VZCZCXRO2284
RR RUEHAG RUEHDF RUEHIK RUEHLZ RUEHROV
DE RUEHMD #2853/01 3111649
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 071649Z NOV 06
FM AMEMBASSY MADRID
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1270
INFO RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE
RUEHKV/AMEMBASSY KYIV 0001
RUEHMJ/AMEMBASSY MAJURO 0001
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 0773
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 0661
RHMFIUU/HQ USAFE RAMSTEIN AB GE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0251
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 0827
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 1441
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA 0042
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RHMCSUU/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 MADRID 002853 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/WE, OES/STC, AND EB/ESC/IEC; DOE FOR DR. 
PATRICIA WORTHINGTON AND MOHANDAS BHAT 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PARM MNUC SENV
SUBJECT: SPAIN AND U.S. COOPERATING TO REMEDIATE RADIATION 
CONTAMINATION FROM 1966 NUCLEAR ACCIDENT 
 
MADRID 00002853  001.2 OF 005 
 
 
------- 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
¶1.  (SBU)  The U.S., through the Department of Energy (DOE), 
is closely cooperating with Spanish counterparts to address 
radiation contamination left in southern Spain after a U.S. 
Air Force (USAF) nuclear accident 40 years ago.  What could 
have turned into a public relations nightmare has actually 
evolved into almost a good news story highlighting the close 
cooperation between two Allies.  DOE is helping Spain to 
prepare the first comprehensive study of remaining radiation 
contamination and will then enter into discussions with GOS 
entities over possible remediation cooperation.  DOE action 
to date has advanced USG policy interests vis-a-vis Spain and 
should be commended.  END SUMMARY. 
 
--------------------------------------- 
INTRODUCTION - HISTORY OF PALOMARES 101 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (U)  On January 17, 1966, a USAF nuclear-armed B-52 
collided with a USAF tanker aircraft during a refueling 
operation in the air above the Andalucian coastline between 
the cities of Almeria and Murcia.  The non-nuclear detonation 
of two of the four weapons that fell to the ground resulted 
in the dispersal of plutonium contamination across 558 acres 
of Spanish coastline near the village of Palomares.  DOD, 
working with Spanish authorities, handled the initial U.S. 
remediation efforts, scraping off a 1.6 million ton layer of 
the contaminated soil (generally to the depth of about 5 
centimeters) and shipping it back to the U.S., where it was 
buried on the grounds of the DOE Savannah River Site in 
Georgia.  The area, which was sparsely populated at the time 
of the accident, was considered remediated to then extant 
standards. 
 
¶3.  (U)  Later in 1966, DOD turned the "Palomares Program" 
over to DOE.  The legal basis for DOE's involvement was the 
"Hall-Otero" agreement, signed on February 25, 1966 by the 
U.S. Atomic Energy Commission Assistant General Manager for 
International Activities John A. Hall and the Spanish 
President of the Nuclear Energy Board Jose Maria Otero 
Navascues.  It is important to note that while this agreement 
committed DOE to funding a research project to "investigate 
various health and safety aspects of fissionable materials 
when released into a rural agricultural environment," it did 
not/not commit DOE to fund any radiation remediation 
activity.  Instead DOE agreed to "provide support in the form 
of technical assistance and advice and specialized equipment 
and materials not readily available to the Board." 
 
¶4.  (U)  Since 1966, DOE has funded (generally about USD 
300,000 a year) GOS efforts to monitor the area and track the 
health of local inhabitants.  The GOS, partially due to an 
emerging real estate boom along the entire Spanish coast that 
was quickly turning Palomares into a community densely packed 
with British retirees, decided in 2001 to take a new set of 
measurements to determine the extent of remaining radiation 
contamination near Palomares.  The results led the GOS to 
believe that the remaining contamination might/might be more 
serious than heretofore believed. 
 
----------------------------- 
BOTH SIDES "REOPEN" PALOMARES 
----------------------------- 
 
¶5.  (SBU)  Just as the GOS was "reopening" Palomares via 
stepped-up monitoring, DOE was coming to the conclusion that 
after almost forty years of U.S. support for post-accident 
monitoring, it was time to consider winding down its 
Palomares Program.  Thus, after a several decade long period 
 
MADRID 00002853  002.2 OF 005 
 
 
of hibernation, Palomares returned to the radar screens of 
both sides (albeit for different reasons). 
 
¶6.  (SBU)  Following the 2004 Spanish national elections, the 
eminent Spanish nuclear physicist Juan Antonio Rubio was 
asked to return from Geneva, where he was working at CERN, to 
take charge of the Education and Science Ministry's Center 
for Energy, Environment and Technology Investigation 
(CIEMAT).  CIEMAT has the GOS lead on Palomares.  In 
mid-2005, then DOE Assistant Secretary for Environment, 
Safety, and Health John Shaw decided to visit CIEMAT and 
Palomares before taking action on a recommendation to 
terminate DOE's Palomares program.  Shaw's September 2005 
encounter with Rubio opened a new era in the Palomares 
Program. 
 
