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Viewing cable 06KABUL5593, Getting the Interior Ministry to Pay Its Police: Case Study

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06KABUL5593 2006-11-27 07:45 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Kabul
VZCZCXRO8792
PP RUEHDBU RUEHIK RUEHYG
DE RUEHBUL #5593 3310745
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 270745Z NOV 06
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4262
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RHMFIUU/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 3299
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
UNCLAS KABUL 005593 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/FO DAS GASTRIGHT, SCA/A 
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG 
NSC FOR HARRIMAN 
OSD FOR KIMMITT 
CENTCOM FOR CG CFC-A, CG CJTF-76 POLAD 
 
SENSITIVE, SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958 N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR AF
SUBJECT: Getting the Interior Ministry to Pay Its Police: Case Study 
in Zabol 
 
Ref:  Kabul 5284 
 
1. (SBU) Summary:  Fixing the profoundly dysfunctional Ministry of 
Interior (MoI) is a long-term project.  We want to encourage Afghans 
to look to their own ministries, and not to us, to resolve problems; 
however, we find ourselves forced to intervene even in basic 
administrative functions to prevent MoI incompetence from eroding 
police morale and effectiveness.  Paying ANAP recruits in Zabol is a 
case in point.  End Summary. 
 
2. (U) During the Ambassador's visit to the Zabol provincial 
capital, Qalat, to observe the November 6 graduation of the second 
Afghan National Auxiliary Police class, several graduates, who had 
been members of the now disbanded Afghan National Highway Police, 
complained they had not been paid in several months, though they had 
been patrolling the "Ring Road" continuously on the orders of the 
Zabol chief of police (REFTEL).  One patrolman loudly announced he 
cared nothing for President Karzai nor for Afghanistan; he just 
wanted the money owed him.  If he didn't get it, he said, he would 
quit the auxiliary police.  His colleagues quickly registered their 
intent to do the same. 
 
3. (U) The Ambassador relayed this complaint to Karzai, who ordered 
Minister of Interior Zarar Moqbil to make good on the arrearages. 
Zarar dispatched a senior ministry general to Qalat with two-month's 
back pay in cash for each of the former highway police. 
Regrettably, the patrolmen now credit the settlement of their salary 
complaint not to their own president, but to the intervention of the 
Ambassador. 
 
4. (SBU) This small incident demonstrates the MoI's inability to 
execute even the most fundamental of administrative 
responsibilities:  paying its employees.  This is not the first time 
the Embassy, CSTC-A or Combined Forces Command - Afghanistan has had 
to intervene to fix a problem that appears inexplicably beyond the 
capacity of this ministry.  Since spring of this year, Combined 
Security Transition Command - Afghanistan (CSTC-A) has led a 
top-to-bottom overhaul of the MoI's police function.  The overhaul 
extends to a competency review of all Afghan National Police (ANP) 
officers, including, when necessary, replacing them, as well as the 
installation and development of entirely new command and control, 
management, personnel, training, logistics and pay systems.  Current 
systems are so dysfunctional and the managerial culture so negligent 
that we expect the overhaul to take at least two years to produce 
even a minimally competent ministry that kindles loyalty among its 
junior personnel rather than anger at their seniors' habitual lack 
of concern for their welfare. 
 
5. (SBU) Although we seek to encourage the loyalty of the ANP rank 
and file for their uniformed commanders and senior civil servants, 
we will occasionally find ourselves intervening overtly - as in this 
case in Zabol - to alleviate egregious personnel grievances for the 
sake of maintaining the ANP's minimal security effectiveness. 
Indeed, since policemen across the country are complaining about 
chronic salary arrearages, we may find ourselves soon intervening 
again.  We will remain reluctant to do so as we seek to inculcate 
among Afghan government employees and the country's citizenry the 
habit of resorting first to their own ministries when seeking 
redress for their grievances. 
 
NEUMANN