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Viewing cable 06KABUL5632, POLICY ACTION GROUP NOVEMBER 22: ADZ'S AND

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06KABUL5632 2006-11-30 03:07 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Kabul
VZCZCXRO2081
OO RUEHDBU RUEHIK RUEHYG
DE RUEHBUL #5632/01 3340307
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 300307Z NOV 06
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4325
INFO RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RHMFIUU/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUMICEA/JICCENT MACDILL AFB FL
RHMFIUU/COMSOCCENT MACDILL AFB FL
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 3302
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 3365
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KABUL 005632 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/FO DAS GASTRIGHT, SCA/A, S/CRS, S/CT, EUR/RPM 
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG 
NSC FOR AHARRIMAN 
OSD FOR KIMMITT 
CENTCOM FOR CFC-A, CG CJTF-76, POLAD 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR SNAR PTER AF
SUBJECT: POLICY ACTION GROUP NOVEMBER 22: ADZ'S AND 
AUXILIARY POLICE 
 
1. (SBU)  Summary:  The November 22 Policy Action 
Group decided to: 
 
- Consider expanding the Afghan Development Zone 
(ADZ) concept to Regional  Command - East (RC-East) 
while maintaining the focus on RC South; 
 
- Limit, for now, the Afghan National Auxiliary 
Police (ANAP) recruitment, training, and fielding 
program to Farah, Ghazni, Helmand, Kandahar, Zabul, 
and Uruzgan provinces. 
 
- Continue discussion of the Strategic 
Communications way ahead, and; 
 
- Meet in Kandahar during December. 
 
2. (SBU)  The group assessed that the October 
agreement between Helmand Governor Daoud and Musa 
Qala district elders, which has led to the 
disengagement of ISAF maneuver units from the area, 
while "still viable," has left space for Taliban 
influence and intimidation of the populace.  During 
a discussion of ANAP program progress, several 
international community PAG members registered 
concern that the Ministry of Internior is failing to 
recruit police who are representative of the tribal 
Pashtun districts to which they will be assigned. 
End summary. 
 
Musa Qala 
--------- 
 
3. (SBU) National Director of Security Amarullah 
Saleh briefed on Musa Qala.  He said that the past 
month has proven that militarily Musa Qala may be 
viable, but the Tailban still psychologically 
dominate the area.  He cited instances in which the 
Taliban have violated the Musa Qala agreement:  a 
family was expelled from Musa Qala for watching 
television; two visiting ANP were killed; visiting 
Taliban groups displayed Taliban flags (though no 
weapons); and schools are only half full with many 
staying home for fear of the Taliban.  The GOA has 
not yet tested the agreement by pushing official 
reconstruction assistance or summoning elders to 
explain and condemn Taliban violations.  In Panjwayi 
and Zharey there have been some Taliban 
infiltrations and incidents, but the majority of the 
people still openly support the GOA.  It was agreed 
that the GOA should test the Musa Qala agreement by 
pushing for safe access for officials and 
implementation of development projects.   ISAF CG 
Gen. Richards said that ISAF would go back into Musa 
Qalah, possibly within a month.  Saleh invited MOI 
to send groups to Musa Qala to monitor the real 
situation.  It was also agreed that Governor Daoud 
should summon Musa Qala elders to explain Taliban 
violations and prevent their reoccurrence. 
 
ADZs in the East, but the South Remains the Focus 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
4. (SBU)  ISAF Commanding General Richards opened 
this discussion topic by urging expansion of the ADZ 
concept to RC-East, as well as to RC-North and RC- 
West, "to counter incipient problems" in those 
regions.  United Nations Assistance Mission in 
Afghanistan (UNAMA) Deputy SRSG Alexander cautioned 
against a loss of focus on the south and feeding a 
popular perception that "the military and not the 
government is the lead on development."  Economic 
 
KABUL 00005632  002 OF 003 
 
 
Adviser to the President Naderi warned against 
diverting scarce resources from "an Afghan National 
Development Plan that is barely working in 10 
provinces."  Representatives accepted National 
Security Advisor Rassoul,s recommendation that the 
PAG consider ADZ expansion to the East while 
maintaining focus on the South. 
 
