VZCZCXRO3962
PP RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #2709/01 3241441
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 201441Z NOV 06
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5296
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUEHRN/USMISSION UN ROME

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 002709 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
STATE FOR AF/SPG, PRM, AND ALSO PASS USAID/W 
USAID FOR DCHA SUDAN TEAM, AFR/SP 
NAIROBI FOR USAID/DCHA/OFDA, USAID/REDSO, AND FAS 
GENEVA FOR NKYLOH 
NAIROBI FOR SFO 
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU 
NSC FOR PMARCHAM, MMAGAN, TSHORTLEY 
USUN FOR TMALY 
BRUSSELS FOR PLERNER 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL EAID PHUM PREF SOCI PGOV KAWC UN SU
SUBJECT: Darfur - UN USYG Egeland Warns of Worsening Situation 
 
REF: Khartoum 2694 
 
KHARTOUM 00002709  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: Despite the strong efforts of the non-governmental 
organization (NGO) community and the commitment of the donor 
community, the humanitarian situation in Darfur is poised to 
deteriorate, according to Jan Egeland, UN Under Secretary General 
for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator.  Egeland 
briefed the donor community on November 18, at the end of his trip, 
which was cut short by restrictions on his travel in Darfur. 
Egeland expressed fears over growing insecurity, a lack of civilian 
protection, and Sudanese government limits on the activities of 
humanitarian organizations.  He also briefly discussed the Southern 
Sudan leg of his trip (reftel).  Egeland characterized the African 
Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) as an impotent force that is seen by 
the affected populations in Darfur as a party to the conflict and 
not a neutral arbiter.  Egeland stated the one breakthrough was the 
recent agreement in Addis Ababa.  Charge d'Affaires (CDA) Cameron 
Hume, however, emphasized that the international community must keep 
pushing.  Hume explained it is likely the Sudanese government will 
step back from at least part of the agreement, will be slow to 
implement what it agreed to, and is likely buying time to try to 
finish its military solution.  End Summary. 
 
----------------------- 
Situation on the Ground 
----------------------- 
 
¶2. (SBU) Egeland stated that while the indicators are currently good 
in the camps for internally displaced persons (IDPs) due to the 
extremely effective work of the NGOs and one of the best resourced 
responses by the donor community, the security situation is even 
worse than in September 2004, with now more than 4 million people 
affected.  He noted that all the hard work is at risk because of 
rising insecurity hampering the delivery of aid, a civilian 
population that is almost completely without protection from 
attacks, and a government that continues to block the operation of 
NGOs.  Egeland emphasized that donor support needed to increase in 
2007 because the worsening security situation, with 95 percent of 
roads declared "no go," would require more aid to be delivered by 
helicopter. 
 
¶3. (SBU) The Government of National Unity's (GNU) Humanitarian 
Affairs Minister Kosti Manibe told Egeland during the trip that the 
moratorium on NGO restrictions would be extended.  However, Egeland 
stated that the non-issuance of travel and work permits, 
non-application of the UN Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), and the 
new NGO legislation are seriously hindering NGOs.  He indicated that 
a third of the staff of many NGOs operating in West Darfur is stuck 
in Khartoum, while another third is in Darfur illegally.  Egeland 
also cited the 25-mile restriction placed on Americans as a serious 
problem. 
 
¶4. (U) Sudan's UN Humanitarian Affairs Representative, Manual da 
Silva, added that the NGO Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) was 
recently given 72 hours to turn over all its equipment, including 
computers and vehicles, to the Sudanese government.  Da Silva 
requested a strong, joint demarche from the donor community on this 
issue. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
Camps Could Become Battleground, AMIS Not Helping 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
¶5. (SBU) Egeland also noted that many IDP camps around El Geneina, 
West Darfur, were controlled by armed opposition groups, and camps 
throughout Darfur were simultaneously seeing more weapons on the 
inside and being surrounded by militia groups.  However, Egeland was 
not able to see as many camps as he would have liked because the 
Sudanese government restricted him from visiting Tawila, Jebel 
Marra, and Kabkabiya, citing security concerns.  In Kabkabiya, 
Egeland had planned to meet Janjaweed leader Musa Hilal. 
 
¶6. (U) Meanwhile, Egeland stated that AMIS is completely ineffective 
and is seen as a party to the conflict.  He said that selective 
enforcement of patrols and other actions have led Darfurians to 
question AMIS' neutrality.  Egeland indicated that the AMIS force 
was much more effective in 2005, when it had one-half of its current 
forces and one-fifth of its present logistics. 
 
¶7. (SBU) Egeland noted that the attack on Sirba, West Darfur, was 
particularly disturbing.  The fighting took place only a few hundred 
 
KHARTOUM 00002709  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
meters from AMIS troops, but the peacekeeping forces did not go to 
the battle site until after the situation had calmed and then 
refused to stay to protect the remaining civilian population. 
Meanwhile, the Sudanese government indicated it was only conducting 
military operations against rebel fighters and not civilians, 
although eyewitness accounts contradicted this. 
 
--------------------------------------------- 
CDA: Addis Ababa Agreement Only the Beginning 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
¶8. (SBU) Egeland indicated that the sole bright spot on the trip was 
the agreement reached in Addis Ababa to bolster AMIS forces with UN 
support.  CDA Hume underlined that the international community needs 
to keep pushing and not assume that anything has yet been resolved. 
He pointed out that President Bashir had agreed to an initial "lite" 
package two months ago and nothing had happened yet.  Hume stated he 
expected the Sudanese government to back away from parts of the 
agreement and be extremely slow in implementing what it had agreed 
to do.  Once the government does accept a heavier package, it will 
likely not be the 17,000 troops called for in UNSCR 1706, Hume 
explained.  And even then, it will take several months to actually 
deploy the troops. 
 
¶9. (SBU) Hume pointed out that over the past six months President 
Bashir has been determined to complete his military solution in 
Darfur.  During that time, the Sudanese government has been 
frustrating all political attempts at resolving the crisis.  This 
includes stalling efforts to organize a non-signatory commander's 
conference in Darfur.  Hume noted that there is also evidence that 
Bashir has given Musa Hilal the "go ahead" to start attacking IDP 
camps. 
 
HUME