VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMU #2434/01 3060038
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 020038Z NOV 06
FM AMEMBASSY MANAGUA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8099
INFO RUEHZA/WHA CENTRAL AMERICAN COLLECTIVE
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 0798
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC

C O N F I D E N T I A L MANAGUA 002434 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR WHA/CEN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/31/2016 
TAGS: EAID KDEM NU PGOV PINR PREL
SUBJECT: DORA MARIA TELLEZ CONCERNED ABOUT FRAUD, POSSIBLE 
FSLN GOVERNMENT 
 
REF: MANAGUA 001031 05 APRIL 2004 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Paul A. Trivelli. Reasons 1.4 (B,D). 
 
¶1.  (C) SUMMARY:  Sandinista Renovation Movement (MRS) 
National Assembly deputy candidate Dora Maria Tellez is 
concerned about election fraud and the possibility of a 
Sandinista Liberation Front (FSLN) victory.  She believes 
that the FSLN will resort to fraud to ensure a first-round 
victory for Daniel Ortega.  Tellez, a long-time critic of 
U.S.G. policies, also told emboffs that she would be 
interested in encouraging dialogue between MRS members and 
the United States.  END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2.  (C) During a meeting Polcouns and Poloff, MRS spokesman 
Israel Lewites and National Assembly deputy candidate Dora 
Maria Tellez said that they do not believe the FSLN can win 
fairly, but are certain that the FSLN is prepared to commit 
electoral fraud to steal a victory.  Tellez claimed that the 
MRS will warn the FSLN that if it steals the election, the 
MRS will "take to the streets," opining that this is the 
"only kind of message Ortega understands." 
 
¶3.  (C) Tellez posits several types of potential fraud. 
(NOTE:  During the campaign, Tellez has also made public 
statements accusing the FSLN of working with the Liberal 
Constitutional Party (PLC) and the Supreme Electoral Council 
(CSE) to mount massive election fraud using widespread vote 
result changes (impugnaciones). END NOTE)  According to the 
scenario she envisions, the FSLN and the PLC will take 
advantage of the confusion over proper dispute procedure to 
annul JRVs in areas where the two parties are losing, or 
polling at a low level.  Tellez accused the FSLN of securing 
two positions on many JRVs throughout the country by 
registering FSLN loyalists for the JRV posing as AC members 
-- if true, such registrations would grant the FSLN two of 
the three spots on a JRV. (COMMENT: We have heard and 
reported before that AC candidate Eden Pastora may be 
Ortega's "Trojan horse," that many of his JRV officials are 
FSLN members and will side with the FSLN in the event of any 
dispute on election day. END COMMENT) 
 
¶4.  (C) Tellez also says that she is aware of an FSLN plan to 
nullify 4 or 5 ballots for the MRS at each voting center 
(JRV).  She believes the same is planned for Nicaraguan 
Liberal Alliance (ALN) ballots.  In this way, the FSLN could 
eliminate 10 MRS/ALN votes per JRV for a total of about 
100,000 votes, enough to give Ortega the lead he needs to 
win.  Tellez and Lewites claim that FSLN, PLC and AC party 
poll watchers (fiscales) are being instructed to nullify the 
ballots (which they note could easily be done by smearing a 
few with ink). 
 
¶5.  (C) Tellez and Lewites also admitted that recent (and now 
discontinued) MRS ads and statements have targeted 
Montealegre in an effort to differentiate the MRS from the 
ALN.  Lewites believes that the MRS can still whittle away 
some of the FSLN vote by emphasizing the differences between 
the two parties and pointing out the MRS, Sandinista 
heritage and "leftist approach" to social issues and social 
justice.  Lewites admitted, however, that Edmundo Jarquin 
opposes any kind of attack on the ALN, no matter how 
carefully done.  (NOTE:  Since our meeting with Tellez, 
Jarquin and Montealegre met again and renewed their prior 
agreement not to attack one another and the MRS ads 
criticizing Montealegre have disappeared.  END NOTE) 
 
¶6.  (C) Tellez and Lewites voiced concern over the impact of 
Jarquin,s statements in support of therapeutic abortion 
(defined in Nicaragua as an abortion performed when the life 
of the mother is at risk).  They believe the Jarquin's stance 
on the issue may have lost him potential MRS voters.  Both 
Lewites and Tellez are also concerned about the other 
parties, vehement anti-abortion stance. 
 
COMMENT 
- - - - 
 
¶7. (C) This first meeting with Tellez was an opportunity to 
hear from a more "hard-line" member of the MRS.  Tellez has 
often been critical of U.S. policies, but showed an apparent 
openness to discuss issues with emboffs and to pursue future 
meetings.  Tellez began the session by quizzing emboffs on 
their backgrounds and then relating stories about her family, 
and "loosened up" as the meeting progressed.  A lively 
story-teller, Tellez is also brutally frank when discussing 
 
politics and her opinions.  Tellez, who says she has a cousin 
in the United States and a nephew fighting in Iraq, stated 
that she does not have an issue with the United States, but 
believes that Nicaraguans often manipulate Americans to do 
"their dirty work." END COMMENT. 
 
BIOGRAPHIC INFORMATION 
- - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶8.  (SBU) Tellez, a key "commandante" of the FSLN, served as 
minister of health under the FSLN and later became a member 
of the Sandinistas' National Directorate.  Tellez was the 
third ranking commander (known as Commandante Dos) of the 
August 22, 1978 attack on the National Palace and the 
principal negotiator for the FSLN during the crisis.  She 
broke away from FSLN leader Daniel Ortega in the 1990s and 
formed the Sandinista Renovation Movement (MRS).  Others 
joined her as discontent grew within the FSLN after the 1990 
"pinata" and Ortega's continued electoral defeats during that 
decade. 
 
¶9.  (C) Tellez is a key member of Edmundo Jarquin's campaign 
team -- part of a core group that includes Jarquin's wife, 
campaign manager Luis Carrion, Victor Hugo Tinoco, Alberto 
Cortes, members of the Greenberg consulting firm, and 
Lewites. 
 
¶10.  (C) In the years prior to 1993, Tellez was classified as 
a terrorist for her role in the takeover of the National 
Palace (septel) and therefore ineligible for a U.S. visa. 
Post reviewed individuals under this classification and she 
was deemed eligible for a visa.  However, in April 2004, 
after post took a closer look at her history, Tellez was 
refused a visa to attend language training in San Diego under 
the new terrorist definition in 212 (a)(3)(B). 
TRIVELLI