to 
deal with election-related violence for two days. 
TRIVELLI