Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 64621 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 06KHARTOUM2626, Darfur: Text of Wali Kibir Interview

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #06KHARTOUM2626.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06KHARTOUM2626 2006-11-06 15:28 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Khartoum
VZCZCXRO0761
PP RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #2626/01 3101528
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 061528Z NOV 06
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5146
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KHARTOUM 002626 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: PGOV KPKO PHUM PREF SU
SUBJECT:  Darfur:  Text of Wali Kibir Interview 
 
 
1. (SBU) On November 5, the Sudan Vision daily published an 
interview of North Darfur State Wali (governor) Sayed Osman Yousif 
Kibir.  In the interview, Wali Kibir reiterated the importance of 
the Darfur Peace Agreement, which he states does not need to be 
re-opened but rather supplemented to bring on board additional rebel 
groups.  He also discusses the expansion of the North Darfur State 
cabinet and legislative assembly to incorporate additional members 
in keeping with the DPA.  Kibir, regrettably, downplays the 
significance of the Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and Consultation process 
and the extent of violence that continues in North Darfur.  He 
regards the return of internally displaced persons (IDPs) to their 
home villages as being delayed for political reasons, and accuses 
the UN and its member agencies of being used as a tool by others. 
Finally, he finds favor with continued African Union efforts to 
address the security situation in Darfur, rather than a more 
international effort. 
 
2. (U) The text of the interview is as follows: 
 
(Begin text) 
 
Interviewed by: Nasr Addeen Al Tahir and Mona Al Bashir of Sudan 
Vision Daily 
 
Situations in Darfur are being focused on presently by, all local, 
regional and international circles.  Much talk is consequently 
circulated about this issue in the form of rumours by circles who 
have their own agenda and interests. 
 
To get information about the Darfur situation from Darfur itself, 
Sudan Vision had to interview some personalities who are directly in 
contact with the real situations in Darfur.  One of these was North 
Darfur State Governor, Sayed Osman Yousif Kibir.  We related 
hereunder our interview with him. 
 
Q:  Mr. Osman Yousif Kibir, Governor of North Darfur State let us 
begin by discussing progress on implementation of the DPA and the 
steps taken so far. 
 
A:  First let me state that the Abuja agreement was the best 
available option at the time as failure of the Abuja 7 talks would 
have undoubtedly meant a return to war.  The Abuja agreement is 
solid which is not to say perfect as it needs complementation in our 
view.  Opinion regarding the DPA can be divided into three main 
categories:  full support, reservation, and objection. This tended 
to create an atmosphere of disruption and rumors with each of the 
three groups propagating those rumors and allegations which best 
served their interests.  This has been addressed through an 
extensive informative campaign to clarify the terms of the 
agreement.  A number of relevant decisions have been made and a 
higher implementation committee and several technical subcommittees 
have been formed including a committee for summarizing the contents 
of the 115-page long agreement of which about a thousand copies have 
been distributed.  A state-wide tour was conducted with the aim of 
enlightening and winning support for the agreement which created a 
degree of stability and security in all regions with very few 
exceptions namely in regions which are exposed to attack by the 
Redemption Front.  We can safely assert that significant progress 
has been made security-wise and that overall the agreement is 
steadily moving ahead. 
 
Q:  You stated that the agreement needs complementing, which aspects 
do you recognize as deficient and what are your proposals? 
 
A:  For the sake of accuracy and in order to avoid misunderstanding, 
let me clearly state that we do not believe that the agreement needs 
reconsideration.  Some appendices have to be made to accommodate 
non-signing factions. 
 
Q:  Has contact been made with these non-signatories? 
 
A:  The truth of the matter is that we presently have a delegation 
engaged in discussions with these factions and I personally make 
contact with their representatives several times a day.  Several 
civil administration delegations have conferred with these factions 
on more than one occasion and we can confidently state that there 
are common grounds and understanding which may well lead to positive 
outcomes. 
 
Q:  In relation to Al Fashir state constitution, has it been passed 
and have amendments been made to accommodate the SLM share in power? 
 
 
A:  This has been accomplished very early on and required amendments 
were forwarded to and approved by the National Constitutional 
Committee.  We are now ready to fully implement the agreement which 
has been incorporated into the National Constitution.  The number of 
state ministries has been amended to (10) ministries and Legislative 
Assembly membership was expanded from 71 to 73 members. 
 
Q:  We would like a practical rebuttal of the talk circulating with 
 
KHARTOUM 00002626  002 OF 003 
 
 
regard to the sluggish implementation of the agreement and claims of 
deteriorating security within the state. 
 
A:  Technically speaking and in relation to timetables specified by 
the agreement, there is a delay in implementation.  This delay was 
intended to provide an opportunity to those who have not signed to 
reconsider their position and to allow for needed readjustments and 
accommodations.  We are proceeding slowly but surely. 
 
Q:  What are the steps following the formation of the transitional 
authority? 
 
A:  As state authorities, we have no role in this aspect.  Some 
posts have to be filled by both sides and this will be supervised by 
the implementing committee. 
 