ANAP: Internationals Worry about Quality 
---------------------------------------- 
 
5. (SBU)  The PAG endorsed the recommendations of a 
November 11 special meeting of international 
community representatives co-chaired by Deputy 
Minister of Interior Khalid and Combined Security 
Transition Command - Afghanistan (CSTC-A) Deputy 
Commander Brigadier General O,Brien.  The most 
important decision resulting from the November 11 
meeting was that the Ministry of Interior would 
immediately cease recruitment, training, and 
deployment of auxiliary police outside of Farah, 
Ghazni, Helmand, Kandahar, Zabul, and Uruzgan 
provinces.  The recommendation arose out of 
gathering international community concern that the 
expedited development of the ANAP lacked sufficient 
coalition oversight and quality control.  The ANAP 
effort will be expanded only after the PAG receives 
a capabilities study which clearly depicts that the 
assets are in place to properly recruit, train, 
equip, and pay the recruits in the expanded areas 
without impacting the effort in the six previously- 
mentioned provinces. 
 
6. (SBU) Another critical recommendation from the 
Nov. 11 meeting was that UNAMA would form a team to 
conduct spot checks on the vetting process used to 
certify recruits for the ANAP.  This arrangement is 
now in effect and spot checks will commence in 
Kandahar this week.  These should help to assuage 
the apprehensions of the international community, as 
well as leading to program adjustments where needed. 
GEN Richards counseled against unnecessarily 
hobbling a promising indigenous force-generation 
program.  Citing a deteriorating security situation 
in Paktia province, Khalid and O,Brien urged 
consideration of early deployment of auxiliary 
police in RC-East.  (Comment:  Embassy will work 
with MOI and CSTC-A to evaluate the feasibility of 
expanding the program to another few provinces. 
Paktia and Paktika are likely candidates should this 
occur.  End comment.)  UNAMA D/SRSG Alexander 
recommended MOI and CSTC-A shift the focus "from 
quantity to quality";  Elaborating, he said many 
alien ANAP "who don,t even speak Pashtu" are being 
introduced into tribal districts where they will 
arouse hostility.  He also noted that the PAG must 
be convinced that a process exists that will ensure 
that the ANAP in remote provinces will be paid in a 
reliable, timely manner.  A failure to pay the ANAP 
will undermine the effectiveness of the entire 
program and will discredit the GOA.  Canadian Charge 
Colvin requested that MOI,s ANAP enlistment records 
capture recruits, tribal origins.  DCM recalled the 
Ambassador,s request to Minister of Interior Zarar 
Moqbil that ANAP force composition strive to reflect 
the tribal and clan balances of the districts to 
which auxiliary police will be assigned. 
 
Strategic Communications:  You,re Not Listening 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
7. (SBU) In the meeting,s closing minutes, 
 
KABUL 00005632  003 OF 003 
 
 
Information and Culture Minister Khoram strongly 
criticized the international community for its 
perceived lack of support for the Strategic 
Communications (Stratcom) effort.  DCM reminded the 
group that its decision to lodge Stratcom in the 
Ministry of Information and Culture deprived the 
effort of the resources and authority of the 
Presidential communications apparatus.  NSA Rassoul 
promised to continue the discussion at the next PAG 
meeting.  (Note:  Embassy  and CFC-A are working 
with the Afghan NSC and the Minister of Information 
on a proposal to reinvigorate the Strategic 
Communications pillar of the PAG, given shortcomings 
in the current structure.  End note.) 
 
8. (SBU) To enhance PAG members, familiarity with 
RC-South issues and convey to that region,s 
provincial leaders the group,s commitment to 
establishing stability and the foundations of a 
prosperous future there, the PAG plans to meet in 
Kandahar sometime during the first half of December. 
NEUMANN