VZCZCXRO2321
RR RUEHDBU RUEHIK RUEHYG
DE RUEHBUL #5638/01 3340716
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 300716Z NOV 06
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4345
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RHMFIUU/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 3305
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KABUL 005638 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/FO DAS GASTRIGHT, SCA/A 
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG 
NSC FOR HARRIMAN 
OSD FOR KIMMITT 
CENTCOM FOR CG CFC-A, CG CJTF-76 POLAD 
 
SENSITIVE, SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958 N/A 
TAGS: MCAP MOPS PREL PGOV PTER PHUM AF
SUBJECT: PRT/LASHKAR GAH: MUSA QALA ? AN INSIDER VIEW 
 
REF: KABUL 5584 
 
¶1.  (SBU) SUMMARY:  On November 21 PRTOff met with an 
Afghan from Helmand Province?s Musa Qala district, someone 
with some influence in the district and access to 
information about the current situation on the ground.  The 
individual offered harsh criticism of the three factions 
vying for control of the district: the local shura 
nominally in charge (the Local Authority put in place 
following the Musa Qala Agreement); opponents of the local 
shura (individuals largely associated with former 
warlords); and the Taliban.  He described not only a quiet 
district in which two shuras exert some influence, but also 
an accommodation with Taliban elements in the district in 
order to keep the warlord faction out of power.  His 
suggestion on the way forward is to support the admittedly 
unattractive local administration with a nearby ISAF 
presence, trained local security and reconstruction and 
development.  Support to the local shura would eventually 
permit the community to dislodge and drive out the Taliban. 
END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2.  (SBU) On November 21 PRTOff met with an Afghan from 
Musa Qala district, located in the north of Helmand 
Province, a person with some influence in the district and 
access to information about the current situation there. 
The individual described the situation in Musa Qala 
following the controversial agreement between local leaders 
in the district and the Government of Afghanistan (GOA), 
wherein the local shura recognizes GOA authority and 
provides assurances regarding maintenance of security, and 
the GOA approves a slate of locally-chosen district 
officials (REFTEL).  Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) 
and ISAF have withdrawn from the district although they 
aver they will return. 
 
¶3.  (SBU) The individual?s motivation is not entirely 
clear, though he said that only when the true circumstances 
of what is happening in Musa Qala come out can any progress 
be made.  He believes the GOA is not receiving the truth 
about what is transpiring in the district, and cited 
communications between the head of neighboring Baghran 
district, Haji Abdel Wahid (a/k/a Rais Bagrani)   and 
ministers at the highest levels of the GOA.  Describing 
Wahid as a ?double dealer,? the individual says Wahid has 
two satellite phones, one to call GOA ministers and assure 
them there are no Taliban in Musa Qala, and the other to 
call the Taliban to say the GOA is not in control. 
 
Villagers Trapped Between Corrupt, Warring Elites 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
¶4.  (SBU) The person painted a picture of elites warring 
with each other and standing between the ?international 
donors? and ?the people.?  According to this individual, 
those elites are corrupt people, only interested in 
personal enrichment, not in permitting the donors and the 
people to make a connection that would lead to development. 
 
¶5.  (SBU) The individual focused most of his attention on 
two of the three groups seeking to control the district. 
The first is essentially the warlord class, identified with 
the Akhunzadha clan of the former Governor and the current 
Deputy Governor.  The person vehemently denounced this 
group, and said the Akhunzadhas? interests would be 
threatened if Musa Qala became safe and secure.  The other 
group is comprised of the local shura and administration 
that now claims to control the district, pursuant to the 
agreement with the GOA.  Those elders, he said, were 
compelled to seek that agreement (and the resulting calm) 
not only by the fierce fighting in the north of Helmand 
this past summer, but also to keep the warlords at bay. 
Taliban comprise the third group. 
 
