VZCZCXRO7542
PP RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #2602/01 3061334
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 021334Z NOV 06
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5113
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHRN/USMISSION UN ROME

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KHARTOUM 002602 
 
SIPDIS 
 
AIDAC 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
STATE FOR AF/SPG, PRM, AND ALSO PASS USAID/W 
USAID FOR DCHA SUDAN TEAM, AFR/SP 
NAIROBI FOR USAID/DCHA/OFDA, USAID/REDSO, AND FAS 
GENEVA FOR NKYLOH 
NAIROBI FOR SFO 
NSC/AFRICA FOR TSHORTLEY 
USUN FOR TMALY 
BRUSSELS FOR PLERNER 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: EAID PREF PGOV PHUM SOCI SU AU
SUBJECT: DARFUR - PROTECTION RECOMMENDATIONS FOR AN ENHANCED AFRICAN 
UNION MISSION 
 
REF: A) KHARTOUM 2489, B) KHARTOUM 1912, C) KHARTOUM 2165, D) ADDIS 
 
ABABA 2775,  E) KHARTOUM 0539, F) KHARTOUM 2367 
 
KHARTOUM 00002602  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
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Summary 
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¶1. (SBU) In anticipation of the transition in peacekeeping forces in 
Darfur either from the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) to a 
United Nations (UN) force or to an AMIS mission augmented by a 
package of assistance from the UN, USAID assessed AMIS's performance 
last year in the protection of civilians.  Conclusions drawn from 
this review point to the need for technical assistance and the 
provision of personnel that have the capacity to assist AMIS with 
maximizing the use of its mandate and rules of engagement for 
protection of civilians; developing rapid-response capacity to 
address threats to civilian safety in a quick and efficient manner; 
providing Arabic language capacity to facilitate communication with 
Sudanese government police, internally displaced persons (IDPs), and 
other civilian populations; and assisting AMIS with delineating a 
more limited role in investigating and reporting allegations of 
violations of human rights and those of International Humanitarian 
Law, including cases of sexual and gender-based violence.  End 
Summary. 
 
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AMIS' Protection Mandate 
------------------------ 
 
¶2. (U) AMIS' mandate for the protection of civilians is to 
investigate and report allegations of violations of the April 2004 
Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement between the Sudanese government and 
opposition groups in Darfur.  In addition, AMIS's mandate is to 
"contribute to a secure environment" and "protect civilians whom it 
encounters under imminent threat and in the immediate vicinity, 
within resources and capability, it being understood that the 
protection of the civilian population is the responsibility of the 
Government of Sudan." 
 
¶3. (SBU) The determining factor in how flexibly AMIS carries out 
this mandate is leadership.  According to the UN Mission in Sudan 
Protection Unit (UNMIS-Protection), AMIS's mandate for protection of 
civilians has expanded or retracted according to the motivation of 
its commanders.  Such examples include that of recent attacks on IDP 
camps in Tawila, literally in the backyard of AMIS' group site, in 
which AMIS found itself unable to respond due to a "command problem" 
(Ref A).  Conversely, where AMIS leadership has been active and 
willing to engage communities and explore options to fulfill its 
mandate, it has been markedly more successful in protecting 
civilians than in instances where leaders have been less active. 
 
¶4. (SBU) AMIS' three main activities for protection of civilians are 
patrols, firewood escorts, and investigation of human rights 
violations.  In each of these three activities, AMIS has had a mixed 
record of success and failure, dependent on the willingness of its 
leadership to engage and the number of troops on the ground. 
 
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Patrols 
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¶5. (SBU) In the insecure environment of Darfur, AMIS patrols are a 
core function to provide protection for civilians.  Where present, 
AMIS patrols in and around IDP camps have contributed to the 
security of the civilian population in the camps.  In particular, 
strong AMIS linkages with the international humanitarian community 
and service providers, as well as with the civilian population in 
IDP camps and communities, have significantly increased protection 
of civilian populations in the camps. 
 
¶6. (SBU) A USAID-funded non-governmental organization (NGO) stated 
that women's meetings, such as those established in Al Salaam camp 
in North Darfur around safety and general issues of interest to 
women, were ways that AMIS established relationships with and gained 
the trust of individual women and the larger community.  These 
meetings were also an effective means by which AMIS could 
communicate key safety information to the women regarding firewood 
escorts and specific areas of insecurity surrounding the camp. 
 
¶7. (SBU) Regrettably, frequent and effective AMIS patrols, as well 
 
KHARTOUM 00002602  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
as good community relations, are the exception rather than the rule. 
 One NGO camp coordinator reported that a major constraint is AMIS' 
fundamental lack of knowledge and understanding of the conflict, the 
political and humanitarian context in Darfur, and the basic 
principles of standard humanitarian operating procedures.  Other 
significant constraints include insufficient numbers of protection 
forces available to escort Civilian Police (CIVPOL) deployments and 
limited Arabic language capacity (Ref B).  Also, due to its own 
security rules, as well as those imposed by the Sudanese government, 
AMIS personnel are confined to their camps during the night, which 
is arguably the most insecure time for civilians, and the time when 
patrols are most needed.  (Comment:  In the Darfur Peace Agreement 
(DPA), the Sudanese government agreed to AMIS 24/7 operations, but 
AMIS rarely conducts night operations.  End comment.)  AMIS is also 
limited by significant resource constraints, such as a lack of night 
vision equipment, which would reduce the effectiveness of night 
patrols, if AMIS were to choose to conduct them (Ref A). 
 