----------------- 
TWO PEAS IN A POD 
----------------- 
 
¶7.  (SBU)  Juan Antonio Rubio quickly turned CIEMAT upside 
down and reinvigorated a somewhat moribund institution.  He 
came to the conclusion that the GOS' Palomares Project had 
turned into a sort of jobs program, with staff prepared to 
continue monitoring forever.  Rubio, however, sought closure 
and seized upon the recent data suggesting the contamination 
might be more serious than previously expected to bolster his 
bureaucratic case.  He decided that he would make "final 
cleanup" of Palomares one of his major priorities during his 
tenure as CIEMAT Director General. 
 
¶8.  (SBU)  When then DOE A/S John Shaw arrived in Madrid in 
September 2005 seeking his own form of closure on Palomares, 
he quickly realized that his audacious and energetic Spanish 
counterpart also wanted to wind down Palomares, albeit via a 
final joint clean up vice a unilateral DOE termination of its 
involvement. 
 
---------------- 
A DEAL IS STRUCK 
---------------- 
 
¶9.  (SBU)  Shaw's September 2005 visit to Palomares charted a 
new course.  Shaw determined that the intensive development 
of this previously underpopulated, rural (and potentially 
contaminated) backwater required renewed DOE assistance and 
that DOE could not walk away from Palomares. 
 
¶10.  (SBU)  During and following Shaw's visit, a deal was cut 
with Rubio and CIEMAT.  DOE would help pay for (and provide 
technical assistance to) a CIEMAT effort to develop a 
world-class radiological map detailing the extent and nature 
of the remaining radiation contamination at Palomares.  Once 
the map revealed the nature of the problem, the two sides 
would then negotiate a "final clean up" plan.  Shaw did not 
formally commit to DOE funding of any eventual clean up 
effort, but it was implicit that DOE would stay on the scene 
in one way or another until Palomares was clean.  In return, 
Shaw received Rubio's commitment of full GOS support for DOE 
terminating the Palomares Program following final clean up. 
The DOE commitment to help pay for CIEMAT'S radiological map 
was enshrined in an MOU signed by Shaw and Rubio in February, 
2006 (just prior to Shaw's departure from government 
service). 
 
----------------------- 
IRONING OUT THE DETAILS 
----------------------- 
 
¶11.  (SBU)  Following Shaw's landmark September 2005 visit, 
CIEMAT moved into high gear to develop the methodology (and 
buy the equipment it would need) to prepare the radiological 
 
MADRID 00002853  003.2 OF 005 
 
 
map.  Meanwhile, in May 2005, DOE dispatched a second 
delegation to Madrid/CIEMAT and Palomares led by then Deputy 
Assistant Secretary for Health Steve Cary.  Cary brought with 
him two of the United States' leading experts on radiation 
remediation, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory 
scientists Robin Newmark and Terry Hamilton.  This visit 
greatly helped CIEMAT to establish its map methodology and 
initiated a fruitful conversation on the technical assistance 
DOE could offer during the map's preparation. 
 
¶12.  (SBU)  DOE experienced a significant reorganization in 
early September 2006 and control of the Palomares Program 
passed to the Office of International Health Studies.  The 
Director of this office, Dr. Gerry Petersen, emerged as the 
lead DOE official for the Palomares Program.  Petersen 
decided to travel to Madrid/Palomares during his second week 
in his new position.  Newmark returned with Petersen.  Their 
discussions served to reaffirm DOE's post-reorganization 
commitment to Palomares and allowed further DOE fine-tuning 
of CIEMAT's almost finalized plans for the radiological map. 
 
------------------------- 
MONEY AND VISITS ARE NEXT 
------------------------- 
 
¶13.  (SBU)  CIEMAT has expropriated the most contaminated 
lands in Palomares, and will soon fence them off and begin 
the sampling that will provide the data for the radiological 
map.  (Note:  CIEMAT has possession of the land, even though 
the amount of compensation they have to pay is hung up in the 
Spanish court system.  End Note)  CIEMAT, however, has not 
yet finalized their overall cost estimate for the map.  DOE 
has committed to "share" the cost of the map, but "share" was 
not defined in the February 2006 MOU.  At the time the MOU 
was signed, it was decided that once the DOE "share" was 
negotiated, this financial commitment would be delineated in 
an annex to the MOU. 
 
¶14. (SBU)  DOE has invited Juan Antonio Rubio to visit 
Washington and Lawrence Livermore National laboratory. 
Initially the trip was linked to the signing of the annex of 
the MOU.  But given CIEMAT's delay in developing an overall 
map cost estimate, it was decided during Peterson's September 
2006 visit that Rubio would be invited to travel to the U.S. 
in early 2007 (not withstanding when the financial annex to 
the MOU will be signed). 
 