Q:  Will some ministers be required to leave office? 
 
A:  No.  According to the state constitution, there are eight 
ministries which are currently fully staffed.  The agreement 
provided for the creation of two additional ministries to be 
administered by the signing armed movements raising the total to 10 
ministries. 
 
Q:  How will positions within these two ministries be distributed 
especially with regard to non-SLM Abuja supporters? 
 
A:  I am not part of the distribution committee but these positions 
have been set aside for all movements. Distribution and labeling of 
these posts and positions will be left up to the signing movements. 
 
Q:  How do you perceive the relationship between the transitional 
and state governments? 
 
A:  According to the agreement, the nature of this relationship is 
one of coordination.  The agreement provides for full 
administrative, financial and executive autonomy to the states which 
implies transcendence of the state government. 
 
Q:  How are preparations proceeding for the Darfur-Darfur dialogue? 
 
 
A:  So far we have participation on the state federal level but we 
have not yet been assigned a definite role on the state level. 
 
Q:  Some observers cite that Darfur-Darfur dialogue needs a lot of 
work to achieve the desired results, what are your comments on that? 
 
 
A:  My personal opinion is that Darfur-Darfur dialogue as addressed 
by the agreement is of no particularly great significance.  Its 
primary function seems to be limited to making suggestions relating 
to the membership within the state council.  With regard to the 
issue of peaceful coexistence and patching up of the social fabric, 
several reconciliatory conferences have been held with excellent 
results.  In my view the entire Darfur-Darfur dialogue issue needs 
re-evaluation and preparation to define specific goals and mandates 
and the extent to which outcomes and recommendations are binding to 
all parties. 
 
Q:  Returning to the humanitarian and security issues how would you 
evaluate the current situation in North Darfur state? 
 
A:  This is an extremely important question because resolution 1706 
and the accompanying uproar are predicated upon the assumption that 
the security situation is in fact highly deteriorated.  I can assert 
unequivocally that the situation is far from that which has been 
depicted and I challenge anyone who would claim otherwise.  It is 
true that some problematic issues remain but in comparison to 
2003-2006 the situation has improved remarkably. 
 
We have detailed statistics of crimes including armed robbery, 
murder, rape and automobile theft which indicate a vast difference 
between 2004 and 2006.  If the international community is bent on 
intervening it should have done so in 2004 when total criminal 
incidents reached 3,500 as opposed to only 350 from January 1st - 
September 30th of this year.  There was a time when you could hear 
artillery on the top of every ten minutes in Al Fashir.  I defy 
anyone who would claim deterioration with respect to the 
humanitarian   situation.  There have been reports issued by seven 
UN organizations which placed the figure of deaths due to 
malnutrition at one for every ten thousand per day.  The UNICEF has 
officially stated that 88% of refugees in the camps of North Darfur 
receive full daily nutrition while 79% have access to clean drinking 
water and 80% receiving comprehensive medical care. 
 
No incident of epidemic outbreak has occurred within the heavily 
populated camps since 2004.  All camps offer free school 
instructions and the state bears the cost of education, nutrition 
and health care. 
 
 
KHARTOUM 00002626  003 OF 003 
 
 
Q:  In spite of this resettlement is proceeding rather slowly, how 
do you justify that? 
 
A:  Politically motivated migration is the reason behind this and 
the camps are sure to be full as long as this is in practice.  A 
considerable number of rebel elements have infiltrated the camps in 
order to sabotage any effort to develop positive dialogue.  Some 
villages are not adequately secured or ready to accommodate return. 
Some are awaiting restitution in the manner of Abdel Wahid Mohamed 
Nour while others are pinning hopes on resolution 1706 to topple the 
regime. 
 
Q:  What becomes of the positive reports presented by UN 
organizations seeing that the UN officially claims that 
circumstances are deteriorating? 
 
A:  I can state briefly that the UN and its organizations had become 
a tool used by some to achieve certain objectives.  There are what 
may be described as pre-packaged conceptions and decisions imposed 
upon and endorsed by the UN.  As Governor of North Darfur State, I 
have received approximately 440 delegations since 2004.  This 
included visits by five heads of State, over 20 foreign ministers, 2 
visits by the UN Secretary General and previous and current U.S. 
Secretaries of State.  Each has come for their separate agendas, 
 
SIPDIS 
initially proclaiming inculpability only to assume a position of 
condemnation upon leaving Khartoum airport. The whole issue amounts 
to escalation in order to achieve a certain agenda. 
 
Q:  Let us talk about the African Union and the role it is expected 
to play following extension of its mandate. 
 
A:  I am of the belief that at one point the AU has exacerbated the 
situation through its unclear position. Nevertheless our insistence 
is that its participation does not compromise national sovereignty 
or autonomy. The AU mission can yield positive results with proper 
logistic and financial support.  Secondly we as Africans are more 
comfortable with the AU assuming this mission. I am not particularly 
pleased with the foreign experts who will be coming from abroad as 
it seems only to be a prelude for further intervention. 
 
(End text) 
 
POWERS