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Viewing cable 06LIMA4366, REGIONAL/MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS: APATHY, LOCALISM

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06LIMA4366 2006-11-14 22:16 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Lima
VZCZCXYZ0003
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHPE #4366/01 3182216
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 142216Z NOV 06
FM AMEMBASSY LIMA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 2982
INFO RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA 4097
RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 7082
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 9918
RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ NOV QUITO 0814
RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO 0936
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RUMIAAA/CDR USCINCSO MIAMI FL
UNCLAS LIMA 004366 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PINR PHUM VE PE
SUBJECT: REGIONAL/MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS: APATHY, LOCALISM 
DOMINATE IN SOUTH, TOO 
 
REF: LIMA 4271 
 
-------- 
Summary: 
-------- 
 
1.  (SBU) Regional and municipal elections have failed to 
spark much enthusiasm in the key southern regions of Arequipa 
and Ayacucho, where voters appear stricken with "election 
fatigue."  A plethora of local movements and candidates 
pursuing often narrow regional and local platforms 
predominates, fragmenting the political landscape.  Neither 
Ollanta Humala's Peruvian Nationalist Party (PNP) nor the 
governing APRA party are likely to do well in the upcoming 
races, with Humala's prospects in his former southern 
strongholds particularly dim.  While democratic participation 
should be high, a multitude of local leaders representing 
diverse groups and elected with narrow pluralities could 
complicate governance.  End Summary. 
 
---------------------------- 
Election Fatigue Dogs Voters 
---------------------------- 
 
2.  (SBU) Voters in the key southern regions of Arequipa and 
Ayacucho are stricken with the nationwide phenomenon of 
"election fatigue," following general elections in April and 
the critical presidential run-off in June, according to a 
variety of local observers interviewed by Poloffs during 
November visits to both areas.  For this reason, although 
campaigns have entered the final phase and colorful candidate 
posters line the streets of the two provincial capitals, an 
air of mild indifference regarding the upcoming vote is 
palpable. 
 
3.  (SBU) Som of this quiescence has to do with the 
perceived low nationwide stakes of the regional and municipal 
balloting.  Local candidates and local political movements 
pursuing often narrowly local platforms predominate, which 
tends to underscore the geographically limited consequences 
of the vote.  While some, including the likely winner of the 
Arequipa regional presidency Manuel Guillen and many 
candidates in Ayacucho, have radical political affiliations, 
the provincial focus of the debate tends to level ideological 
differences.  That is, when they talk about the issues that 
move local voters -- better roads, water, sewage, jobs, etc. 
-- most candidates sound about the same. 
 
4.  (SBU) Moreover, party or group affiliation is in most 
cases decidedly secondary to the merits or electoral 
prospects of the individual candidates.  In Arequipa, the PNP 
candidate for mayor is a former Fujimorista with strong local 
name recognition and a good track record at the municipal 
level.  In Ayacucho, Clelia de Verbist of the pro-business 
NGO Center for Competitiveness told Poloff that nine 
organizations had asked her to be their candidate for 
Regional President, including one with connections to Sendero 
Luminoso.  She declined, noting that these requests reflected 
the shortage of credible local leaders and the willingness of 
power-seeking groups to sign on anyone with name-recognition. 
 
------------------------ 
Neither Ollanta Nor APRA 
------------------------ 
 
5.  (SBU) While both Arequipa and Ayacucho awarded pro-Chavez 
radical candidate Ollanta Humala overwhelming landslides this 
past June (64 percent and 83 percent respectively), support 
for Humala's Peruvian Nationalist Party (PNP) appears to have 
evaporated in both these areas since that time.  For one, the 
UPP and PNP are each fielding separate candidates in both 
regions.  Other leftist groups that had coalesced around 
Humala in the national elections are also running their own 
candidates.  That Humala tried to found a new movement in 
addition to his PNP party has further undermined his 
electoral prospects (Ref A).  Most observers agree that 
Humala is not a factor in these elections, and to the extent 
that his party wins in either region it will be thanks to the 
candidates' track record and standing in the community, not 
for his or her ideological affinity or political connection 
with the radical almost-president. 
 
6.  (SBU) APRA will likely be swamped by similar local and 
 
regional tides.  In Ayacucho, Garcia's party leads narrowly 
in the race for the regional presidency, with incumbent Omar 
Quesada, but elsewhere the party is not poised to do well. 
In Arequipa, the incumbent regional president who represents 
APRA is running a distant third in polls, and the incumbent 
APRA mayor is not running at all (thanks to a party 
injunction).  Many observers believe President Garcia does 
not mind the prospect of working with non-APRA regional and 
local leaders, and some suspect he would prefer to do so for 
several reasons: he can blame inevitable local and regional 
governance problems on non-APRA groups; he can successfully 
co-opt local leaders with national government favors and 
support; and he can maintain his position as the party's sole 
center of gravity. 
 
------------------- 
Too Much Democracy? 
------------------- 
 
7.  (SBU) Rules that make it easy for groups to launch 
candidacies -- candidates for regional president need the 
signatures of just 1 percent of the voters in the previous 
election; candidates for district mayorships require only 500 
signatures -- have unleashed a wide and diverse array of 
competitors on the electorate.  But they have also 
facilitated a blistering fragmentation of representation in 
both regions, where many voters have trouble recognizing who 
is who and what the multiple different candidates represent. 
This could make effective governance difficult, since it 
virtually guarantees that eventual winners will neither 
garner majorities, and at times win with threadbare 
pluralities, nor enjoy solid governing mandates. 
STRUBLE