------------------- 
WHERE ARE WE GOING? 
------------------- 
 
¶15.  (SBU)  Once the map is costed out, the DOE cost share 
determined, the sampling finished, and the map actually 
prepared (perhaps by 2008), the next big step will be to meet 
bilaterally to determine what the map reveals about the 
extent of remaining radiation contamination, and what needs 
to be done to remediate it.  This stage is particularly 
sensitive, as DOE has made no/no formal commitment to help 
fund any possible CIEMAT radiation remediation effort. 
However, it is very/very clear that CIEMAT expects that the 
USG will agree to help pay for any possible remediation. 
Should DOE decide not to fund any such remediation effort, 
DOE and the Embassy will have to work closely to develop a 
damage control strategy, as the U.S. would be skewered in the 
press on this issue (e.g., a good friend and Ally should 
clean up its own nuclear mess).  Given that the 1966 
"Hall-Otero Agreement" did not/not commit DOE to funding 
remediation efforts, and the fact that the accident was a 
military one, we may want to explore the possibility of U.S. 
military funding for any eventual remediation efforts. 
 
¶16.  (SBU)  If remediation is addressed in a mutually 
 
MADRID 00002853  004.2 OF 005 
 
 
satisfactory fashion, CIEMAT, working with local and regional 
authorities, is considering opening a museum/study center on 
the site of one of the two bomb impact sites.  If this comes 
to fruition, DOE and DOD/USAF will almost certainly be 
contacted to provide exhibition materials.  The tentative 
concept would be full transparency about the accident, a 
monument to bilateral efforts to address it, and a broader 
expose of how radiation contamination can be mitigated. 
 
--------------------- 
EMBASSY MADRID'S ROLE 
--------------------- 
 
¶17.  (SBU)  Embassy Madrid's ESTHOFF has spent a significant 
amount of time on Palomares-related issues since the fall of 
¶2004.  When first approached by DOE in the fall of 2004, 
ESTHOFF urged DOE not to unilaterally terminate its Palomares 
Program and to instead come visit and discuss such a 
possibility with CIEMAT.  ESTHOFF then convinced CIEMAT 
Director General Rubio that DOE could be willing the continue 
the Palomares Program for a few more years in return for 
CIEMAT agreeing to a final program termination date.  This 
strategy was pursued during the September 2005 visit to 
Madrid by then A/S Shaw and then approved in the February 
2006 MOU.  ESTHOFF planned all three high level DOE visits 
(September 2005, May 2006 and September 2006), accompanied 
the DOE delegations during all their meetings with CIEMAT in 
Madrid, and traveled all three times with DOE down to 
Palomares.  ESTHOFF also ensured the support of the Mayor of 
Palomares and, working with DOE, made sure that the Mayor 
received VIP treatment during personal travel to Washington 
in late 2005.  The Mayor, who could have posed insurmountable 
obstacles to bilateral cooperation, is now fully supportive 
of DOE/Embassy efforts.  In the periods between the DOE 
visits, ESTHOFF has helped DOE stay in close and continuous 
contact with CIEMAT, nudging the project along whenever it 
hit obstacles. 
 
-------------- 
MEDIA INTEREST 
-------------- 
 
¶18.  (SBU)  Outside an occasional innocuous reference in the 
local and (rarely) national press, Palomares generally stayed 
out of the news in Spain.  This changed following the 
September 2006 visit of Palomares Program Leader Dr. Gerry 
Petersen.  "El Pais," Spain's most prestigious daily 
newspaper (which is close to the ruling Socialist Party), got 
wind of DOE's agreement to fund map preparation and 
approached both DOE and CIEMAT for comment.  DOE correctly 
referred the paper to CIEMAT which, after consulting with 
ESTHOFF, decided to opt for full transparency.  The result 
was a front page lead story on October 8, followed by an 
editorial on October 21.  Both were factual, only included 
minor inaccuracies, and in general portrayed the bilateral 
cooperation in a positive light.  Press interest in Palomares 
has since increased, but this has not had any negative impact 
on bilateral cooperation.  Since there is nothing to hide, 
and indeed a good story to tell about Allies cooperating 
closely, press interest has arguably been a net positive. 
 
------- 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶19.  (SBU)  When Palomares is "done," it has the potential to 
illustrate how close friends and Allies came together to 
finally rid Spain of the legacy of an unfortunate nuclear 
accident 40 years ago.  What at first glance many would want 
to bury, could actually be unearthed and highlighted as an 
example of bilateral cooperation in an non-traditional area. 
Should the remediation issue be addressed in a mutually 
 
MADRID 00002853  005.2 OF 005 
 
 
satisfactory way, Embassy Madrid would hope that the State 
Department, DOD/USAF and DOE, would work closely together 
with CIEMAT and local and regional authorities on their 
efforts to "memorialize" the accident via a museum/study 
center. 
 
¶20.  (U)  This cable was cleared by DOE. 
AGUIRRE