VZCZCXRO9734
PP RUEHAG RUEHDBU RUEHDF RUEHIK RUEHLZ RUEHROV RUEHYG
DE RUEHBUL #5610/01 3320200
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 280200Z NOV 06
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4280
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE
RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RHMFIUU/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUMICEA/JICCENT MACDILL AFB FL
RHMFIUU/COMSOCCENT MACDILL AFB FL
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 3361
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 6649
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA 1989

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 005610 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS, SENSITIVE 
 
STATE FOR SCA/FO (DAS GASTRIGHT), SCA/A, S/CRS, 
SCA/PB, S/CT, EUR/RPM 
NSC FOR AHARRIMAN 
OSD FOR MKIMMITT 
CENTCOM FOR CG CFC-A, CG CJTF-76, POLAD 
 
E.O. 12958 N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER AF
SUBJECT: POST VIEWS ON PRESSURING EU EXTRADITIONS 
 
Ref:  A) Emails between Temin Nusraty (SCA/A) and Gary 
Peters (ROL Coordinator) Notal 
 
¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: In response to ref requests from 
SCA/A, Post has reviewed the issue of encouraging EU 
members to increase the number of extradition requests 
made to the GoA. While post recognizes the importance 
of bringing criminals to justice, we do not believe 
that substantially increasing the number of 
extraditions will help the situation on the ground, 
and in contrast, could potentially undermine the 
Karzai government. END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2. (SBU) Refs requested Embassy views on the issue of 
encouraging the USG and EU members to substantially 
increase the number of extradition requests to the GoA 
for crimes that could be prosecuted elsewhere. 
 
¶3. (SBU) Embassy Kabul does not agree with the 
proposal to use extraditions to relieve the strains on 
an overburdened or inadequate judicial system.  In our 
view, extraditions should be the rare exception and 
not the rule. Extradition is certainly a tool that may 
be helpful in exceptional cases. However, Post 
believes that the primary focus should be on building 
Afghan capacity in counter-narcotics and, more 
fundamentally, in justice and governance as a whole. 
Frequent extraditions would undermine faith of Afghans 
in the effectiveness of their own justice system and 
reinforce existing perceptions that their real 
governance is coming from the West. 
 
¶4. (SBU) Frequent extraditions could also erode 
popular support for Karzai. Supporters of those 
extradited will be inclined to believe their offenses 
were political and not criminal -- possibly offenses 
against the international community but not against 
Afghanistan. The Afghans would miss the learning and 
confidence building experience of seeing evidence 
presented in open court and would fall back, as they 
do now in virtually all terrorist detention cases, on 
the allegation that the arrest is mistaken, 
politically inspired or results from tribal (or 
international) enemies concocting a case. 
 
¶5. (SBU) The Afghan heroin problem affects Europe more 
than the US. Thus, there will be relatively few cases 
that would lead to extradition to the U.S. EU members 
will act in their own interest without US direction 
and any pressure from us could be ill-received and 
counter-productive. We note that many EU countries 
lack effective extradition procedures. 
 
¶6. (SBU) There are also pending extradition 
regulations that are now under consideration by the 
Taqnin. While there has been some support in 
Washington for proceeding on this issue by way of 
regulation instead of law in the interests of time and 
efficiency, Post believes that proceeding by way of a 
law is essential, at least as to the fundamental 
principles and policy questions involved. To do 
otherwise is likely to insult and anger the Parliament 
and to set back Afghan political support for Karzai, 
Sabit and the issue of extradition itself. However, we 
do agree that a law should focus on the essential 
principles and that there is certainly a role for 
using regulations as an implementing mechanism once 
the law is passed.  Historically, Afghans have been 
inclined to use law exclusively. This has produced 
some very inflexible mechanisms. 
 
¶7. (SBU) COMMENT: The reality here is that there will 
 
KABUL 00005610  002 OF 002 
 
 
be relatively few high-level cases for trial in the 
near future. The Afghans have to learn by doing, 
including taking on difficult cases. We can help them 
in that learning process, but not by taking it over 
from them or recommending procedures that would 
circumvent their legislative processes. END COMMENT. 
 
NEUMANN