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Firewood Escorts 
---------------- 
 
¶8. (SBU) AMIS Protection Force and CIVPOL deployments as escorts for 
civilians gathering firewood was a significant breakthrough in 
providing tangible physical protection for civilians.  According to 
UN agencies and NGOs, when firewood escorts were regularly and 
reliably planned with the participation of camp coordinators and the 
IDPs, particularly women who are the primary collectors of firewood, 
they were extremely successful and well-received by the IDPs. 
 
¶9. (SBU) However, in recent months, and in particular since the 
signing of the DPA, firewood escorts that were previously somewhat 
regular, such as those in Kalma camp in South Darfur, have stopped 
altogether (Ref C).  According to U.S. Military Observers with AMIS, 
even when they did take place, there were instances where the 
protection force escort was itself attacked and disarmed by both 
IDPs and other armed groups.  In other cases, due to insufficient 
consultation with the local IDP community, IDP communities rejected 
firewood escorts. 
 
----------------------------------------- 
Investigations of Human Rights Violations 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶10. (SBU) AMIS's mandate includes the investigation of acts of 
violence or any other abuse on civilian populations committed by 
parties to the ceasefire agreement.  Despite its acknowledgement 
that heinous crimes have taken place in Darfur (Ref D) and some 
earnest attempts to address them, AMIS has experienced numerous 
challenges.  AMIS personnel are often confused by the lack of 
clarity between its role and that of the UNMIS Human Rights Unit 
(UNMIS-HR) in investigating abuses, in particular those focusing on 
acts of sexual and gender-based violence.  When AMIS does get 
involved in investigating human rights violations, it often responds 
inappropriately. 
 
¶11. (SBU) For instance, when conducting investigations, AMIS 
investigators have frequently breached rules of confidentiality 
during their investigations by interviewing victims at their homes 
or in health clinics openly and without the victim's consent. 
According to UNMIS-HR, AMIS has also published names of victims in 
their reports and taken photos of victims and then presented them to 
Sudanese government police, thus further jeopardizing the safety of 
the victims.  Similarly, a USAID NGO partner reported that AMIS has 
investigated cases of sexual and gender-based violence by pressing 
national staff, instead of international staff that are less 
vulnerable to harassment by government authorities, for information 
on specific cases.  Lack of discretion and sensitivity to the 
victim's need for confidentiality has often led NGO service 
providers to avoid sharing information with AMIS. 
 
¶12. (SBU) The UN Development Program (UNDP) has developed training 
programs to build the capacity of AMIS to conduct more effective 
investigations (Ref E and Ref F).  In theory, the training is an 
excellent idea; however, in practice, there have been significant 
challenges with its execution.  For example, one AMIS CIVPOL trainer 
in South Darfur noted that many CIVPOL personnel are not even 
familiar with international policing standards.  Another challenge 
with the training is AMIS's lack of language ability; the training 
is in English, and one trainer noted that five out of every 20 
 
KHARTOUM 00002602  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
trainees do not understand English well enough to comprehend any of 
the training content, and yet they receive the completion 
certificate anyway.  Ongoing training support is needed; trainers 
trained through the UNDP program will rotate out within the coming 
months, and currently there are no plans in place to prepare a new 
set of trainers. 
 
¶13. (SBU) These challenges, as well as significant resource and 
personnel constraints, point towards the need for AMIS to limit its 
role in investigating the details of human rights violations and to 
focus instead on employing a proactive approach to basic 
fact-finding and referrals.  It also indicates the need for 
international actors to assist AMIS with formalizing some of its 
current informal arrangements for referring cases to UNMIS-HR and 
other organizations conducting human rights investigations. 
 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
Recommendations for an Enhanced UN Peacekeeping Force 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
 
¶14. (SBU) In advocating for a package of assistance to AMIS, or an 
enhanced UN peacekeeping force, the U.S. Government (USG) should 
advocate certain practical measures to strengthen AMIS' performance 
in the protection of civilians.  In particular, an assistance 
package should: 
 
A) Assist AMIS with clarifying the mandate and rules of engagement 
to ensure it is capable of maximizing the protection of civilians, 
including regular patrols and firewood escorts and other means; 
 
B) Encourage stronger AMIS leadership and rapid-response capacity to 
address threats to civilian safety in a quick and efficient fashion, 
including a greater quantity of troops, night vision equipment, and 
protection forces; 
 
C) Provide basic training to AMIS troops in appropriate languages on 
the basics of the conflict, humanitarian operating procedures, 
protection, codes of conduct, and principles of neutrality and 
impartiality that guide humanitarian action; 
 
D) Develop effective civilian-military coordination between AMIS and 
humanitarian organizations and also IDP and non-IDP communities 
through Civil Military Coordination training (CMCoord) led by the UN 
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA); regular 
AMIS meetings with the community; and more prominent AMIS 
humanitarian liaison officers in each of the three Darfur states; 
 
E) Provide Arabic language capacity to facilitate communication with 
Sudanese government police, IDPs, and other civilian populations to 
reduce misunderstandings and suspicions and increase AMIS's ability 
to understand civilian protection needs; 
 
F) Assist AMIS with delineating a more defined role in investigating 
and reporting allegations of violations of human rights, including 
cases of sexual and gender-based violence, that constitute ceasefire 
violations, and with understanding if and when to refer cases to 
UNMIS-HR for additional follow up; and 
 
G) Standardize procedures for AMIS to augment its role in referring 
these allegations to specialized national and international 
organizations with the capacity and resources to protect the safety 
of the civilian population. 
 
WHITAKER