All is Quiet in Musa Qala ... Thanks to Two Shuras 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
¶6.  (SBU) The person said that the Musa Qala district 
 
KABUL 00005638  002 OF 003 
 
 
center is quiet, for the time being.  He said it is not 
that difficult to maintain quiet, as the district is made 
up of a single tribe, the Alizai, and everyone knows each 
other.  There are two shuras that decide disputes or 
otherwise address problems that arise in the district.  The 
first is the ?official? shura, the one that reached the 
agreement with the GOA.  Apparently, this one lacks 
credibility with the local population, and if this shura is 
unable to resolve an issue, there is a second shura, 50 
strong, to which the locals can turn.  He said that the 
?official? shura will accept the decisions of this larger 
shura. 
 
Corrupt, Incompetent Shura Maintaining Uneasy Balance 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
¶7.  (SBU) While he acknowledged that the ?official? shura 
exerted some influence in the daily life of the district, 
the individual had no praise for it.  He counts among its 
ranks Taliban and ?murderers? (alternatively, people with 
?blood on their hands?).  He also described the individuals 
nominated by the shura for district positions (and approved 
by the GOA) as ?murderers? that the people do not trust. 
The shura is mostly illiterate, without any unifying idea 
on how to govern.  This makes shura members vulnerable to 
influence from the outside, even by the Akhunzadha clan. 
 
¶8.  (SBU) While he made clear his own hatred of the Taliban 
(specifically, foreign Taliban from Pakistan), he was not 
clear about the level of support enjoyed by the Taliban 
amongst the shura or the local community.  Certainly, from 
his description, there are many who wish the Taliban out of 
the district.  However, according to the individual, the 
local shura cannot push the Taliban out, or rather, have a 
compelling reason not to do so: the local elders have 
reached a balance of sorts with the local Taliban, for by 
accepting a Taliban presence in the district they are able 
to keep the warlords out (something they cannot do alone). 
 
Way forward: Support the Shuras with ISAF and Development 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
¶9.  (SBU) The individual asserted that if the two shuras 
are supported by ISAF and ?international donors? the 
Taliban could eventually be forced out.  (NOTE: He devoted 
little attention to the GOA, describing it as weak and 
unable to support the shura. END NOTE.)  If no action is 
taken, the Taliban eventually will decide to dissolve the 
shura; they are reluctant to take such action now because 
the people are happy with the relative calm and the return 
of commerce, and disrupting that might provoke an unwanted 
reaction.  The individual thought ISAF should remain close 
to the district, for with ISAF in the area the Taliban 
would be reluctant to take action.  If ISAF departs, then 
?the next day the Taliban will take over the district.?  He 
also thought that the introduction of reconstruction and 
development to the district would also support the shura. 
 
¶10.  (SBU) Asked whether the local community would accept 
ANSF in the district, i.e., ANSF from outside the district, 
the person said the people would accept those forces. 
(COMMENT: This was a slightly unexpected comment, given the 
common impression in Helmand that ANSF are corrupt, 
especially the police.  In a November 10 meeting at the 
Embassy, the head of the Musa Qala shura hedged on the 
question of ANSF being deployed in Musa Qala, saying they 
could be accepted, possibly, in the ?long term? (REFTEL). 
END COMMENT)  The individual added that ANSF would 
immediately be targeted by the Taliban if there was no ISAF 
presence nearby.  He thought that more immediate support 
could be offered in the form of training for local security 
forces.  Trained local security would support the 
government, and would eventually assist in turning the 
Taliban out of the district.  (NOTE: It has been proposed 
that forty members of the woefully under-equipped Musa Qala 
local security force be sent to Lashkar Gah for training 
using the Afghan National Auxiliary Police (ANAP) 
curriculum; however, details have not yet been worked out. 
 
KABUL 00005638  003 OF 003 
 
 
END NOTE.) 
 
¶11.  (SBU) COMMENT: PRTOff cannot verify the information 
provided by this single source.  However, the individual 
has influence in and access to the district, seemed 
thoughtful and credible, and certainly was willing to 
criticize all parties involved.  He was dismissive of the 
warring elites, and expressed interest in seeing a measure 
of security and assistance for the local community.  He 
expressed a willingness to continue the discussion, saying 
that he would report both ?positive and negative? things 
about what was transpiring in that troubled district.  His 
version of the state of play tends to reinforce our 
perception that the jury is still out on the MQ Agreement 
but that the GOA and ISAF elements need to test access to 
Musa Qala soon. 
 
NEUMANN